

By C. R. Pennell

The Rif War, which took place in Northern Morocco between 1921 and 1926 and which almost shattered Spain's protectorate there, as well as threatening France's hold over the rest of Morocco, is, perhaps the most important anti-colonial struggle of the pre-World War II era. Not only did it lead to the deaths of tens of thousands of Spanish soldiers - 10,000 of them in one battle alone in 1921 - but it also led indirectly to the Spanish Civil War and spurred on the nascent nationalist cause in Morocco itself. Yet the events of the war and the personalities of its leading protagonists, at least on the Moroccan side, are curiously little known, nor is the innovative nature of their convictions fully understood.

Dr. Pennell, who has spent many years studying the Rif war, has attempted, in this book, to analyse the motivations of the Rifi tribes and their leaders. Using hitherto untapped archival material, he shows that the war, far from being merely an expression of tribal irridentism in the face of European occupation, as fundamentally an attempt to mobilise and reform Islamic values to confront the colonial experience. The attempt failed, but it left behind a legacy of memory and inspiration that still finds its echo today.

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*A Country with a
Government and a Flag
The Rif War in Morocco
1921-1926*

by
C. R. PENNELL



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DEDICATION

To Mike, Rita and Trisha, who helped.

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TRANSLITERATION

Transliteration follows the system used in Hans Wehr's A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, edited Milton Cowan, Weisbaden 1971, except that diacritical marks are omitted. For place names, where common European versions exist (e.g. Tangier, Tetuan) they have been used. In quotations the name as written in the original document has been preserved. Arabic tribal names have been preferred to Berber ones for the sake of consistency.

ABBREVIATIONS

(1) Sources

FO - Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office London
MAEE - Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid
MAEF - Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris
SHAT - Service Historique de l'Armée de la Terre, Vincennes, France
SHM - Servicio Historico Militar, Madrid
TAHP - the Times Archive, Harris Papers

(2) Other abbreviations

B des R - (Fr), Bulletin des Renseignements
Capt - Captain, capitaine (Fr), capitan (Sp)
C.M.T. - Confirmation de Message Telephonique (Fr)
Cmte. - Comandante (Sp = Major)
Cmte. Gral - Comandante General (Sp Commanding General
- of the three regions of Larache, Ceuta and Melilla)
Cmte. Mar. - Comandante Militar (Sp - literally Military
Commander)
Cor. - Coronel (Sp = colonel)
Gral - General (Sp)
Interv. (Mil) - Intervention (Militar)
OAI - Oficina de Asuntos Indigenas (Sp Native Affairs Office)
OCTAI - Oficina Central de Tropas y Asuntos Indigenas (Sp -
see text)
Pt(s). - Pesetas
Res de Conf - Resumen de Confidencias (Sp - precis of agents'
reports)
SMI - Servicio Militar de Intervencion

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GLOSSARY

^Calim : scholar

^Camil : representative, agent

^Car : shame

^Casabiya : agnatic solidarity

^Cayan : notable

^Cazib : farm, estate

agraw : tribal or clan council, place where meeting is held

amin : guardian, superintendent

amir : prince

amir al-mu^Cminin : Commander of the Faithful

awqaf : see waqf

baraka : blessing, ability to work miracles, innate property of a
sharif

bay^Ca : pact, covenant

bilad al-makhzan : land of government

bilad al-siba : land of dissidence (beyond government control)

caid : local administrative official, (in Rif also a military rank)

dar al-harb : House of War - the region beyond the Muslim
world

dar al-Islam : House of Islam - the Muslim world

dharfiqth : agnates, relations

dshar : village, (in Rif, local community)

duro : Spanish coin - value 5 pesetas

faqih : Quranic schoolmaster

fatwa : legal opinion

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fissina : 'office'

habus : religious mortmain land

hadith : traditions of the Prophet

haqq : fine paid by murderer

haraka/harka : war party, expeditionary force

jama^Ca : clan or tribal meeting

al-jam^Cia al-watania : "National Assembly"

jiḥad : holy war

jilalatikum : "Your Majesty"

jumhur : the people

jumhuriya : republic

al-Jumhuriya al-Riffiya : The Rifian republic

khalifa : caliph, deputy

khurafat : fairy tale superstition

liff : alliance between social or political units

madrāsa : school

madshar : villager

mahdi : religious revolutionary leader whose actions will revive
Islam

mahakma/mahkama : tribunal, government

majlis al-umma : Assembly of the People / National Assembly

makhzan : government

maks : tax, market or customs dues

masjid : mosque

mia : hundred, used for a military unit of one hundred men

mudd : unit of measure for cereals

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muhtasib/mohtasseb : market official

mujahid (pl. mujahidin) : fighter in holy war

malik : king

murabit : marabout, religious leader

mutasarraf : governor

nadir : supervisor of habus or waqf

nazir : administrator

nizam : organisation

oficina : office - Spanish administrative centre

pasha : governor

presidio : Spanish sovereign enclave on Moroccan coast

protégé : Moroccan granted diplomatic protection by foreign power

qabila : tribe

qadi : religious judge

qadi qudat : supreme judge

qaid : see caid

qasba : fort

ruba'a : 'quarter', sub clan

sahih : true

salaf : ancestor

salafi : supporter of Islamic Reform movement founded by Muhammad Abduh

salafiya : Islamic reform movement founded by Muhammad Abduh in Egypt in the nineteenth century

siba : rebellion

shar^C/shari^Ca : Islamic law

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sharif : descendant of Prophet Mohammed

shaykh : 'elder', minor administrative official

sultan : temporal ruler

sunna : Muslim orthodox tradition

suq : market

sura : verse of Quran

tabur : Spanish military unit

tafsir : explanation, exegesis (of Quran)

taqbilt : tribe

tariqa : Islamic religious brotherhood

umma : Muslim community in the widest sense

^Culama/^Culema (plu), see ^Calim

^Curf : custom, customary law

waqf : religious mortmain land

watan : country, homeland

wazir : minister

zahir/dahir : sultanic decree

zakat : Quranic tax

zawiya : religious centre for tariqa

I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1921, the world had a great many problems to worry about. In mid-July the columns of the Times of London were taken up with attempts to find a solution to the Irish question and by the resignation of a relatively unimportant minister from the government. There was fascist violence to report from Italy. Preparations were being made for the Washington Conference on Pacific security. The war between Greece and the Turkish army led by Mustapha Kemal had seen a series of Greek victories. The drought which afflicted most of western Europe was causing famine in Russia and had disrupted the Henley Regatta. With regard to the question of Upper Silesia, the Times declared on 22 July that "History is being made in Eastern Europe"¹.

The British press was not alone in seeing these as the issues of the day. Far away in Bangkok, the English-language Bangkok Times, probably the most influential newspaper in what was still called Siam, amidst articles on the anniversary of Siamese entry into the First World War and the arrival of French aviators in Siam, had as its main stories famine in Russia, and the Washington Conference².

In the Middle East, the famous Egyptian newspaper, al-Ahram, concerned itself with local nationalist politics, and in particular the activities of Sa'ad Zaghlul, with the course of the war in Anatolia between the Turks and the Greeks, with communal disturbance in Lebanon, and with events in Palestine, with the Washington Conference very much pushed to the sidelines³. In other words, various manifestations of Middle Eastern nationalism and other Arab affairs dominated attention.

The minor skirmishing which accompanied the Spanish attempt to impose a protectorate on Northern Morocco was, by comparison, very insignificant. The area was not economically important, mainly made up of the Rif mountains which were almost unknown in Europe, and Spain was very much a minor European power. Then, in the third week of July, a new story came into the headlines, one which would excite the attention of the international press for the next five years. On 25 July,

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the Times headlined a long report, "Costly Spanish Reverse - Sudden Moorish Rising"⁴. The Bangkok Times took a day longer to tell Siam of the news. Under the heading "Trouble in Spanish Morocco", it declared that Spain was "now faced with a real rebel army"⁵. Astonishingly al-Ahram took even longer to report the Moroccan events: the first reports did not appear until 26 July. Could this have been censorship? Possibly, but al-Ahram reported the Anatolian war in very considerable detail and once the Moroccan news had broken, it quickly faded in importance. The following day it was relegated to page 3, and by 30 July it was not being reported at all⁶. It is hard to imagine that events in Morocco were more dangerous and subversive than the Turkish-Greek conflict. Quite simply al-Ahram was uninterested.

That was not the opinion of the rest of the Islamic world. The Rif War had begun, with the loss of more than 10,000 Spanish troops. In the five years which followed, Spain would lose another entire army and the French would be badly mauled. The Rifis, with their victories over two European countries caught the imagination of the Islamic world. Money was collected for them in India. Their success was used by Tunisian nationalists to rally support and a whole mythology grew up amongst the masses in the cities centred around the Rifi leader, Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi⁷. In Europe the defeat of 1921 helped to destroy the liberal democratic system in Spain and to usher in a period of dictatorial rule by Miguel Primo de Rivera. In France the Left agitated for the Rifi cause. In Britain a committee of support for the Rifis was set up, which repeatedly lobbied the government to recognise the Rifi "state".

When the war was over, many books were written about these events, and the subject has not ceased to fascinate both historians and propagandists since. There is thus an extensive literature on the Rif War. Or rather, there is an extensive literature about aspects of it. In particular what has exercised most writers has been either the military campaigns, or the effects of the war in Europe, or the personality of the Rifi leader throughout the five years of the war, Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi.

The military history of the war has been elucidated clearly enough. Several books were written by Spanish army officers who fought in the war, and these can only be described as Spanish, rather than Moroccan history. That does not mean that some of them are not very useful. Particularly good are the books, by General Goded,⁸ and Andres Sanchez-Perez,⁹ both of which only cover the final stages of the War. The account by Francisco Gomez-Jordana y Souza,¹⁰ another participant in the events, gives excellent insights into Spanish military thinking. On the other hand, the book by General Damaso Berenguer¹¹, the Spanish Commander-in-Chief in Morocco at the time of the defeats in 1921 can only be described as special pleading. Finally, there are two modern historians who deal with the

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Spanish military action, the military historian Carlos Martinez de Campos,¹² (another General) who provides a detailed chronological account of the campaigns, and the American Shannon Fleming,¹³ who deals with the military policy of the Spanish army and government in great detail most clearly. The best French account of the time, was also written by a soldier, Leon Gabrielli, who was the officer in charge at Tawrirt, to the south of the Rif. Gabrielli kept fairly closely in touch with events in the Rif, and with bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and played a part in the peace negotiations. His book has some political information of interest¹⁴.

There are writers who have dealt with the Rifi side. Ahmad al-bu ^CAyyashi,¹⁵ the son of one of the Rifi military leaders has written a pioneering two volume history of the war in Arabic, which is drawn from European published sources and the personally collected reminiscences of some of the participants. Germain Ayache, a very prominent Moroccan historian has written a long and very detailed book¹⁶ on the years leading up to the start of the war in 1921. Amin Sa'id, in his long book on the Arab struggles of the twentieth century gives an account, sympathetic to the Rif which is based mainly on secondary sources¹⁷. Apart from these, however, there is little on the Rifi side. The American sociologist David Hart's admirable book on the largest tribe in the Rif¹⁸ is invaluable, but it concentrates on only one tribe and has wider terms of reference than the war, which takes up one chapter. Another American, David Woolman has also written on the Rif War,¹⁹ a workmanlike study which does attempt to discuss both sides of the conflict, but he is limited in his attempt by his reliance on European printed sources.

Most disappointing of all, in many ways, is the collected volume of papers given at a conference held in Paris in 1973 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of the "Republic of the Rif"²⁰. Except for a few papers,²¹ most of the proceedings were taken up with discussions of the war's effects in Europe, or of similar movements elsewhere.

Apart from these writings there are a number of journalistic accounts of the war. The best of these are those by Vincent Sheean, an American who visited the Rif twice during the war²² and Walter Harris,²³ the long-serving correspondent in Tangier of the *Times* of London, which is particularly helpful for the peace negotiations towards the end of the war.

All these books have a tendency in common: they concentrate to an enormous extent on the personality of a single Rifi, the leader Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim. The most blatant example of this is the book by Rupert Furneaux,²⁴ which in addition is both highly romanticised and frequently inaccurate. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim is undoubtedly important, but accounts which concentrate on him tend to become biography (or hagiography), not history. No thorough picture of the political social and economic history of the Rif at war has yet been given.

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This book intends to present such a picture. It deals not with the political events which the war provoked in Europe, nor does it describe the day-by-day progress of the military campaigns. Both those things have already been done elsewhere. Its subject is the Rif at war, and how new political and social structures were established, how bin ^CAbd al-Karim was able to seize the leadership of the resistance, and having seized it to retain it and lead his followers to a series of victories and then finally to defeat.

The study relies, therefore, not on secondary European sources but on archival and unpublished material which has never before been used. In the French Foreign Ministry in Paris are preserved a large number of captured Rifi documents. In Rabat the Archives Generales hold the memoirs of one of the principle Rifi participants - Muhammad Azarqan, the "Minister" for Foreign Affairs in bin ^CAbd al-Karim's government - which were taken down by Ahmad Skiraj; like most memoirs these perhaps overplay the role of their subject, although I do not agree with David Hart that they are necessarily invalidated by that, nor that they are as inaccurate as he implies - certainly they cross-check on most important details. However, Hart is quite correct in finding suspect the supposed "memoirs" of bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself, collected by a French journalist, J. Roger-Mathieu, in the immediate aftermath of the war²⁵. They are impressionistic and on occasion inaccurate. One of the richest archival source is in Spain: the archives of the Spanish Army in the Servicio Historico Militar are extremely valuable. These consist of daily intelligence reports received from Rifis in Spanish pay throughout the war, and a considerable quantity of letters from Rifis in Arabic. Again, they cross-check in most details.

There are several other archival sources of lesser importance. The Public Records Office in London contain the regular reports of British Consuls in Tangier and Vice-Consuls in Tetuan, many of them characterised by a patrician disgust with Spanish colonial practice. The French Army Archives at the Service Historique de l'Armée de la Terre at Vincennes near Paris, contain military intelligence material which is most useful for the period after France entered the war in 1925. The archives of the Spanish Ministry of State, later the Foreign Ministry, provided only a very little useful information, as did the archives of the Times newspaper in London, which contains the papers of Walter Harris, the paper's correspondent in Tangier for many years.

What is probably the most useful archive of all is that of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. Today it is housed with the papers of the Spanish Prime Minister's Office the Presidencia del Gobierno, in Alcala de Henares outside Madrid. Unfortunately, it has still not been opened for research, although that has been long promised. It almost certainly contains many captured Rifi documents and when the Spanish government does decide to open it, some, perhaps many, of the conclusions of

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this book will be changed.

Until that day, this book must serve as a provisional history of the Rif War, as it was fought and experienced by the Moroccan participants.

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10. Gomez-Jordana y Souza, *Tramoya*.
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13. Fleming, "Primo de Rivera and Abd el-Krim".
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18. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*.
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20. *Abd al-Krim et la Republique du Rif*, referred to throughout as *Colloque*.
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23. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*.

24. Furneaux, *Abdel Krim, Emir of the Rif*.

25. Roger-Mathieu, *Memoires*.

2. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MOROCCAN STATE

In 1830, the French invaded Algeria. Although this was the first European invasion of North Africa in modern times, another country, Spain, had had a much longer history of involvement in the area. Spanish interest was a continuation of the Reconquista, when the Christians wrested control of the Iberian Peninsula back from the Muslims. Indeed it had begun even before the "Catholic Monarchs", Ferdinand and Isabel, had completed the reconquest with the capture of Granada in 1492. In 1449 John II of Castille had given permission to the Duke of Medina Sidonia to conquer the west coast of Africa¹. The will of Isabel herself specifically demanded of her successors that "they should not cease in the conquest of Africa and fight for the faith against the infidels"². In the century and a half that followed, Spain occupied a number of positions on the North African coast, including Oran (1509), Bugie, Algiers and Tripoli (1510), Asila (1588), and Larache (1618). Some remained Spanish possessions for only a short time, but four have been kept until today - the islets of Penon de Velez de la Gomera (Badis in Arabic), taken in 1508 and retaken in 1564, and Alhucemas (al-Nakur), in 1673, and the towns of Ceuta (Sibta in Arabic), ceded by Portugal in 1580, and Melilla (Mililla), in 1497. Isolated for over two hundred years from their Moroccan hinterlands, these presidios stagnated and became little more than military prisons. Spain's great colonial adventures took place in South America, not Africa.

Spanish interest in North Africa was reawakened by the French invasion of Algeria in 1830. In 1848 the Spanish entered into competition with the French by occupying the Chafarinas Islands close to the Algerian-Moroccan border. Quite useless for anything else, these islands provide a good natural anchorage and became the centrepiece, in the nineteenth century, of grandiose schemes for a huge port complex, which came to nothing³.

There may have been imperial rivalry with France, but there was a real military threat to the Spanish in Morocco from the Moroccans themselves. During the nineteenth century one

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or other of the presidios was always under siege. In 1847 it was Melilla that was threatened, in 1858 a Spanish ship was captured by Moroccan "pirates", and in 1859 fighting broke out around Ceuta. Ceuta at this point was barely surviving, its economy stagnant, its population rising only imperceptibly⁴. It badly needed more space and in late 1859 the excuse for a military adventure was provided.

Spanish troops trying to build a frontier post were attacked by men of the Anjara tribe, which lived in the mountains around Ceuta. Several were killed, the new fortifications were torn down, and the Spanish flag was defiled. Madrid demanded that the tribesmen be punished and, when the Sultan refused, declared war. On 1 January 1860 Spanish troops invaded Morocco. Although the invasion was dignified by Spain with the title of "The War of Africa", it was a wretched affair. Spanish troops took more than a month to reach the nearest Moroccan city of Tetuan, 23 miles south of Ceuta. The inefficient Moroccan army, badly led by the Sultan's brother Mawlay al-^CAbbas, provided little opposition. That came from the more enthusiastic and effective irregulars from the tribes of northern Morocco. Eventually the Spanish army fought its way to Tetuan, and there it stopped, permanently⁵.

Spain occupied Tetuan for only a few months, but in that time managed to cause a considerable amount of annoyance to the population. Perhaps the most offensive decision was to turn the important shrine of Sidi Ahmad al-Baqqali into a church and to store grain and rifles in two other mosques⁶. Far worse in the long run, however, were the terms of the peace treaty of 26 April 1860, under which Spain withdrew from Morocco. Not only was the Sultan obliged to concede preferential trading rights to the Spanish, but he was also to allow them to increase the area of both Ceuta and Melilla and to occupy the territory of Ifni in southern Morocco, and to agree to pay an indemnity of one hundred million pesetas⁷.

The defeat of 1860 was not the first suffered by Morocco at European hands in the nineteenth century. In 1844 a Moroccan army sent to the assistance of ^CAbd al-Qadir bin Muhyi al-Din, the leader of the western Algerian resistance to the French, was defeated at the battle of Isly. From then on the Moroccan state showed increasing signs of political weakness, as the Sultans were unable to defend the Islamic territory of which they were the guardians.

Military defeat was not the only reason why Morocco could not cope with the European threat. There were other problems which were equally important: the increasing debt of the Moroccan state to European banks, the increasing share of Europeans in Morocco's international trade, and the growing power of the European consuls in the political life of Morocco.

Commerce increased as successive treaties with the different European powers removed trade barriers. In 1856 the British-Moroccan treaty opened up the Moroccan market. The Spanish

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profited from their victory of 1860 to impose a similar agreement, and other countries followed. Customs duties on imports were lowered, and prohibitions on the export of wool, grain, cattle and minerals were lifted. Morocco soon became a major export market for European goods - particularly British cottons - and the local textile industry all but collapsed. Instead Morocco became a source of primary products, mainly agricultural, for the southern Mediterranean countries. The result was a growing trade gap between imports and exports⁸.

The most pressing problem for the Moroccan government, however, was to pay the enormous debts that were contracted. The one hundred million pesetas indemnity promised to Spain in 1860 was quite beyond Morocco's means, and it was raised by a loan from Britain and by imposing taxes on the movement of goods through the gates of Moroccan cities. These taxes (maks) were illegal under Islamic law although on this occasion the Sultan received special permission from the ^Culama (religious leaders) in Fez to impose them⁹. In effect, the Sultan was maintaining his rule, the primary function of which was the preservation of Islam, at the expense of Islamic law.

The third problem was that the Sultan was unable to prevent ever greater European influence over Morocco through the consuls and European merchants. Between 1832 and 1860 the number of Europeans settled in Morocco increased six times (to 1,500)¹⁰. Attracted by the easing of trade and the growing possibilities of raising animals (cattle and sheep) in partnership with local farmers, their economic influence grew. Europeans were given special status by the capitulatory agreements between Morocco and the European powers, which dated back at least to the eighteenth century. These exempted them from prosecution in the Sultan's courts and from Moroccan taxation and military service. In legal matters they were the responsibility of their national consuls. The same privileges were extended to their Moroccan partners and employees, who became consular-protected persons or protegés. As the number of Europeans grew, so did the number of protegés. Both Europeans and Moroccans took great advantage of the system and a large number of the richer and more influential Moroccans took protected status and passed out of the reach of their government. The widespread abuse was never ended, despite two international conferences on the matter: at Tangier in 1867 and Madrid in 1860¹¹. These two conferences solved nothing, but they did make it clear that the fate of Morocco was going to be decided by discussion amongst the European powers, great and small, and not by the Moroccan government.

Part of the reason for the failure of the two conferences lay in the inability of the European powers to agree over the division of the spoils in North Africa. The question was raised more starkly by the occupation of the new areas of North Africa by European powers. The French occupied Tunisia in 1881, and in the following year the British took Egypt. Morocco, however,

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remained independent, although persistent raiding by the tribes across the Moroccan-Algerian border gave the French the excuse to nibble away at Moroccan territory. In 1899 and 1900 French troops occupied the south-western Moroccan oases of Gurara, Tidikelt, Igli and Tuat. This caused considerable anxiety in Madrid, Berlin, Rome and London. The imperial rivalry was partly resolved by a series of agreements between France and other European powers. The British recognised the French occupation of Tunisia and French interests in Morocco in exchange for recognition of British rights in Egypt, and the Italian government did the same in return for a reciprocal recognition of their primary interest in Libya. Finally, in October 1904 France and Spain reached an accord which recognised spheres of paramount Spanish interest in the north and south of the country and paramount French interests in the remaining portion. The Spanish zone, however, was much smaller than Spain had hoped for; it was to stretch from the River Muluya in north-eastern Morocco to Larache on the west coast; in the far south the Spanish zone of interest would consist of the Tarfaya region¹².

These arrangements were possible because the Moroccan government was in no state to prevent them. The problem of finance was too acute. In 1902 and 1903 the Sultan borrowed money from Britain, France and Spain, but it was not enough. In 1904 a consortium of eleven French banks lent Morocco 62.5 million francs (although after inflated commission and service charges had been deducted Morocco received only 50 million francs). The loan was secured by reserving 60 per cent of customs dues for servicing the debt, to be collected by French officials. The economic and political independence of Morocco was thus severely compromised¹³.

One European power felt excluded. As French influence in Morocco increased, concern deepened in Berlin that Germany was being unfairly treated. In March 1905 the Kaiser paid a surprise visit to Tangier, demanded that Germany's interests in Morocco should be respected, and repeated his support for Morocco's "independence". Following the visit, the German Foreign Ministry demanded an international conference to deal with the Moroccan question. The conference duly met, in the port town of Algeciras in southern Spain between January and April 1906. The result was a diplomatic setback not only for Germany but for Morocco as well. Although the Act of Algeciras reaffirmed Moroccan "independence", it also recognised the need for "reforms". These took the form of an effective Franco-Spanish control over Moroccan finances, and the policing of the major Moroccan ports by the French and Spanish¹⁴.

The Act of Algeciras brought starkly into question the capacity of the Sultan to rule his country. The prime role of the Moroccan Sultan was to lead the Islamic community, and to ensure that it was protected from invasion by non-believers, and to uphold Islamic law, the shari'ah. Theoretically, he was not

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an absolute ruler for his authority was delegated by the community as a whole, the umma, which was the real possessor of sovereignty¹⁵. This theoretical relationship between ruler and ruled was recognised in the institution of the bay'a, the declaration by the people of each town or district that they accepted him as their Sultan, a declaration they made at the beginning of his reign. Thereafter, in theory again, he had no legal right to make laws: he had to seek the consent of the ulama, the religious scholars and jurists, who gave their opinions on the validity of new regulations in documents known as fatwa-s.

In practice, however, the accession of a Sultan was effected by force, on the death of his predecessor and was determined by who was the most powerful within the Alawi family which had ruled Morocco from the mid-seventeenth century. This dynasty claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, hence the name often given to precolonial Morocco, the "Sherifian Empire" (sharif is an Arabic word meaning a descendant of the Prophet). The bay'a-s given by the towns or tribes were no more than the recognition of a fait accompli: The Sultan had already seized power. Nevertheless, the idea of a contract existed, and a particularly important part of it was the expectation of the Sultan's subjects that he would lead the defence of the state if it was threatened from outside, especially by Christians. This religious mission the Sultans were quite clearly unable to fulfill after the failures at Isly and Tetuan. Despite considerable effort, little could be done to remedy this situation.

The effort consisted, in Morocco as in other North African and Middle Eastern states, of an attempt at modernisation. Modernisation can mean a number of different things, for it is a concept which is ideologically loaded according to the perceptions of the moderniser. The European powers demanded reforms in Morocco, but their concept of reform - of the trade system, the legal system and the way in which order was preserved - had purposes very different from those of the Moroccan modernisers. They wanted to integrate Morocco into the modern capitalist world. The Sultans wanted to increase the power of the state, to strengthen their rule, and make it richer.

At the heart of these efforts at reform lay the army. Early contacts had been made with Muhammad ^CAli Pasha, the Egyptian ruler, who sent military instruction manuals to Morocco¹⁶. But it was the defeat at Isly which gave a real impetus for change. From the 1850s onwards a number of treatises appeared in Morocco advocating new, European methods of warfare and military organisation¹⁷. The point was rammed home by the Tetuan war with Spain in 1860. During that conflict the only Moroccan forces which performed effectively were the irregular local forces, not the Sultan's army. The conclusion which might have been drawn from this - that in the North African environment irregular troops were more useful than organised armies - was not reached, however. Instead, Sultan Muhammad IV, who succeeded to the Sultanate at the

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beginning of the war, tried to reorganise his army along European lines. From 1870 onwards officers were sent to Gibraltar for training, and in the 1880s his son, Hassan I, started to send them to Germany and Belgium and employed French military instructors to assist in training in Morocco itself¹⁸.

These attempts at military modernisation were not in fact very successful, and disillusionment grew as it became clear that the new army could not deal with the European threat. In 1893, when fighting again flared up in the Melilla area over Spanish threats to expand the presidio, it was once again local irregular forces which were involved. The Sultan refused to commit his army to the fight, and made peace with the Spanish, incurring yet another indemnity of 20 million pesetas¹⁹.

Besides the military reforms, there were various attempts at reforming the administration. They were generally unsuccessful, for the fundamental nature of the system did not change.

The title of the pre-colonial Moroccan government was the "Makhzan", which literally means "treasury". The name symbolised the nature of the political relationship between the government and the governed: it was defined by taxation. In the cities and the plains surrounding them there was a regular system of taxation, backed up by an administrative structure dependent directly on the Sultan, who appointed his Pashas (governors) in the large towns like Tangier, Casablanca, Rabat, and Tetuan. The capital cities, Fez and Marrakesh, were ruled either by the Sultan directly - if he was there at the time - or by a close member of his family. Direct control over the tribes in the surrounding countryside was maintained by appointing qaid-s who were responsible for the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes. Lesser officials administered the markets, ran prisons, and performed less important administrative functions. At the higher levels of government, a certain amount of responsibility was given to ministers (wazir-s), but theirs was largely an executive role, and one without defined areas of responsibility. The power of decision lay with the Sultan. Muhammad IV attempted to reform this by appointing ministers with specific areas of responsibility. Under him there were a chief minister to oversee the administration of the towns and tribes and the activity of the government, a minister for war, a minister for finance, a foreign minister, and a minister for "complaints" (wazir al-shikayat), whose job was rather more nebulous, to supervise the hubus religious endowments (the word used in Morocco for what are known as awqaf in the eastern Arab world) and to advise the Sultan. There were, however, no ministers responsible for those areas of administration with which modern governments concern themselves - such as agriculture, the development of trade, industry or social matters²⁰. At the lower levels of administration Muhammad IV set up a school for officials, and under his successor some students were sent to Europe to study, although when they returned they were rarely given important government posts²¹.

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Both the military and the administrative reforms showed the influence of European methods. However, the fact that the model for change was found in Europe disconcerted many more conservative ulama. The late nineteenth century historian and chronicler, Ahmad al-Nasiri, expressed his concern about the numbers of students going to Europe to receive military training when he wrote, "They want to learn about war in order to preserve their religion, yet they neglect their religion in the very process of learning"²².

On the other hand, there was a widespread belief that military organisation was the key to any attempt to resist the Europeans. Indeed the very word nizam, the term used to describe the new forms of military organisation, came to be credited with an almost magical significance²³.

In the end, it was al-Nasiri who was nearer to the truth. With the end of the reign of Hasan I in 1898 he closed his long chronicle of the history of Morocco, by saying:

Know also that the power of these Europeans during recent years has increased to a shocking degree, making itself apparent to an unprecedented extent. The progress and improvement in their circumstances has rapidly increased, doubling and redoubling like grains of wheat in the squares of a chess board, so that the state has fallen into a time of complete calamity. Knowledge of the results and the limits of all this belong to God, may He be exalted, who alone knows what is hidden. 'I know well what happens today and yesterday before it. But to the things which tomorrow brings, I am blind'²⁴.

Nasiri's vision of an almost mathematical progression to the growth of European power was vivid enough. His premonition that worse was to come was accurate enough. But he provided no prescriptions of what action should be taken. Although there were practical responses which could be, and were made, opposition to the European powers was finally in vain.

Morocco was not the only Muslim country which faced a challenge from European colonialism and technical superiority and made an effort to meet it by attempting to "modernise" along European lines. However, Morocco was and is a Muslim country, and another response to the external threat presented itself as being more natural and fitting: to argue that the decline in the power of the state was because Islam had been weakened and to try to reform things by reimposing Islamic law, the shari'a. This was nothing new in Moroccan history and it is easy to over-emphasise the European threat as a catalyst for religious reform. For long before the European intervention, the Middle East and North Africa had seen campaigns for reform, the continuation of currents that went back to the Middle Ages at least. In more recent times, the powerful Tunisian ruler, Hammuda Pasha (1782-1814), had attempted to strengthen the role the shari'a²⁵ and Ahmad Bey, the last Ottoman governor of Constantine in eastern Algeria before the French invasion, had attempted a similar

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policy²⁶. In western Algeria, the leader of the resistance to the French ^CAbd al-Qadir bin Muhyi al-Din also laid great emphasis on the shar^C²⁷. Furthermore, during the late eighteenth centuries, the emergence of the fundamentalist Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula was felt in other parts of the Islamic world and its propaganda even reached Tunisia (where it was dismissed by Hammuda)²⁸.

However, the rapid growth of European power and influence in the Middle East did make matters more urgent. The sort of modernisation proposed as a solution by Muhammad ^CAli Pasha and, to a lesser extent, Sultan Muhammad IV of Morocco raised objections that it was betrayal of Islam. The criticism was answered by such teachers as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) who asserted that while Islamic societies should learn European techniques and ideas, this should be accompanied by religious and social reform, so that the decay which had corrupted Islam could be reversed. This could be done only by restoring the unity of the Islamic community, the umma, and by regenerating the force of the shar^C. This call by al-Afghani and his followers for a return to the purity of the times when Islam was powerful both politically and as a religion, the Islam of the salaf (the ancestors), gave the name of the movement which developed from these ideas, the Salafiyya²⁹.

The ideal of the Salafiyya was the general reform of Muslim society and politics, so that they conformed with the shar^C. Amongst other things, this included an attack on the Sufi religious brotherhoods, the tariqa-s, which had a powerful following especially among the less affluent members of society. There was a strong mystical content to many of the tariqa-s teachings, and often somewhat heterodox ceremonial practices, so that Muhammad ^CAbduh, one of al-Afghani's most prominent followers, attacked them on the grounds that they "played with religion"³⁰. Such attacks on the tariqa-s were not new even in Moroccan history - Sultan Mawlay Sulayman (1792-1822) had led a campaign against them, partly for political reasons but at least partly on religious grounds³¹.

Salafi ideas reached Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Moroccan religious teachers returned from study in Egypt, where they had come into contact with ^CAbduh's and al-Afghani's ideas. Their cause was much advanced in 1908, when Mawlay ^CAbd al-Hafiz seized the throne from his brother. He helped the reformists to restructure the teaching at the great mosque-university of al-Qarawiyyin in Fez, the most important religious centre in Morocco. Its courses would now include one on tafsir, Quranic explanation, allowing for a reform of society based on a reinterpretation of the shar^C. Such attempts at reform were resisted by tariqa-s such as the Kittaniya, whose leader, Muhammad bin ^CAbd-Karim al-Kittani, was killed on the orders of the new Sultan³².

^CAbd al-Hafiz's success in seizing the throne was not, however, based on the support of a small number of Salafi

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reformists, but resulted from the crisis in Morocco which had led to the collapse of the political and financial system under the rule of his brother, ^CAbd al-Aziz. ^CAbd al-^CAziz had succeeded their father in 1908, while he was still in his minority. The chief wazir, Si Ahmad bin Musa, had mounted what was effectively a coup d'etat to secure the Sultanate for the young prince and for the first two years of his reign wielded almost total power. But it was an almost useless power. In 1899, the year before ^CAbd al-Aziz achieved his majority, the French occupied Tuat oasis and the following year that of Ighli, both in the far south - west of Morocco. Since he was unable to protect his territory, the Sultan's legitimacy was called into question.

There were other problems. ^CAbd al-Aziz attempted to reform the tax system. This involved taxing both the ulama and the privileged classes for the first time. Both groups refused to cooperate, and under the weight of this opposition the tax system collapsed and no taxes were collected at all. To provide revenue, Morocco looked to foreign loans, thereby increasing even further the influence of Europeans. As that influence increased, so did Moroccan agitation against them. In 1907, ostensibly to protect their citizens there, French troops occupied Oujda, a Moroccan city on the Algerian border. In July of the same year, they landed at Casablanca on the west coast, after riots against foreigners. ^CAbd al-Aziz was again unable to protect his territory.

^CAbd al-Aziz's personal conduct made matters worse. An excessive concern with the baubles of European technology, including bicycles which he provided for the ladies of his harem, led to a widespread loss of confidence in his judgement³³. Out of the general discontent grew a movement to replace him.

The choice of successor was his brother ^CAbd al-Hafiz, the governor of Marrakesh. But the movement was led by the "big caids" who controlled the far south of Morocco, with the support of the ulama, and it was they who chose ^CAbd al-Hafiz rather than he who led the movement. This relationship was summed up in the bay'a given to him by the ulama of Fez, when he was declared Sultan there in 1908. Unlike those bay'a-s which were simple statements of a fait accompli, this declaration made specific demands on the new Sultan. He was required to liberate Casablanca and Oujda, to guarantee that the shar^C would be enforced, to end the employment of foreign advisors in the country and to end the illegal (under the shar^C) maks, taxes on produce entering the gates of the cities³⁴.

From a practical point of view, the demands could not be fulfilled. The Moroccan army was incapable of defeating the French. The European powers, with their massive investments in Morocco, would not allow their influence to end, and abolition of the "illegal" taxes would have led to bankruptcy.

The situation was made worse by a local war which flared up around Melilla in 1909, leading to yet another Spanish invasion

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in order to secure important mine-workings in the area. The Spanish occupied considerable territory around Melilla, and stayed there.

^CAbd al-Hafiz's support ebbed away. Not only was he unable to prevent further occupation of Moroccan territory by the Europeans, but he even accepted the Act of Algeciras³⁵. In 1911, ill-feeling over the taxation issue erupted into rebellion in the countryside around Fez, and tribes from the area besieged the city. In April that year they proclaimed another brother of Mawlay ^CAbd al-Hafiz, Mawlay Zayn, as Sultan and gave him a bay'a in the city of Meknes, although the new pretender accepted the call somewhat reluctantly. ^CAbd al-Hafiz had been chosen to oppose foreign interference. Now, in a striking reversal of his role, he called for help from the French. Troops were sent to lift the siege on Fez, and for the moment, ^CAbd al-Hafiz was saved³⁶.

France now had troops in Fez as well as Casablanca and Oujda, and was well on the way to occupying Morocco. The only opposition to this was from other European powers. Germany was therefore bought off by the cession of a large tract of land in the Congo, and Spain was allowed to occupy the port of Larache on the west coast, followed by an expansion into the hinterland³⁷.

The Moroccan state had all but collapsed, and nine months later, in March 1912, ^CAbd al-Hafiz signed the treaty of Fez giving France a protectorate over Morocco. There followed a short season of revolts in and around the northern capital until, on 25 May, the new French-Resident General, Hubert Lyautey, arrived and, after considerable fighting, restored order³⁸. There remained only to deal with the diplomatic demands of Spain for a role in Morocco, and this was achieved on 14 November when France and Spain signed another treaty giving Spain a sub-protectorate in northern and southern Morocco. ^CAbd al-Hafiz resigned six months later and the French appointed his brother Mawlay Yussif as Sultan.

This may have been the moment when it was visible, but the Moroccan government had effectively collapsed long before the Treaty of Fez was signed. The long defeat which ran through the nineteenth century made it clear that any resistance which was to be organised would have to be a local responsibility.

This was not new in North Africa. When, in 1830, the French invaded Algeria and the provincial Ottoman authorities collapsed, the Ottoman Sultan showed that he too was incapable of protecting his subjects, so opposition to the French was organised locally. In the east of Algeria, the Ottoman governor of the city of Constantine, Ahmad Bey, was obliged to reorganise his administration on a local level in order to preserve order and to provide some central direction to resistance against the French. However, local movements still looked for outside support. Ahmad Bey maintained that he was technically still an

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Ottoman official, although he headed what was effectively an autonomous political entity, with its own army, its own coinage and administration and internal organisation³⁹.

In the west of Algeria the obvious source of support was not the Ottoman Sultanate in Istanbul but the far closer Moroccan state. The inhabitants of the town of Tlemcen wrote to the Sultan asking if they could change their oath of allegiance, bay'a, from the Ottoman Sultan to him. Mawlay ^CAbd al-Rahman was most unwilling to do this for fear it might lead to conflict with the French, and refused, saying that an oath of allegiance could not be changed. The Tlemcenis replied with a complicated legal argument based on their claim that the Ottoman governor of Algiers had ruled with scant regard for either justice or the shar', and that his master in Istanbul was unable to come to their assistance against the French. Quoting a fifteenth-century Tunisian jurist and commentator on the sabih of Muslim (a collection of traditions about the life of the Prophet) they claimed:

The text of al-Ubi in his commentary on Muslim is a clear statement on a case similar to ours, to the effect that if the Imam is unable to make his orders be obeyed in a country, it is permissible to set up another in his place and to proclaim him, and any delay in the proclamation leads to eternal damnation⁴⁰.

The formula was crucial: not only could a local resistance be organised, but a local leader was not only legally acceptable but required by the shar'. As colonialism advanced, those who opposed it could reorganise politically, autonomously, in order to resist the threat. Indeed, if al-Ubi's arguments were correct, they had to do so.

Faced with these arguments, the Moroccan Sultan agreed to accept the allegiance of Tlemcen and provided a minimal amount of support. However, the real organisation of the resistance in western Algeria fell to a local religious leader, ^CAbd al-Qadir bin Muhyi al-Din who, during the 1840s, led the resistance to the French in western Algeria. Like Ahmad Bey in Constantine, he claimed to be the theoretical representative of a Sultan - in this case of Morocco - and like Ahmad Bey he led an autonomous political entity with its own army, administration, monetary system and taxation⁴¹. He went further than Ahmad Bey, however, by insisting on using the title Amir al-Mu'minin, reflecting not so much a desire to lead all Muslims as to assert an untrammelled authority within his own region, notwithstanding his lipservice to the Moroccan Sultan⁴².

Abd al-Qadir and, to a lesser extent, Ahmad Bey were much more effective at resisting the Europeans than were the traditional authorities in either Morocco or Algeria, even though they eventually failed. They both had an objective beyond the immediate one of resistance, and had in common an expressed desire not only to prevent European domination but also to establish a political system based on Islamic law.

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By the time that the Franco-Spanish protectorate over Morocco was imposed in 1912, a number of things were clear. It was apparent that the traditional authorities in North Africa were unable, or unwilling, to organise resistance to the Europeans. As a result any resistance, would have to be carried out at a local level. Moreover, that resistance would be likely to involve changes in the local political structures, an attempt at the reimposition of the shar^c. Finally, there was a widespread belief in the importance of an organised army, trained along European lines and backed by a more efficient administration. Undoubtedly, these priorities were never expressed quite so baldly, but in the circumstances of early twentieth-century Morocco that was the direction of the political drift.

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3. NORTHERN MOROCCO - THE SPANISH PROTECTORATE

The Spanish protectorate in Morocco was founded on a number of illusions. It was believed that the area had an economic and strategic significance which would offset Spain's exclusion from most of the rest of Africa. It was held that Spanish rule could be exercised as a protectorate, while preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan. Finally, and most dangerously of all, it was hoped that this protectorate could actually be put into effect without much expense. These were illusions which were to cost Spain dear, both in men and money, but they were based on a misconception yet more fundamental. This was that the Spanish knew or understood much about the area at all.

This latter point was clearly illustrated by the very treaties on which the Protectorate was based - those of 1904 and 1912. As far as the northern zone was concerned these laid down very precise definitions of the exact extent of the territory, with its southern limit stretching from the Wadi Muluya in the east to the Atlantic coast south of Larache in the west. The boundaries were to follow the basins of two rivers (the Kert and Sebu), and to conform to distances between isolated positions which were precisely measured in kilometres. In fact this was territory over which very few Europeans had ever passed, and which had certainly not been surveyed¹. Indeed, the only town in the interior, the "holy" city of Shawin, which was founded by exiles from Andalusia in the fifteenth century, had been visited by only three Europeans, all of them disguised as Moroccans. Had they gone there openly they would have been killed². Certainly the terrain had never been surveyed, and as a result a number of tribes, such as the Banu Zarwal and Gaznayya, were cut in two by the border.

The Spanish zone was believed to contain rich economic prizes, in both agriculture and minerals. Back in the 1860s, two Spanish army officers who advocated Spanish expansion into Morocco had described a land of mountains and rivers, with good soils and thick forests. They declared it to be "one of the most beautiful countries in the world"³. In addition there were supposed to be rich mineral reserves in the central Rif mountains

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which made up the central core of the zone⁴.

The reality was rather different. While there was, in the western part of the zone, a region very like that described by the optimistic Spanish officers, that formed only a small part of the area. The zone itself stretched in an arc from Tangier in the west along the northern coast of Morocco as far as the Muluya river in the east - a distance of some 340 kilometres, and inland for a distance of some 100 kilometres at the widest point, narrowing off towards the east. The total area was some 20,000 square kilometres⁵.

The terrain is generally mountainous, apart from a wide plain along the Atlantic coast. The western mountains rise steeply behind, and catch much of the rainfall which is brought in by the westerly winds from the sea. Around Tangier the rainfall is indeed considerable (as much as 810mm a year), and the Jibala region, the mountainous district in the west of the zone, has reasonably good agricultural production, in the valleys at least. To the east the mountains rise even higher, forming the central Rif range, and reaching heights of 2,000 metres in places. The almost continuous chain of mountains is not very wide - between 50 and 80 kilometres at the most. To the south it drops down into the fertile lowland valleys of the Wargha basin, and the district around Fez and Taza. This area, however, was not included in the Spanish zone.

It is the chain of mountains that causes the main problems for the area. The rainbearing winds blow from the west, and so the western part of the zone is by far the wettest. Rainfall diminishes further to the east, so that around Melilla it is around 310mm a year. The mountains themselves are largely formed of calcareous rock, which is porous so that there are no large rivers in the area, and most of the main watercourses circle the south of the mountains. There are, however, many smaller streams which run in deep gullies and ravines, and these form a considerable barrier to long distance communication. Finally, since the mountains fall almost directly into the sea at most points along the north coast, there are few large harbours of easy access.

As a result, with good rainfall, farming is fairly easy in the valleys of the Jibala region in the west, but the slopes of the mountains are thickly wooded. Further east, in the central Rif, agriculture is more difficult and the mountain sides have long been denuded of trees and are suitable only for grazing flocks of sheep and goats. Once again cultivation is mostly confined to the valleys. The easternmost part of all, the Garat plain, is almost semi-desert when deprived of rain. One estimate has been made that before the Rif War only between 10 per cent and 25 per cent of the land was cultivated, on average rising to 50 per cent in a few very favoured places⁶.

This, then is a land of villages, extended hamlets and scattered homesteads, whose size depends at least partly on agriculture, which in turn depends on the quality of the soil and

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the extent of irrigation. Where these are sufficient, the land is fertile, producing a wide variety of crops; the staples were grains (wheat and barley), together with vegetables and several types of fruit trees. One of the best irrigated and most-favoured areas in the central Rif is the fertile plain of Swani, facing Alhucemas Bay, watered by two rivers, the Wadi Ghis and the Wadi Nakur. This, as well as the mountain behind was the territory of the largest tribe in the Rif, the Banu Waryaghal. Even so, here, as elsewhere in the mountains, much depends on the rainfall. If it fails, as it often does, then the crops fail too. In pre-colonial Morocco, starvation followed, not immediately but when people had eaten up all the seed grain set aside for sowing which meant there was nothing left to plant the following year. In really straitened circumstances people were reduced to gathering wild foods, the acorns of evergreen oaks, wild rose pods and the fruit of the lentisk tree (a kind of pistachio nut), which could be ground into a substitute for flour⁷.

This difficult land was overpopulated. Population figures before the Rif War are at best guesses, but as a rough guide, the estimates of density of population for the Jibala are around 19 - 20 per square mile, whereas those of the Rif, which is much poorer, were between 40 and 60 per square mile. (see Appendix N) As a result, large numbers of Rifis left the mountains every year to work on the harvest on the French farms in the Oran region of Algeria⁸.

The poverty of the area and its extreme difficulty of access were important factors in determining its political and social structures and its status as a part of Morocco. These structures were broadly similar to those of other isolated and peripheral parts of Morocco, but their detailed workings are matters of great dispute, for the perceptions of colonial anthropologists were used to justify the methods of colonial rule.

Pre-colonial Morocco, as described by contemporary European anthropologists and historians, was a country quite unlike a modern nation-state. They saw a "basic division of the country into a plains area over which the government held sway - the Bled el Makhzen or 'Land of Government' - and a mountain area over which it had no control - the Bled es Siba or 'Land of Insolence'..."⁹. This political division according to the anthropologists, was co-terminous with a linguistic one, between speakers of Arabic, a literary language, and Berber, which was almost entirely an unwritten one. But the most important distinction was political. It was held that the only authority which the Sultan had over these areas of siba was a religious one as head of the Islamic community in Morocco. Quite apart from the difficulty of distinguishing between religious and secular power in an Islamic state, this theory ignores another essential reality of the nature of power in pre-colonial Morocco: the question of money.

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Morocco was a relatively poor country, made more financially insecure by the financial crises of the last years of independence. So the extent of direct government was dictated partly by financial conditions. But it was also determined by the needs of the Makhzan (government). Obviously, the Sultan needed to maintain as tight a grip as possible on the cities and the rural areas surrounding them. Failure to do so might result in rebellion and his overthrow. Control of the Atlantic coast was needed to facilitate both internal and foreign trade. This was not true of the more remote and mountainous areas, which were economically less important, and politically less so as well - provided that local systems could be relied upon to maintain order.

Rural society in Morocco, like that of the Maghrib as a whole, was organised along segmentary lines. This is often described as a "tribal system", not always a very helpful phrase. The word "tribe" is a translation of the Arabic qabila, a grouping defined not by size, which can vary from less than one thousand people to as many as forty thousand or more, but on descent (at least in theory). In theory, the qabila (taqbilt in Rifi Berber) is the largest unit which claims descent from the same ancestor. It is then subdivided into smaller groups and these lower levels of segmentation are also defined by descent through different branches of the original "ancestor's" family - the "clans", called rub'a'a in the Rif and the lineages which usually correspond with local communities, madshar in Arabic (dharfiqth in Berber). But descent, important though it is in providing identity, is not the only factor. There is also a territorial identification, which roughly corresponds to the genealogical segmentation - each tribe, clan and local community occupies a defined area, considered to be the territory of that group and inalienable from it¹⁰.

In the case of nomadic tribes, these areas were not static, of course, and the tribes moved over very large distances, although always within certain limits. There are no nomadic tribes in the Rif, although the Matalsa and Banu Bu Yahyi tribes used to practice small scale transhumant herding. There, people rely for their livelihood on the uncertain cultivation of the valleys and the herding of sheep and goats on the hills.

Historically, there was a political dimension to this social segmentation. Within a tribe, neighbouring clans engaged in a competition for political influence and for resources. Power within the tribe was balanced by a combination of mutual antagonism and co-operation between groups of the same level, clan against clan and, most frequently, lineage against lineage. To reinforce their position in the struggle clans looked for outside support, usually from the immediate neighbour of their opponent, that is the next clan but one. However, as clans are not of even size, there was often an imbalance of power which was sometimes rectified by bringing into the alliance clans from neighbouring tribes. These alliances were called liff in Arabic,

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and they could be of very long standing. Most, however, were temporary arrangements; a clan or lineage which needed help would appeal to another clan in a way which imposed a moral obligation to provide assistance. One way of doing this was to use a form of shame compulsion, called car, which in its most dramatic form would be done by sacrificing a bull or other animal on the steps of the other clan's mosque. In the end, the search was for stability through equality of power, so that if a clan was attached it could call on the assistance of its allies. In theory, if matters got out of hand such a system could have led to the gradual spread of conflict throughout the tribes¹¹.

Thus, in Abdallah Laroui's phrase, the tribe "was a means of defense" ¹². So were its various subdivisions. But it was more than that, for the tribal system survived in the plains, and the lands which had been controlled by the Makhzan for generations. If the tribe was simply a method of defence against other groups, why did it continue in those areas where such mechanisms were no longer needed? Was it simply so much a part of the traditional structure and so deeply engrained that it could not easily disappear? If this was so, as Jacques Berque asks, why did it collapse so easily in Algeria under French administration, "aided by our reforms as well as by colonial dispossession?" ¹³. In fact, as Berque also points out, there were a number of associated reasons why the tribal system survived: the process of political evolution had not reached a stage at which the tribe could be transcended because the higher levels of power were less than stable; ¹⁴ it was of great use to the Makhzan as an administrative unit; and local traditions still kept quite considerable vitality of their own ¹⁵. However, since when the tribal structure came under pressure from the French in Algeria, where it was no longer needed even for administrative purposes ¹⁶, it did begin to break down, which suggests that the reliance of the Makhzan on the tribal system did indeed have considerable importance as a factor in its survival. In the Rif, before the protectorate, however, these administrative and traditional functions were not nearly so immediately apparent as the vitality of political structure itself.

Underlying the political structure was the threat of violence. In the Rif, in particular, people took no chances; each house was isolated from its neighbour, surrounded by a thick and virtually impenetrable cactus hedge and, before the Rif War equipped with a watchtower on the flat roof from which strangers who approached could be observed and, if necessary, resisted ¹⁷. That identification was made easier in the pre-war Rif by the scalplocks which all men wore from their otherwise shaven heads and which were particular to each tribe ¹⁸. In general, however, widescale conflicts were relatively rare - despite the impression given by many writers on pre-colonial Morocco. Much has been said about the "anarchy" and "violence" of life in the Rif, and not only by Europeans. Even a prominent Moroccan nationalist has claimed that "the insecurity was such

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that men remained barricaded in their houses; only the women could go out and attend to the family business. The markets were frequented only by women¹⁹. Quite apart from the fact that this is untrue - ordinary markets continued to function alongside those set aside for women - it is based on a completely illogical view of Rifi society. If the society was indeed so steeped in violence, in blood feuds which demanded the taking of a life for a life, the eventual outcome should have been a population of one. That this was not the case, indeed the Rif was overpopulated, suggests that the methods of dealing with disputes did prevent them from developing into wider conflicts²⁰. This machinery was an organised system of local control, itself based on the segmentary divisions of the tribes. At each level the running of the community was organised by the most important men meeting in a council. At the lowest level, that of the dshar, the heads of the families dealt with matters of minor importance: the repair of irrigation ditches, damage caused by wandering animals and minor offences such as petty vandalism and small thefts. So its concerns were both with minor problems of order and with cooperation between members of the community. To enforce its authority, the council (which was called jama^Ca in Arabic or agraw in Berber) could enforce fines; for instance, amongst the Banu Waryaghal, the largest tribe in the central Rif, the theft of a sheep or goat was punished by a fine of 50 pesetas²¹. At an intermediate level, the council of the clan dealt with those who refused to pay the fines and with more serious crimes - the theft of livestock, fighting, entering a women's market, and so on. This council met once a week at the site of one of the main markets of the clan.

The tribal jama^Ca or agraw met only when it was needed, usually at an important market, and dealt only with the most serious crimes: adultery, wounding and murder. In the case of murder, the tribal council would try to prevent a blood feud from breaking out, firstly by forcing the murderer to pay blood-money to his victim's kinsmen, and secondly by punishing him by burning down his house and fining him heavily.

These fines, known as haqq, were the mainstay of the system of maintaining order, and of the political system. They were imposed by the council acting as a group, and the council members shared out the proceeds between them. Obviously this depended on the ability and willingness of the ayan to enforce them. Because it was a collective action, it was only by seeing that the fines were always paid, by everyone, irrespective of the family or other loyalties of the members of the council, that the system could continue. The collective nature of this system is crucial, for no other forms of coercion were available to the councils: any individual action would lead to feuding. Thus all the mechanisms of which the Makhzan in the cities made use in order to keep control were lacking: there were no prisons in the Rif, and no-one to administer the classical punishments of

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the shar^C, such as cutting off the hands of thieves - although this practice was not very common even in Moroccan cities.

It is, in fact, often claimed that the shar^C had been practically overtaken by customary law, urf, in the Rif. This is an exaggeration, but there were two areas in which it was true. The right of women to inherit property was almost entirely limited by local rules on the division of land amongst the clans and lineages²². This had a close connection with the collective control over land, and the desire not to alienate it outside the group. The same collective needs defined the other major deviation from the shar^C. Since there was no overall authority to investigate and judge crimes, how then could the guilt or innocence of a man be determined? The mechanism which was used was the collective oath. A man accused of murder could call on his blood relatives to swear, in the mosque, that he was not guilty, if there was no eye witness to swear otherwise. There was some protection against mass perjury, since it was universally believed that God would severely punish anyone who swore an untruth²³. In this way, the collective nature of social order underpinned the collective political system, and was underpinned by it.

The danger was, of course, that if the collective systems broke down, then there was no-one who could impose authority on the region. If the fines were not paid, then violence could indeed spin out of control, leading to a widescale conflict which could be solved only through the mediation of someone outside the group²⁴.

One source of this mediation was a local religious figure. This could be a murabit, an individual who had local prestige, who embodied the idea of baraka, that is blessing (from God). Baraka is founded on a reputation for piety or learning or some semi-miraculous power, and can be preserved after a man's death in his tomb, which then becomes an object of pilgrimage, and can sometimes be passed down to his descendants. Another individual who might provide mediation was a sharif, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, of whom there are large numbers (not always genuine descendants) who were highly respected. Yet another source of mediation was the religious brotherhoods, the tariqa-s, which many members of the tribes joined. The tariqa-s performed a number of functions: they provided a popular religious experience for their members, each having its own specific rituals, which roused the anger of more orthodox Muslim teachers, and particularly the Salafi reformists, they had a political function uniting people of different tribes and regions because they crossed tribal boundaries; and in the local centres, the zawiya-s, which they maintained in many tribes and in the cities, they provided centres for some form of education, a place of lodging for travellers and, in the person of the head of the zawiya, a source of arbitration in disputes. The wealth of these zawiya-s was based on the gifts of the members of the tariqa-s and those who made use of their services, on property given

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by the Makhzan (known as ^Cazib) and on property willed by individuals²⁵. This property was inalienable, theirs in perpetuity - the Moroccan term for this is hubus, or awqaf in the Arab east - and it was to be used for the maintenance of the zawiya-s' functions, not, in theory for private purposes. As a result the wealth of the zawiya-s accumulated and some of them were very rich indeed. The most important tariqa in the Rif, the Darqawiya, had its very wealthy mother - zawiya at ^CAmajutt in the Banu Zarwal on the southern edge of the Rif and it had numerous smaller zawiya-s throughout the region, where it was particularly popular amongst the Banu Waryaghal. Often the tariqa-s coopted local murabit-s and sharif-s and the two sources of religious prestige were combined. A Rifi example of this was that of the Akhamlishin family, based at Zargat on the borders of the Rif and Sinhaja, branches at Targist, Tizi Ifri on the border between the Banu ^CAmmart and the Banu Bashir and Snada in the Banu Yittuft. The head of the family, who had great influence amongst the Sinhaja and some amongst the Banu Waryaghal, was Muhammad Sadiq al-Akhamlish, a member of the Nasiriya tariqa like most of his family. However, Sidi Hamidu, the head of the zawiya at Snada belonged to the Wazaniyya tariqa. Another member of the Nasiriya was Si Ahmad Bujdayn, a sharif who headed the tariqa's zawiya in the Banu Tuzin, although he had a far more localised influence. Wealth and social and religious authority combined to give such men considerable prestige, but it also had to be earned personally: the Akhamlishin, for example, had a history of fighting the Spanish which went back to 1860²⁶. All this is not to say that the Makhzan was devoid of power and influence in the Rif. The Sultan appointed governors in the region and although they generally did not live in the Rif itself, but in Tangier, they still had influence, in particular as yet another source of mediation in disputes²⁷. Moreover, the Rifi tribes paid taxes, if rather irregularly, to the Sultan. The method of extracting them was complicated, sometimes involving a form of kidnapping Rifi qaid-s who were visiting Fez, but it was certainly cheap²⁸. These qaid-s were theoretically the Makhzan's representatives in the tribes, responsible for the collection of taxes and the maintenance of order. In fact real power remained in the hands of the councils. Nevertheless, appointment as qaid by the Sultan was most useful to an ambitious local leader as it gave him a certain prestige. Muhammad Bu Qaddur of the Rifi tribe of Timsaman is an excellent example of this process. His rise to power and influence was begun by appointment as qaid by Sultan ^CAbd al-Aziz, and thereafter he cooperated enthusiastically with whatever outside power appeared to be strongest, in an effort to maintain his position²⁹. Finally, the Sultan did maintain a small military presence in and near the Rif, in the forts, qasba-s, at Snada in the Banu Yittuft tribe, near the presidio of Penon de Velez, and in Silwan, at the eastern end of the plain of Garat facing Melilla³⁰. Their purpose, however, was not so

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much to maintain control over the tribes, as to protect the Moroccan territory from an outside threat. In cases of outright disobedience the Makhzan could, and did, send in a military force from outside, a haraka, to impose its will. In the 1890s, for example, the small coastal tribe of Buqquya, many of whose members were fishermen, turned to piracy as a profitable sideline. The Spanish, whose ships suffered the most, complained to the Sultan. Mawlay ^CAbd al-^CAziz told the Buqquyis to stop their piracy no fewer than five times and was ignored. Finally in 1898, a large haraka was sent into the area, the tribe was severely punished, heavily fined, four of its chief shaykhs were executed and large numbers of prisoners were taken³¹.

Nevertheless, for practical purposes, the daily organisation of the Rif was dependent on local structures. These were not simply political, but economic as well. The local economy had, to a large extent, to be self-reliant since, while there was some trade between the mountains and the capital city of Fez to the south and the Spanish presidio of Melilla to the east, the main Moroccan trade routes skirted the Rif. This was partly because of the difficulty of access, and partly because the area was poor, and so the general market was reduced. However, political disturbances played their part as well. The revolt in the north east of Morocco led by Abu Himara in 1902 disrupted trade³², and so did fighting in the Tetuan area in 1900 and around Tangier in 1904³³. As a result of these factors, a means of distribution had to be maintained locally.

There were no shops in the Rif. Instead, people relied on local markets, which were held nearly every day within travelling distance for most people. A market would be held on a particular site, on a particular day of the week - and would be named accordingly: Suq al-Ahad (Sunday Market), Suq al-Arba'a (Wednesday Market) and so on. Nearly every tribe had at least one market a week, and big tribes, like the Banu Waryaghal, had markets on several days of the week³⁴.

The markets varied greatly in size, some very small, serving only the immediate neighbourhood, others much larger and attended by people from several tribes. Before the Rif War, people from the Banu Shikar tribe in the Qal'aya peninsular attended not only the Sunday market in their own tribe but also the Tuesday market in the Banu Bu Gafar and the Friday market in the Mazuja³⁵. In the central Rif the important Sunday Market at Al-Ruwadi in the Buqquya was attended by people from the Banu Yittuft, Banu Bu Frah, Targist and Zarqat tribes. The Monday Market of Aith bu ^CAyyash in the Banu Waryaghal was even more important, and in the eastern foothills of the Rif, Midar, in the Banu Tuzin, and Targuist had large markets twice a week.

However, markets did not simply have an economic function, but social and political ones as well. They served as places where political support could be rallied for expeditions, haraka-s, against the Spanish when they started to move into

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their protectorate, and as places where the tariqa-s could recruit members, as the Alawiya tariqa did in the Qal'aya on the eve of the Rif War³⁶. The specifically women's markets, which existed in many of the Rifi tribes before the Rif War, provided a medium of exchange of magic potions, charms, and the arrangements of marriages - although the latter function was equally carried out in the main markets which were attended by both sexes³⁷. Above all, the main markets served as places where the councils of the clans or the tribe could meet: this was an important function of the Sunday Market at Thisar in the Banu Waryaghal, for example³⁸. Thus the markets were another part of the collective glue which held the political structure of the Rif together.

In the rest of the northern zone there were also local systems of political and economic organisation. The tribes which stretched eastwards from the foothills of the Rif, across the River Kart, and into the Qal'aya peninsula on which Melilla stands had much the same arrangements, as did the Sinhaja group of eight small tribes whose territory is on the northern side of the valley of the Wadi Wargha to the south-west of the Rif. In the Ghumara, the territory of another group of nine small tribes lying to the west of the Rif on the coast, these systems were also similar to those of the Rif. However, the most westerly tribes of this group were largely under the influence of the most powerful man in the Jibala, the region lying to the west of the Ghumara and Sinhaja. This was Mawlay Ahmad al-Raisuli, one of the most notorious figures in pre-colonial Moroccan history.

Al-Raisuli's career fits nicely into the theories about the nature of rural and Berber politics in pre-colonial Morocco put forward by Robert Montagne, the chief sociological theorist of the French Protectorate. Montagne's thesis in brief is that "Berber society tends to oscillate between democratic / oligarchic tribal republics and ephemeral tyrannies"³⁹. He suggests that in certain circumstances a prominent local leader can, usually through wealth, come to dominate his clan, win over the support of its allies in the tribe, and finally come to dominate the tribe itself. With that base, he might move on to dominate neighbouring tribes, and once he had reached a position of power he could then expect the Makhzan to take note of him and co-opt him into the system⁴⁰. This was the origin of the "Great Qaids", who dominated the area south of Marrakesh in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries⁴¹. At certain times in history, when the Makhzan was weak, such men with the rallying cry of religious reform as a prop, could create for themselves a power-base which directly challenged the Makhzan, and then overcame it, seizing power for themselves. Such, say Montagne, were the origins of the al-Murabitun (eleventh and twelfth centuries) and the al-Muwahhidun (twelfth to thirteenth centuries)⁴².

Al-Raisuli, of course, never reached the stage of creating

his own dynasty, but he certainly achieved a wide measure of local power, although his base was not simply wealth but also descent. He came from an important branch of a family descended from one of the most charismatic religious figures of Morocco, Mawlay Abd al-Salam bin Mashish, a fourteenth-century murabit who was buried in a village which bore his name on the mountain of Jabal Alam, in the Jibalan tribe of Banu Arus. Al-Raisuli was based in this village although he was born in the tribe of al-Fahi outside Tangier. His personality also contributed to his rise to power. He was a man of considerable intelligence, but, from the days of his youth, something of a loner - as he himself admitted⁴³. He was physically very strong, ruthless, quick to anger, often cruel, but with a strong sentimental streak which showed flashes of generosity. By the time of the Rif War, he was entering middle age and had become immensely obese, partly the result of the dropsy that would eventually kill him.

Al-Raisuli was highly educated in the traditional Islamic sciences, but during the reign of Mawlay Hassan he drifted into banditry. He was captured and imprisoned until, at the beginning of the reign of Abd al-Aziz, he was set free. He soon returned to banditry and kidnapping. One victim in 1904 was an American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, and this incident led to a threat by President Theodore Roosevelt that he would declare war unless the Sultan secured Perdicaris' release⁴⁴. In return, al-Raisuli demanded, and was granted, the post of Pasha of Tangier. Dismissed from this post under European pressure, he returned to banditry, until another kidnapping, this time of the Sultan's military adviser, Sir Harry Maclean, led to his appointment as Pasha of Asila on the west coast. He held this post until the Spanish invasion in 1911, when he was replaced by an old rival, Idris al-Rifi⁴⁵.

Al-Raisuli's over-riding concern was to preserve his own power and he was quite prepared to cooperate with the Sultan in order to do so. Equally, if rather less willingly, the Sultan was prepared to incorporate al-Raisuli into the Makhzan structure so as to preserve his own nominal authority in the region. Indeed, al-Raisuli's support was not only desirable, but vital to those who laid claim to the Moroccan throne in the turbulent political years at the beginning of the century. He played his part in removing Abd al-Aziz from the throne⁴⁶. He was appointed as "Pasha of the North" by the brother of Abd al-Hafiz, Mawlay al-Zayn, during his short revolt in 1911, and by the far more important Abu Himara, who kept up a long rebellion and claim to the Moroccan throne between 1902 and 1909⁴⁷.

The revolt of Abu Himara is proof that, although the idea that Northern Morocco was in a state of perpetual rebellion against the Sultan is not true, there were revolts in the region which did directly challenge his legitimacy. Abu Himara was a former court official of the Makhzan who claimed, quite falsely, to be yet another brother of Mawlay Abd al-Aziz,

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
Mawlay Muhammad, who had been imprisoned in the palace in Meknes for a number of years. To this claim, he added another: that he was the divinely guided precursor to the mahdi, who would usher in the millenium. This was a claim of great significance, for it had a long pedigree in North African history. "Abu Himara", the pretender's nom - de - guerre, literally means "the man on the donkey", and the figure of the man mounted on a donkey who claimed to be precursor of the mahdi recurs throughout the history of revolts in north-west Africa from the tenth century onwards⁴⁸. Abu Himara was thus basing his opposition on two claims: to be a member of the ^CAlawi family, and to be a precursor of the mahdi. At a time when the Sultanate, unable to resist European penetration or to protect the frontiers, was falling into disrepute, these claims had considerable attraction. However, in 1904, the Sultan's army was able to expel Abu Himara from his original base at Taza, near Fez, the northern capital of Morocco, and he moved to Silwan, near the Spanish presidio of Melilla. From there he governed the surrounding countryside in a rather haphazard fashion, still claiming the title of Sultan, and relying for economic survival on a series of "concessions" which he granted to foreign companies, mainly Spanish⁴⁹. Abu Himara's brief, localised spell of rule came to an end in 1908 when he tried to extend his authority over the central Rif, and was successfully prevented from doing so by an alliance of the tribes, led by the Banu Waryahgal⁵⁰. In August 1909, Abu Himara was captured by the Sultan and was executed, but only after he had been half-eaten alive by the Sultan's pet lions⁵¹.

Abu Himara was really defeated by the local tribal alliances, not by the Sultan. The tribes were unwilling to submit to direct rule from outside. At stake, of course, was an economic consideration - direct rule would have been accompanied by direct taxation, to an extent too great for the local economy to support. It will be seen that the apparent autonomy of areas like the Rif served the interests not only of the Sultan, who was saved the expense of direct rule while maintaining his sovereignty, reasonable order and limited taxation, but also of the local people, who could rely on the Sultan for mediation in local disputes, for the legitimisation of local qaid-s and leaders, and (in theory at least) for some protection against the Spanish through Makhzan qasba-s at Silwan and Snada.

It was, however, a system which was both fragile and complex. To outside eyes, those of a European observer, it all too often appeared chaotic. The French and the Spanish were not the only Europeans who, intervening in the Moroccan scene, assumed that there was a fundamental political division between the bilad al-makhzan and bilad al-siba. British Consul Herbert White wrote that the Berber tribes "had long been free of any of the inconveniences of government"⁵².

The question of language is yet another element of confusion. It is true that in most of the Rif, as in many other


ILLUSTRATIONS




1. Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim, February 3, 1925



2. Si Muhammad Azarquan



4. The Rifi Flag in the Museo del Ejercito, Madrid




5. Raisuli's house at Tazrut



6. The road built by bin 'Abd al-Karim between Ajdir and Targist



7. The Plain of Anual looking towards the Rif, 1920



8. The mahakma of bin 'Abd al-Karim at Ajdir

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mountainous and remote areas of the Maghrib, Berber not Arabic was the lingua franca. This was also true of a few, but certainly not all parts of the Ghumara. The Jiblis, however, spoke Arabic.

The fact that Arabic is a written language and Berber, to all intents and purposes, is not, does not mean that the Jibala was necessarily more literate than the Rif. In no part of northern Morocco was the literacy rate very high, although there were schools, madrasa-s in the towns, masjid-s (literally 'mosques', for that is what they were) in the villages, which were attached to the mosque. Here boys, and only boys, were taught by the faqih (roughly 'scribe' or 'teacher') to learn the Quran. That was the extent of most men's education. Some however, moved on to the clan mosque, where they were taught some writing, and some of the principles of religion and grammar. After completing this stage, if he ever did, a pupil might go on to study in a mosque such as the Luqash in Tetuan, or the Qarawiyin in Fez. In these great mosque-universities a student would be educated in the shari'a, theology, grammar and so on and might eventually leave with the status of a qadi (judge). So, even in the Berber-speaking Rif, the language of education was Arabic. It was also the language of law, for the faqih-s in the villages helped settle quarrels over inheritance and property, and drew up contracts and marriage documents. With the exception of restrictions on female inheritance, this was the realm of the shari'a⁵³.

Admittedly, the number of qadi-s in the Rif was small, reflecting the relatively low level of literacy in the Rif - yet not as low as some European writers have made out⁵⁴. People had to write in order to communicate, and they wrote in Arabic. The large number of letters in the Spanish Military archives is an eloquent testament of this, although it is true that they contain many grammatical and orthographic errors.

The assumption about an allegedly low rate of literacy was only another example of a whole series of misunderstandings of the Rif in particular and Morocco in general. They derived, in part, from a belief that nothing in the region ever changed, that this was a static society. In fact this was far from true on the eve of the Protectorate, if it had ever been.

The nineteenth century had brought very deep changes to the Rif. Some were economic. The opening of the new labour market in Algeria on the farms in the Oranie provided a new way out for the population surplus. The growth of the British garrison on Gibraltar created a demand for food, and the lifting of trade restrictions in Morocco as a whole stimulated the economy of northern Morocco. These economic changes had social effects: in Algeria, Rifis learned Arabic and some French; new trading routes grew up between the Rif and Tetuan and Gibraltar.

Most important of all were the political changes: the emergence of a strong-man, Mawlay Ahmad al-Raisuli, to

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dominate the Jibala, the loss of prestige of the Sultanate, and, in the long run, perhaps, most significantly of all, a general increase in the number and quality of guns in the Rif. In 1909, the Spanish were aware of the rapid trade in arms and ammunition in the Tuesday market in the Mazuja tribe near Melilla supplied by smugglers from the Buqquya, they thought⁵⁵. Alongside the old flintlocks more modern guns were now available: the 1860 Remington, the 1890 Lebel, and the 1888 German Mauser⁵⁶.

The idea that this was a static society, the mistaken beliefs about the Rif's social and political structure and the economic riches which the region allegedly held, are easy to dismiss. Perhaps, however, they should not be condemned too glibly but rather be understood in the context of the time. Very little was known about northern Morocco in 1912, so it was hardly surprising that the Spanish shared the same assumptions about the nature of society in their zone as other observers from the rest of Europe. Like them, they saw a region without the supposed benefits of centralised government, an anarchic region without any strong political unity, and they based their policy on this misunderstanding. Although the occupation of the Spanish Protectorate could only be achieved, if at all, by military means, the Spanish army would always be under pressure to limit its military activity to spare the Spanish budget and to prevent loss of life. Instead, they had to concentrate on political action, using the social and political structures to ease the occupation. A few notable exceptions apart, army officers were not usually anthropologists. When they were asked to act as such, to achieve the occupation of the zone through political penetration, rather than the use of force, they failed. Indeed, as the result of trying to implement a political policy by manipulating misunderstood concepts about the nature of Moroccan society, the Spanish army helped to create a united resistance, and provided it with the means with which to fight.

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4. THE IMPOSITION OF THE SPANISH PROTECTORATE

Resistance to the Spanish was not new in Moroccan history. It was at least as old as the Spanish and Portuguese invasions of Morocco in the sixteenth century. Indeed, the Sa^Cdi dynasty - which ruled Morocco between 1548 and 1641 - was founded on the success of Sultan Ahmad al-Sa^Cdi (1578-1603) against the Portuguese ¹.

However, the Sa^Cdi dynasty based, as it was, on a combination of sheer force and on reliance on the support of the tariqa-s, was fundamentally unstable. It soon collapsed under economic pressure into warring factions, and it was not until the 1670s that a new dynasty, that of the ^CAlawis, was able to replace it. ^CAlawi power, at first, was founded on a centralised political system and a slave army. This was successful enough for a while, and the ^CAlawis were able to expel the Spanish from Larache in 1689. However, they were not able to prevent the Spanish from occupying Alhucemas Island in 1673, or to dislodge them thereafter. In the 1720s, once again under economic pressure, the regime fell apart, and it was not until the reign of Muhammad III (1757-1790) that ^CAlawi power was finally stabilised along the lines which were to characterise the Moroccan Makhzan until the early twentieth century - a controlled centre with devolved political power on the periphery. While Muhammad was able to expel the Portuguese from Mazagan in 1774, he could not to take Melilla when he besieged it in 1774 and made no more than feints in the direction of the other presidios. His successor, al-Yazid (1790-1792), was no more successful in his siege of Ceuta ². Thus not only the maintenance of order but also opposition to the Spanish effectively became a local responsibility in peripheral areas like the Rif which included the hinterland of the Spanish presidios.

Alhucemas Bay, had anyway always been a minor political centre. The plain of Swani, watered by the Wadi al-Nakur and the Wadi Ghis is the most fertile area of the central Rif. The Wadi al Nakur had, in the eighth century AD, given its name both to a small kingdom and to its capital, situated on the banks of the river some five miles from the coast. The port of the

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kingdom was at al-Muzimma, near the modern settlement of Ajdir, and although the kingdom collapsed around the middle of the eleventh century, it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth that al-Muzimma finally disappeared. On the site of al-Muzimma the local people built a fortress to protect the coast line from the Spanish on Alhucemas Island. Significantly the gasba was named the Burj al-Mujahidin, the "Fort of the Warriors for the Faith" ³, - resistance to the Europeans was a religious duty. At the end of the nineteenth century, the gasba consisted of a large building and a mosque, and was manned by 100 men drawn in rotation from various clans of the Banu Waryaghal, and relieved every month. They were armed with some 100 ancient cannon which, apparently they could not fire ⁴.

Things were similar on the shore opposite the other island presidio of Penon de Velez de la Gomera. There had been a medieval town, Badis, on the shore of the Banu Yittuft which was deserted after the Spanish occupied the Penon in 1564. In its place a military fort was built ⁵. Meanwhile a new settlement grew up at Snada, some distance inland, where an important zawiya of the Wazzanniya tariqa was founded, and a Makhzan gasba established from time to time ⁶. To defend the region against the Spanish, local groups, the zawiya-s, and the Makhzan interacted.

Snada and Ajdir were more than military bases, however. They were important settlements too - by the beginning of the twentieth century a community of around 1,000 families lived in Ajdir and about 7-800 people in Snada. This gave them an economic role, and despite the establishment of the gasba-s, trade between the presidios and the mainland was carried on. In both places, the Rifis went to the islands to buy food (particularly grain in times of harvest failure) and textiles. It was a rather onesided trade at times, for at the end of the nineteenth century the Mujahidin did not allow local people in the area of the Penon to provide any supplies to the island, not even water ⁷. This prohibition may in fact have been only a temporary response to the fighting that flared up around Melilla in 1893. However, during the nineteenth century there was often open resistance to the Spanish. Irregular forces from the Rif were sent to help the Sultan's troops in the Tetuan war of 1860 and, having arrived on the very day the peace treaty was to be signed, were only with great difficulty restrained from attacking the Spanish ⁸. In 1893, the Spanish were able to deal with the fighting around Melilla but real problems arose there in 1909.

In 1908 the pretender to the Moroccan throne, Abu Himara, made his last attempts to cement his authority over northern Morocco. From his base in Silwan he sent his disastrous expedition to subdue the central Rif, and impose taxes there. Around the same time, he opened relations with Spanish companies over mineral concessions. Legally, the only authority able to give mining concessions in Morocco was the Sultan - but Abu

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Himara claimed to be the Sultan anyway, and issued zahir-s (decrees) to the Compania Española de Minas del Rif allowing them to start mining for iron at Wiksan in the mountains of the Banu Bu Ifrur tribe south-west of Melilla, and to build a railway to serve the workings⁹. Isolated attacks on the mine workings began in 1908, at the same time as a revolt against Abu Himara himself led the largest tribe of the central Rif, the Banu Waryaghar. By the time the railway works began in July 1909, the pretender's power had collapsed. Led by Muhammad Amziyyan, a member of a respected family of sharif-s in the Banu Bu Ifrur¹⁰, a local jiḥād was declared. The delegation sent to ask Sultan 'Abd al-Hafiz for support from the Makhzan, having been turned down¹¹, local people had once again to act alone.

Following the attacks on the railway workings, troops were mobilised in Spain and sent to Morocco. The forces were led by the commander in Melilla, General Marina, who managed not only to remove the threat to the mine and railway workings, but also to occupy most of the Qal'aya peninsula as far south as Silwan¹². The campaign was carried out in the face of fierce resistance, to which the Spanish retaliated severely. A British war correspondent described how crops were destroyed and houses blown up in the al-Nazur plain, a policy of which he approved which he described as a regrettable necessity of war " . . . part of the price barbarism pays for the coming of civilisation"¹³.

If the Moroccans were not particularly anxious to receive such benefits of civilisation from the Spanish, it was equally true that many Spaniards were not particularly anxious to provide it for them. When the Madrid government mobilised reservists in Catalonia in order to prepare more troops to be sent to Morocco, there was a week of rioting in Barcelona - the Semana Tragica, as it was called - which ended only after fierce fighting¹⁴. The events of 1909 made two things clear. The first was that there was considerable political opposition in Spain, especially from an increasingly organised and politicised working class, to any large scale involvement in Morocco. The second was that any opposition to Spanish involvement on the Moroccan side would have to come from locally organised forces, and could not rely on the disintegrating Makhzan.

In fact, the 1909 conflict temporarily weakened the Moroccan side, and it was not until May 1911 that Muhammad Amziyyan was again able to begin effective attacks on the Spanish. To begin with these were sporadic raids, but in September he led a large Rifi force to attack Spanish positions on the Wadi Kart. The Spanish were seriously threatened by these repeated attacks until, in May 1912, Amziyyan was killed in a skirmish and the fighting died down¹⁵.

By this time, the Spanish had additional problems to worry about. The collapse of Morocco as an independent state was entering its final stage. French troops had occupied Fez, and the Spanish had occupied Larache. With the announcement of

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the Protectorate in November 1912, the process was completed.


As has been seen, when the protectorate treaty was ratified in 1912, Spain already occupied two areas of northern Morocco - a strip along the Atlantic coast, centred on Larache, and the region around Melilla which they had occupied in 1909. The vast bulk of their new protectorate was as yet unoccupied, and that included Tetuan, which had been designated as the capital.

In fact the Spanish government was most unwilling to commit large numbers of men and large amounts of money to a Moroccan adventure. The Semana Tragica of 1909 had shown how unpopular a major war in Morocco would be. Even the occupation of Tetuan itself was only authorised provided that it could be carried out peacefully. This was done, and on 19 February 1913, Spanish troops commanded by General Alfau entered the city¹⁶.

Once Tetuan had been occupied a system of government could be set up. The Spanish - like the French - were under international law, a "protecting power", so the Sultan's sovereignty had to be maintained. In the French zone the French Resident-General, Lyautey, ostentatiously acted strictly in the name of the Sultan, albeit one whom the French had chose, Mawlay Yusuf. Government was in his name, and the Sultan's flag, not the Tricolore, was flown and his anthem was played¹⁷. In the Spanish zone the Sultan's authority was represented by a khalifa, roughly the viceroy of the Sultan. He was to reside in Tetuan, and be the theoretical head of the administration. In fact, although the Sultan officially chose the khalifa, he did so from a list of nominees put forward by the Spanish, so that the control of the Spanish High Commissioner, the senior Spanish official, was absolute. As the semi-official historian of the Spanish Protectorate pointed out, "there is no practical point in any discussion of whether the Jalifa (sic) is coordinate with or subordinate to the High Commissioner, since his every act presupposes the consent of (the High Commissioner)"¹⁸. The only limits to the High Commissioner's authority were those imposed by the government in Madrid, a relationship which was somewhat confused by the fact that he was responsible to two separate ministries: to the Ministry of State (i.e. Foreign Ministry) in political matters, and to the Ministry of War in military questions¹⁹. This split responsibility would cause considerable administrative and organisational difficulties²⁰.

The confusions surrounding the formal organisation of the Protectorate aside, the real problem the Spanish faced was how to administer the territories which they actually controlled, and how to extend their authority over the "unsubmitted" areas without a great loss of life and a great deal of expense. The fact that the two areas which the Spanish did control in 1912 and 1913 were widely separated, led to the development of different systems of administration and different political policies.

In the Jibala, the first practical problem which faced the Spanish was that of Mawlay Ahmad al-Raisuli. The Sharif had



1. Area held by Spain, November 1912

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had high hopes of being appointed khalifa of the whole Spanish zone, which would have been in the Moroccan tradition of giving posts to powerful local leaders, and incorporating them into the state structure, a tradition from which he had benefitted in the past. Al-Raisuli, however, had real power and probably for that reason, the Spanish preferred to appoint a non-entity, Mawlay al-Mahdi bin Isma'il bin Muhammad, a relative of the Sultan. Al-Raisuli was, however, offered reinstatement as Pasha of Asila, the post from which he had been ejected in 1911 in favour of Idris al-Rifi²¹.

This did not help the Spanish. Since al-Raisuli was unable to rely on their support to retain his prestige, he had to depend instead on that provided by his followers, and they demanded that he lead the resistance to the Spanish²². In the summer of 1913 he took up this role; supplies were sent up to his old base at Tazarut on Jabal Alam near the shrine of Mawlay Abd al-Salam bin Mashish in the Banu Arus. Once this had been done he was declared as leader of a jiḥād during Friday prayer in the nearby zawiya of Sidi Yussif al-Tilidi in the Akhmas. Further calls for jiḥād came from the Darqawi zawiya to Tuzgan in the Banu Mansur (Ghumara) where a small force was prepared²³.

However, on-one, not even al-Raisuli, was strong enough to meet the Spanish in the open. So resistance was confined to hit-and-run raids on Spanish positions and harrying their lines of communications. They were uncoordinated as well, and each group acted independently²⁴.

Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the resistance did not stop al-Raisuli from making exaggerated claims to leadership. Despite the fact that the Anjara tribe near Ceuta had always been opposed to him as well as to the Spanish, when it rose against the Spanish in 1913 he assumed a new title: "Sultan of the Jihād". The declaration was made not in Tazarut but in "holy" Shawin²⁵. Al-Raisuli was now the strongest individual in the Jibala, despite the shaky nature of his support. From this position of strength, al-Raisuli once again opened negotiations with the Spanish, in an attempt to secure his position on all sides.

The negotiations, in 1914, failed, partly because heavy rain disrupted communications, and partly because in the unstable coalition which supported him, "enmities were more important than alliances"²⁶. Internal feuding broke out amongst al-Raisuli's supporters, and by the end of 1914, the Spanish were advancing again.

During the first part of 1915, al-Raisuli's relations with the Spanish were strained further. One of his messengers was murdered and he alleged that this was done by Idris al-Rifi, on the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Fernandez Silvestre, the Spanish commander in the Jibala. Silvestre, a flamboyant, impetuous, even arrogant officer was an old enemy of al-Raisuli, and had been the man who removed him as Pasha of Asila in

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1911 to replace him with Idris al-Rifi. Whatever the truth of al-Raisuli's allegation, the High Commissioner, General Marina, certainly believed it, for he sacked Silvestre and then resigned himself²⁷.

Marina's replacement, General Jordana, was uncomfortably aware that al-Raisuli had considerable power - at least 2,000 well-armed men, who were paid out of the taxes which their master levied on the tribes. Negotiations began again, and once more al-Raisuli showed that he was quite prepared to cooperate with the Spanish and was intolerant of local criticism for doing so. When some of his supporters accused him of betraying the resistance, he answered by pointing out that they had chosen him as Sultan. The agreement recognised what was virtually a free hand for the Sharif in the mountains, in return for him holding off attacks on the Spanish²⁸.

With al-Raisuli's cooperation the Spanish were able to advance further during the summer of 1915. They finally managed to occupy the Funduq of Ain Al-Jadida, at the top of the main pass between Tangier and Tetuan. This was a crucial position, for it at last gave the Spanish troops in the capital a link with those on the west coast. In return the Spanish helped al-Raisuli to impose his authority on the recalcitrant tribe of Anjara, and further backed him in a more general way. Al-Raisuli gained more from his relations with the Spanish than they did; they made his authority more secure, but did not control him, and many of the positions which they had occupied were only of symbolic value. As al-Raisuli pointed out to his biographer, Rosita Forbes, the fact that they had taken a village meant very little: "With you, if a town is taken, that is the end. With us it means a few more men in the mountains"²⁹.

Northern Morocco is superb guerrilla territory, and its inhabitants knew well how to use the land. The Spanish forts and posts would always be vulnerable, as the Rifis would show in 1921.

For the moment, al-Raisuli kept his word, and benefitted thereby. By the end of 1915, attacks on the Spanish had decreased and the Jibala was mainly under his control³⁰. However, with no threat from the Spanish, and anxious for other sources of support, he began to look in new directions. The World War opened the intriguing possibility of getting German backing, and al-Raisuli, who had had contacts with the German minister in Tangier before the war, spent much of 1916 spreading German propaganda in the Jibala and prophesying Allied defeat³¹. Were such propaganda to be widely believed it would mark al-Raisuli as the ally of the future victor in the World War, and further increase his prestige. Again he benefitted most, for al-Raisuli's intervention could have little effect on the course of the war itself.

Meanwhile the Spanish military marked time. Strikes in Spain, and a series of unstable governments - there were five ministries between April 1917 and March 1918 - put paid to any

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plan to advance in Morocco. For nearly three years, from the beginning of 1916 until November 1918, al-Raisuli was left virtually in charge of the Jibala.

In the eastern zone the task facing the Spanish was more complicated than it had been in the Jibala. In the Rif there was no one leader like al-Raisuli with whom they could make a deal. Instead there were a large number of smaller leaders whose authority had only a very localised span and was dependent on the balance of power within the tribes. This complicated political situation both helped the Spanish and hindered them.

Soon after the occupation of Tetuan in 1913, efforts were made in the Rif to raise forces and send them to the Jibala to help in the resistance. Some of these haraka-s were successfully bought off by the Spanish³², others were too small to be effective³³. One major force did leave for Tetuan in early July, with the support of most of the tribes in the central Rif except the Banu Waryaghal, because of their long-standing mistrust of the Qal'ayi tribes who had joined it. Support slowly ebbed away, and the haraka came to nothing³⁴. This distrust on the part of the Banu Waryaghal for Qal'ayi resistance to the Spanish in 1921.

Rifi disorganisation played directly into the hands of the Spanish, who made great efforts to encourage it. Indeed, the major thrust of their action up to the end of the World War was directed to that end, for Spanish policy in the Rif had the same priorities as it did in the rest of the Protectorate: to achieve the best result possible without a heavy commitment of men or money. As a result a policy of political penetration was adopted.

In the Melilla zone this penetration was undertaken by an agency of the Spanish army, the Oficina Central de Tropas y Asuntos Indigenas (OCTAI, - the Central Office for Native Troops and Affairs), which had originally been set up in 1909 to administer the newly-captured Qal'aya Peninsula, when it was called Negociado Indigena (Native Office)³⁵. As its name suggests, the OCTAI had two functions, one military - to recruit Moroccans into the Spanish "native" forces, the units known as the Regulares, - the other administrative and political.

The OCTAI had two distinct political tasks. It had to administer the zone already occupied by the Spanish and it had to win over the unoccupied or (as the Spanish saw it) rebel area. As far as the first was concerned there was little problem. The occupied territories were firmly in the Spanish grip, and the OCTAI defined its main function as follows:

. . . to serve as an intermediary with the chiefs who wish to speak to Your Excellency (the Comandante General in (Melilla), listening and taking note of their declarations and desires, carefully preparing the mind of the person concerned for the refusal or postponement of his requests, flattering him with fine words and hopeful replies, so that even if he does not see his desires realised, he will not leave

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dissatisfied³⁶.

It was in the unoccupied areas that most political effort was expended. The main objective was to force into submission the largest and most powerful tribe in the central Rif, the Banu Waryaghal, which controlled Alhucemas Bay, the plain of Swani and the mountains behind.

The Spanish had a two-fold plan. Firstly, they planned to isolate the Banu Waryaghal, by forming around it a cordon sanitaire of other tribes, linked together in a "Gran Lef Oriental" (great eastern liff). This would unite the Banu Tuzin, Timsaman, Banu Walishak, Gaznaya and Banu Sa'id tribes. Secondly, they would try to form a series of pro-Spanish alliances in the Banu Waryaghal, and to ensure that the existing conflicts in the tribe worked in their favour³⁷.

This plan was to some extent contradictory, for it involved simultaneously uniting and disuniting the tribes. Moreover it implied a greater level of control in the region than the Spanish actually had. People could not be forced into alliance with the Spanish, since the Spanish army was not allowed to undertake direct military action. They therefore had to rely on other methods of persuasion: money, control over commerce and the links between the Rif and the world outside and the creation of disorder. The first and last of these levers were the most important, for the Spanish believed that by judicious use of pensions paid to individuals they would promote themselves as the major providers of income, and bring about the collapse of the system of haqq fines, which as we have seen underpinned social and political stability, and so weaken the opposition that it would be impossible for any large group to unite against them.

From the beginning of the protectorate, the Spanish authorities paid out large sums of money to local people who, they hoped, would help them to penetrate the area. Accounts exist of payments from Alhucemas Island from 1913 onwards³⁸, when the Spanish distributed some 6676 pesetas a month to 152 people, mostly from the Banu Waryaghal, with smaller amounts spread around three other tribes. The average amount per person was 44.3 pesetas. Over the years the amount increased - by 1917 an average of 70 pesetas per month was distributed to each pensioner³⁹. For some people these pensions represented an important part of their income. In 1919, when food was very scarce, barley cost 60 pesetas a quintal and wheat 80 pesetas a quintal⁴⁰. These were men without any great political or social significance. Their job was to keep Spanish intelligence informed about the goings-on in the Banu Waryaghal, so they were mainly drawn from among the people who regularly visited the presidios at Alhucemas or Penon de Velez, small traders and farmers. That at least partly explains why so many pensioners (60 per cent of the total in 1913) came from the Ajdir region, the foreshore of the Banu Waryaghal. It was a function which their ancestors had carried on for over two hundred years: the Spanish had been paying Moroccan informants since the mid-

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seventeenth century.

The paid informants were only part of the story. The really big catches, in Spanish eyes, were men who had real political and social influence in the Banu Waryaghal and a few other tribes. From the first, the Spanish made great efforts to win them over. In the earliest lists appear the names of such people as Si Bu Bakar bin al-Hajj Ushshan, who had been appointed the overall qaid of the Banu Waryaghal clans of Banu Yussif w-^CAli, Banu Turirth, Banu ^CAli and Timarzga by Bushta al-Baghdadi, when he came with the Makhzan army to punish the Buquyis in 1898 (150 pesetas a month); Muhammad bin Sadiq who effectively led the Banu Hadifa clan of the Banu Waryaghal and who was later joined by his brother, ^CAmar, and son, Sadiq; and from outside the Banu Waryaghal, Ra'is Misa^Cud bin ^CAmar "Sibara", one of the most important leaders of the Buquya tribe; Qaddur bin ^CAmar of the Banu Sa'id, later a powerful anti-Spanish leader; and the nephew and son of Muhammad Amziyyan, Spain's old opponent who was killed in 1911. All these received 500 pesetas a month⁴¹. Most important of all, in Spanish eyes, was a qadi living in Ajdir, ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi.

The al-Khattabis were not sharif-s or even murabit-s, but they did claim descent from ^CUmar ibn al-Khattab, the Orthodox Caliph and companion of the Prophet Muhammad, although doubts have been cast on the truth of the genealogy⁴². However, their considerable influence in the Banu Waryaghal, particularly in the clan of Banu Yusif a-^CAli centred on Ajdir where they lived, was based on quite different considerations. This was a family of culture and education in an area where neither was very common and one which, as a result, had had a close relationship with the pre-colonial Makhzan. Both the grandfather and father of ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi bore the title of qaid⁴³, and he was a qadi as well, a position conferred by successive sultans. In 1880 Mawlay al-Hassan appointed ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi as qadi of the Banu Waryaghal⁴⁴, and that was confirmed by Mawlay ^CAbd al-^CAziz in 1906⁴⁵. In 1908 Mawlay ^CAbd al-Hafiz wrote to him making him responsible for reading out his letter asking for the tribe's bay'a⁴⁶. He was not the only member of the family to enjoy this sort of close relationship with the Makhzan. Then Bushta al-Baghdadi brought his troops into the Rif in 1898 to punish the Buquyis he appointed another member of the family, Si Ziyyan al-Khattabi, as qaid of the Banu Yussif w-^CAli, although it was not long before he was murdered⁴⁷. Finally, a brother of ^CAbd al-Karim, Si Muhammad Manfusha, was a teacher in the great mosque-university of al-Qarawiyyin in Fez⁴⁸, and his eldest son, Muhammad, received his education there as well, studying alongside his father's younger brother, ^CAbd al-Salam al-Khattabi, who was much the same age as himself⁴⁹. This was just the sort of important family whose support the Spanish coveted, and they made great efforts to "attract" ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi, efforts which al-Khattabi was quite happy to reciprocate. His son was taken into Spanish service

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a long time before the Protectorate was imposed. In 1907, two years after finishing his education in Fez, Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim was sent to Melilla by his father, and became a teacher in a Moroccan school and then Berber interpreter in the OCTAI, then a qadi and finally qadi qudat (chief judge) of Melilla. From the beginning of his stay he was also responsible for writing the Arabic column in the local newspaper, El Telegrama del Rif ⁵⁰. In January 1913 his apparent loyalty was given official recognition when the young qadi was awarded the Spanish decoration of "Knight of the Order of Isabel the Catholic Queen" ⁵¹, an ironic honour in view of Isabel's will which demanded the conquest of North Africa, and the young qadi's later activities. In the same year, his father was receiving 250 pesetas a month from the Spanish, which increased to 500 pesetas a month by 1917 ⁵². He was, however, expected to provide more for the Spanish by way of return than mere information.

^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi's main job was to put into effect what can only be described as a policy of "continuous war". The Spanish hoped to prevent the collection of haqq fines. That would lead to feuding and prevent the tribes from uniting against them. This, as Colonel Riquelme, the head of the OCTAI, later described it, was ^CAbd al-Karim's task:

His method was to prevent the fines from being paid, to break up the markets with fighting. Then came vengeance, blood debts, and a man from one village killed one from another and they could never join strength and swell the harka fighting us. Many years were passed in this way; they were in a state of continuous war, and they never came to fight us ⁵³.

Certainly this tactic was reasonably successful for some time, and in 1917 the Spanish were able to report that there was a "savage blood bath" in progress amongst the Banu Waryaghal, doubtless organised by the "criminal elements" which the Spanish had recruited amongst their ordinary pensioners. It was a situation which gave them considerable satisfaction. As a Spanish report put it, "This disturbed situation as well as distracting their attention from us has the advantage that when they are themselves tired of it, they will desire some authority to put an end to it" ⁵⁴. In Spanish eyes such an authority could only be themselves.

There were serious flaws in this reasoning, for there was no guarantee that the Rifis would turn to the Spanish to put an end to their feuding. They might, and in the end did - seek a quite different solution, that of reorganising the political structure themselves in order to end the feuding and to oppose the Spanish. The Spanish, of course thought that the possibility was rather remote. A more immediate problem was that their agents might not wish to carry out the functions for which they were paid. As the British Ambassador in Madrid rather bluntly put it: "The trouble is that so many Moors, to use an American

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phrase, persistently decline to 'stay bought' "55.

Such unreliability was not a fickleness of the race, as the Ambassador might seem to suggest, but practical good sense. Politics was a question of balancing between the Spanish and local rivals. Alliances with the Spanish, the French or, later, the Germans, provided access to money and to external backing. They were not made out of political conviction. This was as true of important men like al-Raisuli, as it was of lesser leaders like Muhammad Bu Qaddur of the Timsaman, who rather than ally himself with other pro-Spanish Rifis like the al-Khattabis took every opportunity to blacken their name with the Spanish 56. Furthermore, as a new recruit to the ranks of the Spanish pensioners, Abd al-Karim bin al-Hajj Ali Luh, of the Buquyya tribe explained to the Spanish in 1916, their agents had a vested interest in slowing down the Spanish advance:

Know also that those who take money from you and declare that they are the friends of Spain are liars; they are evil and treacherous, for they know and have assured themselves that if the Spanish nation does come down upon the Rif and settle its troops there, the monthly salary which they take now will no longer remain. And so they never advise you truly; on the contrary, they always deceive you 57.

Doubtless the new recruit was seeking favour with the Spanish while decrying his local rivals who had served them for much longer. That, after all, was one of the advantages of the Spanish: like the old Makhzan they provided political support for ambitious local leaders. He was not necessarily lying, however. Indeed, his words would be borne out in 1920, when a former Spanish agent in the Qal'aya peninsula behind Melilla - which had been occupied since 1912 - made contact with resistance groups in the unoccupied tribe of Banu Sa'id. He wanted to co-ordinate their attack on the Spanish with a rising behind the Spanish lines. "His reason", the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan reported, "is the contemptuous treatment he receives from the Spanish who no longer need his services now that the Qal'aya is in their hands" 58.

There were other reasons why important local pensioners could not carry out their roles. They had to survive in the political environment of their tribes, and the largesse bestowed by the Spanish on the highly favoured few exposed them to greater risk. Quite simply, those who had more money had more to lose, and were therefore more liable to pressure from other people in the tribe. Provided that they could balance this pressure by providing tangible benefits to their supporters, there was no immediate threat. Muhammad Bu Qaddur, a qaid of the Timsaman tribe and an important pensioner, explained this in a letter to the Spanish. He had been asked to secure the release of some smugglers held in Melilla and told the Spanish that, "Every day people seek me out in the markets asking about those who have been detained in Melilla. If you do set them

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free, I will be much more highly esteemed"⁵⁹. However, if he did not provide the benefits he was at risk. So, when the Spanish failed to pay the pensions on time, he (and other pro-Spanish leaders) would write to demand that they should do so at once. Bu Qaddur's political philosophy was quite simple; he told the Spanish: "Know that words have no force without money - on the contrary, money gives force to words"⁶⁰. Bu Qaddur, like other big pensioners, had to tread carefully, knowing that his survival depended on a Chinese box of deceitful relations between himself, other Timsamanis and the Spanish; he told the Spanish that "I encourage them, deceiving them to keep them happy - just as you do with me"⁶¹.

The principal weakness of the pension policy was its reliance on the loyalty of individuals. That loyalty was bought not only with money, but with other rewards too - particularly education. But here again the policy was flawed. Schools for Moroccan children had been set up in Tetuan and Melilla before the announcement of the Protectorate, and these schools had been followed by others in Larache and near Melilla in 1912. However, the number of children they taught was very small - by 1919 only 200 Moroccans were receiving full-time education in the Melilla area⁶².

The small numbers were the result of an education policy designed to benefit the children of a small number of prominent local leaders from both the occupied and the unoccupied territories. There were reasons for this. Firstly, the children from the unoccupied areas provided useful hostages against the good behaviour of their fathers⁶³. Secondly, the Spanish hoped that Moroccans whom they had educated would eventually enter their service and become useful in the Army and administration. This was indeed what happened in the case of a Qal'ayi boy, Muhammad bin Amziyyan (Mizzian in Spanish documents), who studied in Melilla, went on to the Spanish Infantry Academy in Toledo, became a lieutenant in an infantry regiment, and eventually rose to the highest ranks of the Spanish Army as Military Governor of the Canary Islands.

After Moroccan independence in 1956 he became Chief of Staff of the Moroccan Army⁶⁴. Bin Amziyyan was "the son of a shaykh always noted for his friendship towards Spain"⁶⁵, and that description is the clue to the third reason for the Spanish concentration on providing education only for the sons of the shaykh-s that education of the son was the reward for the friendship of the father. Results were not always what was expected. One very promising student was the younger son of ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi, Mahammad, who studied first in Melilla and then in the prestigious School of Mines in Madrid⁶⁶. However, when his family turned against the Spanish in 1919, he abandoned his studies in Madrid and returned home to take part in the resistance.

The reason for the failure with Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim lay in the very nature of a policy directed at the sons

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of important leaders. For, just as the sons were hostages of the Spanish, so their fathers were a sort of hostage in the hands of their own people. The leaders in the unsubmitted areas were extremely vulnerable to the pressure of their followers. The failure to take that into consideration lay at the heart of the Spanish political failure in Morocco although, given the constraints of men and money that Madrid put on them, there was little else the army could have done.

It was not, however, the only reason. Moroccans accepted Spanish friendship in order to bolster their position politically and economically. But the Spanish were not the only potential source of revenue, certainly during the First World War.

As far as the great conflict on the battlefields of Western Europe was concerned, northern Morocco was a backwater, yet even here the great powers fought their surrogate wars. The Spanish zone provided a marvellous opportunity for the Germans: a legally neutral and absolutely uncontrolled territory from which they could organise local people to attack the French to the south. Their chief agent in these affairs was a young German, Albert Bartels, who knew Morocco well⁶⁷. Seen from the eyes of those Moroccans who wanted to prevent the French from occupying their land the war was also a golden opportunity to use German support to fight their mutual enemy. So Bartels was easily able to find a local ally in the person of ^CAbd al Malik bin Muhyi al-Din, the grandson of the great Algerian leader of resistance to the French, the Amir ^CAbd al-Qadir. ^CAbd al-Malik had spent many years in Morocco, and when the World War broke out moved to the Rif to lead his own resistance to the French⁶⁸.

In fact, ^CAbd al-Malik was distinguished more for his dislike of the French than his support for the Germans. The latter were useful allies, and no more, and he and Bartels often quarrelled. ^CAbd al-Malik was apparently worried that, in the event of a German victory, French colonialism might be replaced by German⁶⁹. In fact, neither ^CAbd al-Malik nor Bartels had more than a nuisance value for the French, but they did receive some support for the Rif, proof that although attacks on the Spanish were relatively infrequent, the spirit of resistance was certainly not dead. It was directed against the French rather than the Spanish because, while the Spanish remained stationary behind their lines, the French posed an immediate threat. So, in July 1916, ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi sent men to help ^CAbd al-Malik⁷⁰, and in March 1917 he helped to organise the despatch of more from the Timsaman⁷¹. However, two months later he told the Spanish that he had quarrelled with ^CAbd al-Malik and was abandoning the German cause⁷².

There is no reason to doubt the motives of the general support for the Germans, and their allies, the Turks. They were, after all, fighting the Moroccans' main enemies, the French. The repeated attacks on the French during, and after, the First World War are enough to make it abundantly clear that such

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support did exist. However, working with the Germans also brought to the local leaders important supplies of money. Like the Spanish, the Germans tried to buy support. In October 1916 the Spanish in al-Nazur intercepted some 800,000 pesetas on their way to ^CAbd al-Malik⁷³, in March 1917, 11,740 pesetas was seized⁷⁴, and in the same year another, very intriguing consignment was sent in. This consisted of 18,000 duros (90,000 pesetas), 18 gold watches, and 18 personal letters which were supposedly signed by the former Sultan Mawlay ^CAbd al-Hafiz, who was actively working for the Germans from his place of exile in Barcelona. These were directed to 18 important personalities in the Melilla area, including ^CAbd al-Karim, Isma'il wuld al-Shadli of the al-Mazuja tribe, who would be an important leader against the Spanish at the beginning of the Rif War, and the strongly anti-Spanish al-Hajj ^CAmar of the al-Matalsa tribe⁷⁵.

The German agents were not entirely acting in the dark, for they would have had good reason to believe that Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim, at least, was well disposed towards them. Even before the War, in his Arabic column in the local newspaper, El Telegrama del Rif, while calling for cooperation with the Spanish in order to undertake the modernisation that Morocco needed, he attacked France for wanting to colonise Morocco⁷⁶. The First World War changed his attitude to the Spanish. His open dislike of France and sympathy towards Germany, when coupled with his father's identical views in the first part of the war, raised questions about his loyalty to Spain, France's partner in Morocco. In 1915 the Spanish arrested him. He was eventually acquitted, but although the judge said that he had committed no crime he went on to declare that his real loyalties were hard to discover and impossible to prove⁷⁷. So, bin ^CAbd al-Karim remained in prison until, in 1916, his father stopped working with ^CAbd al-Malik and the Germans.

Nevertheless, the son kept his sympathies for the Germans, and probably his links with their agents also. Certainly he remained of use to them. In 1917, the Spanish arrested ^CAbd al-Qadir bin Sarga, the son-in-law of another prominent al-Matalsi leader, the qaid Abu Rahayl. It was Abu Rahayl who had first introduced Bartels to ^CAbd al-Malik⁷⁸. The Spanish suspected bin Sarga of helping the Germans, and he was only released after the intercession of Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim. Towards the end of the World War bin Sarga reappeared in Ajdir, carrying a supply of money which he claimed was from ^CAbd al-Hafiz and the Germans. His aim, he said, was to organise a haraka against the French. While he was in the Banu Waryaghal he made contact with the Bu Dra^C family, members of which played a large part in bin ^CAbd al-Karim's government during the Rif war and which was connected with the al-Khatjabi family by marriage, and also with Si ^CAmar bin Misa'ud, "Pantorillas", another military leader in 1920 and 1921⁷⁹. Thus during the First World War, German money and

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the shared opposition to the French began to bind together some of the men who would later lead the resistance to the Spanish, including the al-Khattabi family.

It was not the only link which joined them, for it was paralleled in the Banu Waryaghal by a more enduring one still, based on intermarriage. The al-Khattabi family was a fairly important one in the context of their tribe, and its marriage links were fairly extensive. There was, for example, a long-standing marriage connection with the Azarqan family, which was reinforced when a daughter of ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi married Muhammad Azarqan, later Rifi "Minister" for Foreign Affairs⁸⁰. The Bu Dra^C family, with whom bin Sarga had made contact, also had close connections with the al-Khattabis: not only were they cousins, but Muhammad Bu Dra^C, brother of the future "Minister" for War, was married to another daughter of ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi. Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim, the future Rifi Amir and now qadi in Melilla, and Muhammad Bu Jibar each married the other's sister, a neat swap which strengthened the links between their two families⁸¹.

The links stretched even beyond the Banu Waryaghal, a very unusual situation in the Rif where most marriages are endogamous within the clan, let alone the tribe. Haddu bin Ziyyan was a cousin of the al-Khattabis, and he married a sister of a man of the Buquyya tribe. This was Ra'is Misa'ud bin ^CAmar, usually known as "Sibara". His nick-name was a corruption of the surname of a Spanish Admiral Civera, for Ra'is Amar was a man of the sea. He first came to the attention of the Spanish as a pirate. In 1896 the Spanish captured him while he was trying to take a Spanish boat by force. In 1911 he was arrested again, this time by the Tangier police, for smuggling and released the following year in exchange for Spanish prisoners taken by Muhammad Amziyyan in the fighting around Melilla. He later bought a boat which, under the Spanish flag, he used for commerce with the Spanish mainland. His partner in this latter venture was another Buquyyi who had been arrested with him - ^CAbd al-Karim bin al-Hajj ^CAli Luh - who later became Sibara's trading partner and "agent" in Tangier, the other end of the smuggling chain⁸². To seal the relationship he married Sibara's sister⁸³. Even further afield, there was a longstanding bond of friendship between ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi, and the head of the Akhamlishin family with its headquarters in Targist⁸⁴.

Thus, by the end of the First World War, a nucleus existed in the Rif of people who were connected both by marriage and by political links. Some of these were the powerful local shaykh-s who had always competed for dominance in the tribes. Others represented a rather new group - young, not necessarily from families with political prestige, not murabit-s or sharif-s, but to some extent educated. Some, like Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim bin al-Hajj ^CAli, were at least able to read and write in Arabic although they had been educated less formally perhaps.

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But many of them were not literate in Arabic alone, but could speak and sometimes write European languages, usually Spanish, and were conversant with European ways in a manner which their fathers could not have been. Muhammad bin Abd al-Karim had, by the end of the First World War, spent eleven years in Melilla. His brother, Mahammad, had been educated in Spanish schools, and at the end of the War was studying in the School of Mines in Madrid. Others, like Sibara, had made his acquaintanceship with Europe through the gaols of Tangier and, like Abd al-Karim bin al-Hajj Ali, through trade, legal and illegal. These men, of course, represented only a fraction of those who had some contact with Europe. By the end of the First World War, they were many indeed. Spain had occupied the Qal'aya since 1909, and local men had been recruited into the Spanish Regulares. They too had learned something of European ways, especially of military techniques, and would play their own part in the Rif War.

As yet, however, neither these Moroccans in the Spanish Army, nor the group whose nucleus was the al-Khattabi family and whose tentacles spread into neighbouring tribes through marriage and pro-German sympathies, were actively opposed to the Spanish. Many of them were still Spanish pensioners. Even the Al-Khattabis, despite the difficulties of 1915 and 1916, were again considered by the Spanish to be loyal.

This was a situation which would change when the Spanish again began to move forward, when the tradition of localised resistance to the Christians reasserted itself and political unity was restored, and when social and political pressures in the Rif obliged the local leaders to turn against the Spanish.

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5. THE BASIS OF RESISTANCE

For the tide to turn, for a resistance to be formed out of the political confusion in the Rif, a stimulus had to be provided. While the Spanish remained in their blockhouses, their advance frozen on the orders of the government in Madrid, that stimulus was lacking. Disunited by feuding, with many leaders in Spanish pay, an organised resistance was anyway impossible.

New Spanish policies changed that. The First World War ended on 11 November 1918. A week later General Jordana, the Spanish High Commissioner in Tetuan, completed a major report on what he himself described as the failure of Spanish policy in Morocco over the previous three years. Moments after finishing it he died at his desk. The end of the war in Europe, the death of General Jordana, and his final report all marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Protectorate.

In Jordana's view there were two reasons for the political failure. The first was Madrid's instruction to maintain the status quo, and not to risk Spanish troops. This policy, he said, "... has paralysed our action during this period, which may be considered wasted, making pointless, for the most part, much of the political work carried out"¹. To bring about real pacification, he believed, the army would need troop reinforcements, more supplies and properly organised air support².

The second reason for failure, Jordana believed, lay in the dichotomy between the civil and military arms of the Protectorate. He explained that:

There are two policies headed by the same person (i.e. the High Commissioner) which must act independently. The war policy, which opens the way to civilisation, using arms as the means to an end . . . and the native policy, which must be controlled by the civil organs of the Protectorate in the pacified zone³.

In fact the government of the "pacified zone" was not exactly efficient. Walter Harris, correspondent of the Times in Tangier, pointed to the almost total absence of communications, of hospitals and dispensaries and reported the complaints of a Spanish deputy in the Cortes who said:

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The reports of our maladministration of our zone fade before the reality. At the outbreak of war, Spain took over from the German company which was operating the port of Larache all their material, but nothing whatever has been done . . . In all our zone the insecurity is absolute⁴.

From 1919, Spanish policy changed. Building hospitals and schools was still a low priority, but much more emphasis was put on military advance. The occupation of the Protectorate was renewed, with the sanction of Madrid. There was nothing new about the Madrid administrations - a series of weak, and increasingly exhausted conservative administrations⁵ - but they did give the new High Commissioner much wider latitude of action than his predecessors had received.

The Protectorate was restructured. Now, while the High Commissioner retained a general control over military matters, his specific authority was political. Day - to - day military affairs were to be the responsibility of the two Comandantes Generales in Ceuta and Melilla⁶. At first sight this was the prescription for a civilian protectorate, with a civilian not a military officer as High Commissioner. It was therefore illogical, as at least one Cortes deputy pointed out, that Jordana's replacement should be a prominent soldier, General Damaso Berenguer⁷.

Because Berenguer was a soldier, the emphasis on political action was laid aside. Once certain adjustments had been made to give Berenguer more direct control over military budgets, the new High Commissioner effectively took control of operations in the Jibala. This would later allow the Comandante General in Melilla a considerable latitude of action⁸. Meanwhile, in the Jibala, Berenguer concentrated on al-Raisuli.

The first step was to adopt a new political policy towards the Sharif, as a debate in the Cortes in February 1919 revealed. Al-Raisuli would not be treated with the same consideration as he had been in the past, the Prime Minister explained. A cynical left-wing deputy explained that this meant that "we are going to give him less money"⁹, but Berenguer went further than that and demanded that al-Raisuli submit to the "authority" of the Khalifa. To make the point doubly clear, he had Idris al-Rifi, the Sharif's old enemy, reinstated as Pasha of Asila¹⁰. The 22,000 men that Berenguer had in the western zone were a powerful disincentive to al-Raisuli to resist the new policy¹¹.

The Sharif did not resist. However, he did not submit to the Khalifa either. In February 1919 Spanish troops occupied much of the ^CAnjara tribe, and in April took positions on the coast east of Tetuan. In May, Berenguer moved into the Hawz tribe and from there into the Wadi Ras. By now al-Raisuli was desperate, and he appealed for help from the Rif. It came in the form of a small haraka led by Sidi Hamidu head of the Wazzaniyya zawiya at Snada. But it soon broke up¹².

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Sidi Hamidu carried on trying to get Rifi support to help al-Raisuli. In May he organised a delegation to see the sharif, in June he visited the Ghumara to find troops, and in July he held a meeting at his zawiya in Snada. On the last occasion representatives from three tribes (Buqquya, Banu Yittuft, and Banu Bu Frah) and three clans of the Banu Waryaghal (Banu Hadhifa, Banu ^CAbdallah, and Banu Bu ^CAyyash) promised to send help to al-Raisuli. It was a promise that was easier to make than to fulfill. The Banu Waryaghal clans refused to go and the haraka collapsed¹³. Despite Sidi Hamidu's efforts, al-Raisuli had little support in the Rif.

The Sharif was not finished, however. In July, the Spanish bungled an operation in the Wadi Ras and he took advantage of the confusion to attack the Spanish and rout them. Despite his own forebodings that this was an isolated victory, it made him wildly popular in the Jibala, and for the second time in his career al-Raisuli was declared Sultan of the Jihad, at a huge meeting at Mawlay ^CAbd al-Salam¹⁴. This was a story which would be repeated many times during the next few years: the euphoria generated by victory against the Spanish would cement support behind an individual leader, but it would also be couched in a call for jihad.

Al-Raisuli was more realistic and knew that he still needed help. In August he sought it once again in the Rif, and at his request Sidi Hamidu organised a haraka. He was no more successful than before. Although the haraka did set off, on 12 August, when it eventually reached Mawlay ^CAbd al-Salam it was found that there was no money with which to pay it. By 27 September the whole haraka had broken up and returned to the Rif in disorder¹⁵. When the Spanish attacked again in October they were virtually unresisted. They took Funduq ^CAin al-Jadida on 5 October, once again linking Tetuan with the Atlantic coast.

Sidi Hamidu's repeated failure to send help to al-Raisuli was not only the result of the Sharif's unpopularity in the Rif - although that undoubtedly played a part - but also of political disunity and economic chaos, and the lingering effects of the First World War. Long after the war was over, some Rifis continued to live in a world of illusion, for the German defeat took some time to sink into the general consciousness. In January 1919 rumours were still circulating that Germany and Turkey would continue the fight. The following month former German agents in the central Rif were sent letters which promised that they would continue to be paid¹⁶.

Even when the German defeat was accepted, it was still generally considered to be more urgent to fight the French than the Spanish, for there were rumours that the French were about to occupy the Spanish zone. These rumours were made more credible by numerous reports of French agents visiting the Rif¹⁷. Once again, however, it was a resistance without a leader, for the wartime chief of the struggle against the French,

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^CAbd al-Malik, had been expelled from the Rif at the end of the war by the Banu Waryaghal mountain clans of Banu ^CAbdallah and Banu Hadhifa. In April 1919 a large haraka was formed by men from the Banu Waryaghal (50 men), Buquya, Banu Bu Frah, Targist, Banu Mazdui, Banu Yittuft (10 each), Banu ^CAmart (400), Banu Siddat (300), Banu Gamil (200) and Akhmas (150)¹⁸. This was the first widescale opposition to the French and more men were sent in July, when the French occupied Hasi Wanzgha in the southern part of the al-Matalsa¹⁹.

Aside from the distraction provided by the French, the Rifis had other reasons for being wary of attacking the Spanish. Economic conditions in 1919 and 1920 were appalling. Harvests had been bad in 1918 and that winter rainfall was low. By March 1919 there was no grain left in the Banu Waryaghal. Prices rose rapidly to 60 pesetas a quintal at a time when the average pension paid at Alhucemas was 63 pesetas a month²⁰. The misery can be easily pictured, although not everyone suffered equally; ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi with his 500 pesetas a month pension could afford to buy five times more barley than the average pensioner, and both were better off than the man who got nothing.

To exert political pressure, the Spanish shut off commerce from al-Nakur Island. The French did the same from the south and by October there was full-scale famine in the Rif. Finally the OCTAI in al-Nakur Island insisted that commerce be reopened or people would starve to death. However, the point had been made - the Banu Waryaghal did not join a haraka being prepared in the Banu Tuzin, Tafarsit and Banu Walishak tribes²¹.

For a short while at the beginning of 1920 it looked as though the rains would be enough to ensure a reasonable harvest. In the event, both Rifi hopes and Spanish fears were misplaced. The harvests were disastrous. By the end of May people were reduced to eating roots and apparently continued to do so until December, when the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan, Mr. Atkinson, reported that there had been several deaths from poisoning through eating unwholesome roots²².

This might have helped the Spanish politically, driving home the advantage of cooperating with them, had they made sure that the areas which they did control were supplied with the grain that they needed. This was not done. In September 1920, the Kabdana tribe, east along the coast from Melilla, which had been in Spanish hands since 1912, complained that it was starving. In two anonymous letters, Kabdanis complained not only of hunger but also of heavy debts²³ and the oppression of the qaid-s, who had been appointed by the Spanish: "The tribe of Kabdana has been hungry and the qaid-s that rule it tyrannise the poor people . . . " one of them said²⁴. Looking back on the winter that followed, the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan, Mr. Atkinson reported that:

I understand that matters were especially hard during the famine last winter when Riffians were dying of hunger in

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the streets of Melilla (sic) and little or no attempt was made to feed them excepting by private enterprise in return for which the charitable individual required the female beneficiary to prostitute herself to him²⁵.

Atkinson was no admirer of Spanish colonialism in Morocco, and may have been predisposed to believe stories which were possibly exaggerated. However, that they circulated at all is evidence of the hatred felt for the Spanish. It is true that there had been famines before in the Rif, and that no Moroccan government had tried to relieve them; but the Spanish occupation had raised expectations. When those expectations were not fulfilled the disillusion was all the greater. With the considerable benefit of hindsight, Mr. Atkinson remarked in September 1921 that, "It is not to be wondered on the whole that the Riffians took advantage of the first occasion to rise"²⁶. Before they did that, however, the fragmented political unity had to be rebuilt.

Despite the prior call of the French threat, some efforts were made at the beginning of 1919 to organise the opposition to the Spanish. The basis of this attempt was to link a return to social order with a return to political unity. The first stage was to reimpose the haqq fines, which were now to be applied not only to criminals, but also to Spanish agents in the Rif. This time the haqq fines had overtly political ends.

The first efforts were made in the mountain clans of the Banu Waryaghal, which were far more enthusiastic opponents of the Spanish, partly because the extent of Spanish political and economic penetration there was much less. In February and March it was announced that anyone who attacked members of the haraka would be fined 2,000 pesetas. If a haraka member was killed, the fine would be 4,000 pesetas²⁷. In the Timsaman, in March, threats of heavy fines were made against Spanish agents such as Muhammad Bu Qaddur, and in the Banu Amart 10,000 pesetas collected in fines went towards the costs of the haraka. At the beginning of March, a meeting of representatives of the Buquqya, Banu Yittuft and Banu Waryaghal had met at the important Sunday market at al-Ruwadi in the Buquqya and agreed to reimpose haqq fines for all crimes²⁸.

It was not so easy to enforce these policies, for they were vigorously opposed. People in the area around the Penon de Velez objected to what they saw as a Waryaghli attempt to control them. The extremely heavy fines which were imposed alienated even previously anti-Spanish shaykh-s. This alienation had grown considerably by August, since the poorer people objected even more strongly to the severity of the fines. In September the fines collapsed completely, when an attempt by two mountain clans of the Banu Waryaghal - the Banu Hadhifa and the Banu Abdallah - to impose a heavy fine on the Banu Bu Ayyash failed in the face of opposition from every other clan in the tribe²⁹. As the first two clans were the main instigators of the return of the haqq fines and the principal

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leaders of the anti-Spanish movement, the frail political unity collapsed.

One reason for the collapse of the fines lay in the activities of pro-Spanish leaders in the Rif, who mainly lived near the coast, just as the more active opposition in the mountain clans is explained by the smaller number of pensioners there. In June 1919 Muhammad Bu Qaddur was able to persuade many of his fellow Timsamani shaykh-s to go to Alhucemas Island to make peace with the Spanish. This resulted, in August, in a pact between the Spanish and shaykh-s of four clans in the Timsaman who promised to stop any further haraka-s from being formed in their tribe and to allow the Spanish to set up military posts in the Timsaman when the time came³⁰. When attempts were made in November to reimpose fines and to organise a haraka to help the Banu Sa'id, Bu Qaddur and others were quite able to contain them. The importance of people like Bu Qaddur in breaking the opposition temporarily cannot be underestimated.

Unfortunately for the Spanish, however, this was only a temporary success, for the opposition to them was, in the end, stronger. It had the ability to apply coercion locally to important Spanish supporters.

Eventually most of the important Spanish pensioners would be forced to join the anti-Spanish coalition. Some would do so willingly. The al-Khattabis were among the first. There were complex reasons for this, the result of personal feelings as well as the growing weight of the opposition. Each of the three most important members of the family had his own reasons.

The youngest son, Si Mahammad, had been educated, as a prize for his father's friendship, in Melilla and then in the School of Mines in Madrid, a prestigious technocratic education. His elder brother had received a far more traditional training in the great mosque-university of al-Qarawiyyin in Fez. Al-Qarawiyyin, in the early years of the twentieth century, was the Moroccan centre of the Salafiyya movement, although it is not certain whether bin 'Abd al-Karim came into contact with the movement then, or later, when working for the Spanish in Melilla³¹. In any event, he was certainly involved in anti-French activity during the First World War.

After the war he was worried that his anti-French attitude might lead him into trouble with the Spanish, and was reassured by Colonel Riquelme, deputy head of the OCTAI, that nothing would happen to him. However, in January 1919 he asked for leave to go back to the Rif for a visit. He never returned to Melilla. At precisely the same moment Si Mahammad asked the permission of the authorities in Madrid to pay visit home as well. He never returned either; at the end of February he wrote to the Ministry of State to tell them that he did not intend to do so³².

The brothers' simultaneous return suggests that more than just disillusionment with Spain was at stake; the deciding factor was the slowly growing resistance in the Rif. In the campaign

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to reimpose the haqq fines and form a united opposition to the Spanish at the beginning of 1919, an obvious target for the anti-Spanish groups was ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi, a rich man whose property made him particularly vulnerable. ^CAbd al-Karim himself confirmed that local pressure was responsible for his change in attitude. He told the Spanish that members of his clan had ordered him to call his sons home since the Spanish might hold them as hostages; if he did not his house would be burned down³³. His son Muhammad said the same in a long letter to Colonel Civantos, the officer in charge on Alhucemas Island³⁴.

Breaking with the Spanish was not the same as joining the opposition, and for some months ^CAbd al-Karim wavered. The balancing act which, if it was to succeed, had to take the form of undeclared support for the anti-Spanish groups in protecting his position at all, worried the Spanish; as one of their fortnightly reports from Alhucemas complained: "His efforts at defence by persuasion must be prejudicial to us, since they will be based on showing himself to be opposed to Spanish penetration in the area"³⁵. Two things pushed ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi from his undecided position into the anti-Spanish camp: the cancellation of his pension and the choice by the Banu Zara, ^Cthe lineage of the Banu Yusuf w-^CAli to which the al-Khattabis belonged, of Sulayman bin Muhammad al-Mujahid as its shaykh in preference to himself. Bin al-Mujahid was firmly pro-Spanish³⁶. By the end of August ^CAbd al-Karim was writing to a Timsamani sharif, one of the shaykh-s who had signed the pact with the Spanish, to persuade him to change sides. He had also made contact with a certain al-Mu^Callim Muhand, a Timsamani expert in the repair of guns who was known for his extreme anti-Spanish sentiments³⁷. The al-Khattabis had changed sides.

One swallow does not make a summer, and the fact that one prestigious family had joined the opposition, did not suddenly transform the resistance. Unity, with the collapse of the haqq fines in the autumn of 1919 was still very fragile. There was no overall leader; even the most important murabit in the central Rif, Sidi Hamidu, had repeatedly failed to organise any concerted action. The economic situation at the beginning of 1920 was even worse. Above all, at the beginning of 1920, the anti-Spanish groups were still on the political margins of the Rif, since the threat was still seen as coming largely from the French.

The haraka-s against the French consisted of two groups, in the Gaznaya and the Matiwa al-Jabal, where they were led by the other major Rifi murabit, Muhammad bin Sadiq al-Khamlishi of Targist. Both groups contained many Waryaghli³⁸. In February, ^CAbd al-Malik returned to the mountains and began recruiting first in the Akhmas tribe in the Jibala, then in the Ghumara then on the edges of the Rif³⁹. In March he moved into the Marnisa, and remade a wartime alliance with Amar bin Hamidu, an important Marnisi qaid⁴⁰. This was

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entirely an alliance of convenience, however, for ^CAmar bin Hamidu was generally reckoned to be pro-French now. What was really at stake, what always determined bin Hamidu's actions, was the preservation of his own personal, local power. Between them ^CAbd al-Malik and ^CAmar bin Hamidu were able to force Muhammad bin Sadiq al-Khamlish from the leadership of the haraka. This split the Waryaghli contingent and in order to avoid any conflict they all left for home. By May, when ^CAbd al-Malik ran out of money to pay it, the rest of the haraka had collapsed⁴¹.

The failure of the action against the French strengthened the position of those who wanted to fight the Spanish. By May it was anyway clear that they were right. On 12 February 1920 a new Comandante General had taken command in the Melilla zone. Lieutenant-General Manuel Fernandez Silvestre, al-Raisuli's old enemy, was a far more aggressive officer than many of his predecessors. Silvestre wanted to advance, and because the reorganisation of the Protectorate in 1919 had left him some freedom of action, he was able to do so.

Silvestre moved quickly. His first objective was the occupation of the Banu Sa'id, the most important tribe between Melilla and the central Rif. Spanish troops crossed the Wadi Kart in April and on 15 May occupied the important position of Dar Driush in the al-Matalsa tribe. Well-satisfied with his progress, Silvestre stayed there until August⁴².

The advance had not been seriously resisted, but once it was over the reaction grew. A Rifi haraka was raised in May, which included men from the Timsaman and Banu Tuzin and the mountain clans of the Banu Waryaghal. Although it quickly collapsed, after the Spanish airforce bombed it, the fact that it had been organised did strengthen the hand of the mountain clans. Led by the Banu Ayyash they were able to enforce the payment of a haqq fine for murder in the neighbouring Buqquya tribe⁴³. The political offensive against Spanish pensioners was reopened as well. Bu Qaddur wrote to the Spanish complaining that the Timsaman was slipping out of control, dropped dark hints about "things which should not be said in this letter", and reported that: "there has been much discussion in this tribe and the people became greatly alarmed by it, and as a result rebellion has broken out in our tribe and we do not have the power to restore the peace . . ." ⁴⁴. In June what Bu Qaddur alleged was a campaign of slander was turned on him. He had arranged the release of a boat owned by a prominent leader of the Banu Wallshak which had been confiscated by the Spanish in an effort to secure co-operation. Now he was accused of giving false undertakings about the owner's friendship towards Spain in return for a bribe⁴⁵. True or not - and it may have been either - the allegation made him look untrustworthy both to the anti-Spanish groups and to the Spanish themselves.

Nevertheless, the resistance was still inchoate, still patchy disunited and leaderless. At the end of June ^CAbd al-Karim al-

Khattabi decided that the moment had come to change this. He began a campaign, as the Spanish saw it, "to impose himself onto all the clans and their leaders so as to become the number one of his tribe"⁴⁶. He was extremely unsuccessful. Despite visits to various markets, he was able to recruit only three men for the haraka assembled in Tafarsit. The following month he managed to get 80 more, but only by spending vast amounts of money. In mid-July his efforts collapsed when he returned home saying that he was ill⁴⁷. He had, however, caused the Spanish some worry, so that they were not displeased to discover that he was not just ill but dying. General opinion in the Rif afterwards was that he was poisoned on Spanish instructions⁴⁸. There is no hard evidence of this, but it is difficult not to recognise the satisfaction that was felt when he died on 6 or 7 August 1920⁴⁹. A Spanish report said:

We must say, without allowing ourselves to rejoice in anyone's death, since the principles of our religion would forbid it . . . that we are forced to recognise that the disappearance of so mysterious and inconsistent a factor in the political activities of the Beni Uriaguel must necessarily clear the ground and be a point in our favour⁵⁰.

This was an unrealistic hope, for the resistance was not dependent on ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi, and so was not affected by his death. Spanish agents were physically attacked in the markets in the Banu Waryaghal and the Buquyya and feuding followed. Fines were then imposed by the mountain clans of the Banu Waryaghal - 90,000 pesetas in the case of one of the Buquyyi participants⁵¹.

In early August the Spanish advance began again and Tafarsit and ^CAzib Midar were occupied. This gave the resistance even greater impetus. A massive haraka was formed of at least 900 men drawn from the mountain clans of the Banu Waryaghal, the Banu ^CAmart, the Gaznaya, Banu Yittuft, Buquyya and Targist tribes. It had a collective leadership which included a qadi from the Banu Tuzin, Si Muhammad bin ^CAli, known as the "Faqiḥ Bu Lahya" (the faqiḥ with the beard), later to be a very prominent member of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's wartime government, and Muhammad bin Fuit of the Banu ^CAll clan of the Banu Waryaghal⁵², at the end of August 1,000 more arrived from the Marnisa, led by ^CAmar bin Hamidu, and the Banu ^CAmart⁵³.

The resistance was becoming firmer and wider and the haraka larger, despite Spanish attempts to bomb it into collapse. But it was still led by a number of individuals. One of these men, Muhammad bin Fuit, was a longstanding enemy of the al-Khattabis; another, ^CAmar bin Hamidu, was an ally of ^CAbd al-Mallik, who had fallen out with ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi during the First World War. Consequently, neither of the two al-Khattabi brothers was involved so far.

This was not a situation which lasted much longer. They soon entered the scene, albeit by a rather circuitous route. In late September 1920 a new leader suddenly appeared in the Rif.

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Although he called himself "al-Sharif al-Idrisi", his real identity was, and remains, a mystery. He described himself as a Turk, possessed of supernatural powers, and announced that having declared himself "Sultan of the Rif", he would use these powers to destroy Spanish aircraft, rout the Spanish army and lead his victorious troops into Melilla. The Spanish considered him to be "either a lunatic or a fool", and many of their opponents in the Rif were equally sceptical. However, he moved his camp to Tawarda, in the Banu Walishak, where the haraka was being reformed and managed for a short while to dominate it. Amongst his supporters were the al-Khattabi brothers, but they were unable to protect him when he was accused publicly of being a fraud. Unable to disprove it, his power quickly collapsed and the brothers were forbidden from propagandising in his name⁵⁴.

Al-Sharif al-Idrisi was a traditional "miracle-working" leader, and was easily exposed as a fraud. However his brief reign as "Sultan of the Rif" raised, for the first time, the question of a united government in the mountains. Out of step as he was with the more practical aspects of Rifi resistance, in this he chimed in tune. The idea of an independent Rif was spreading amongst the anti-Spanish groups, as a Spanish report at the end of October described it:

They look for a Government of the Rif without foreign interference; they want to be subjected to no protectorate, and are opposed to the introduction into their villages, exercising their power of justice and command, of any police force that is not entirely made up of natives. In short they dream of a government in their lands completely independent of our Protectorate⁵⁵.

The collapse of the "Sultan of the Rif" had not changed that feeling.

For the Spanish, however, the removal of the "Sultan" raised their hopes. With Berenguer's permission, Silvestre advanced into the Banu Walishak and Banu Sa'id. By 9 December all the Banu Sa'id was in Spanish hands⁵⁶. Silvestre asked for permission to advance further, and once again Berenguer gave it, provided that he moved only into friendly areas and did not expose himself to risk. On 11 January Spanish troops began an advance which by 27 January had brought them to a new front line stretching from Sidi Hussayn on the coast, through Anwal, Tafarsit, and Azru, to Azib Midar⁵⁷. This appeared to put the seal on a great success; in less than a year Silvestre had doubled the area under Spanish occupation.

As the Spanish advanced, a propaganda campaign was started in the markets of the Banu Waryaghal. January began with an announcement in the Monday market of the Banu Bu Ayyash that anyone who killed a Spanish pensioner would not be fined. The following week it was proclaimed that no Spanish pensioner would be allowed to attend the market. In the third week there was a call to form a haraka, and in the last week of January

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it was announced that anyone returning from the haraka before 15 days were up would be fined 250 pesetas. In the first week of February, the market was told that anyone who did not go to the haraka when it was his turn would be fined. The old principle of rotating contingents to man the Burj al-Mujahidin on the Ajdir foreshore had been revived. The Monday market was the centre of this propaganda, partly because it was one of the largest markets in the Banu Waryaghal, and partly because it was controlled by the Banu Bu ^CAyyash which had until now provided the leadership of the anti-Spanish groups. Those responsible were not all Bu ^CAyyashis, however. The name which occurs most frequently is that of Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi. By the end of January he was the accepted leader of the haraka⁵⁸.

Not everyone was equally content with the emergence of the new leader. In mid-February Muh Abaqash, a qaid of the Banu ^CAbdallah, wrote to bin ^CAbd al-Karim to say that he could not support him, "... since Si Husayn wants to make himself Sultan of the Rif, and here everyone is a Sultan or no-one is"⁵⁹. This was the voice of authentic Rifi egalitarianism, but it was not the only reason for disputing bin ^CAbd al-Karim's authority. In the Timsaman, there were worries that corn supplies from al-Nakur Island might be cut off. In the Banu Tuzin, several shaykh-s wrote to the Spanish in February and early March reaffirming their loyalty to the Spanish, and asked the Spanish to advance into their territory⁶⁰.

Naturally Silvestre found the offer most attractive and when the head of the OCTAI, Colonel Morales, confirmed that it was possible, decided to advance. Morales, however, sounded a note of caution. Once the Spanish had taken Sidi Idris on the coast, their forces would have arrived, he said, "at the limit of the elasticity of the forces at Your Excellency's disposal"⁶¹. Sidi Idris was occupied on 21 March.

The capture of Sidi Idris brought the Spanish even closer to the Rif, and bin ^CAbd al-Karim was able to organise another haraka. Economic conditions were easier, too. It was now clear that for the first time in many years the harvest, which was now ripening fast, would be good. Atkinson, the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan, reckoned that it would be the best for 14 years, and that once it was gathered the Spanish would have to fight if they wanted to advance any further into the Rif. He also reported that the resistance was growing all the time. Not only was there a haraka on the eastern front, but another had been formed by the Matiwa al-Bahar to protect Jibha, westwards along the coast from Penon de Velez, to resist a possible Spanish landing there⁶².

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was rapidly taking a commanding position in the Rif. He had demonstrated it in late March when the High Commissioner, Berenguer, began a tour of inspection of the island presidios, hoping to meet important pensioners. When he arrived at Alhucemas Island, bin ^CAbd al-Karim forbade

anyone from the central Rif from visiting him. Most obeyed, but five shaykh-s did not, including Sibara from the Buqquya and Sulayman bin al-Mujahid, the pro-Spanish shaykh of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own lineage, the Banu Zara^C. On their return all the Waryaghli were fined 5,000 pesetas each and all of them paid up except for Sulayman who fled to the Buqquya to ask Sibara for help. An armed pursuit party followed close behind. Sulayman was obliged to seek refuge with the Spanish on Alhucemas Island, and Sibara was forced to change sides and join the opposition⁶³.

Similar pressures led a number of shaykh-s in the Timsaman and Banu Tuzin to change sides as well. In these front-line tribes specific plans for opposing the Spanish were now being proposed, centred around a tactic of cutting off the Spanish to the rear. Spanish agents reported in mid-April that people from the Banu Waryaghal had written to them, "They say to us: be on the alert for the enemy wants to advance into your territory. Be men with valiant hearts. Then if we see him broken and defeated . . . we will come upon him and cut off his rear and loot what he has"⁶⁴. Implicit in these instructions was the assumption by these Waryaghal propagandists that they would be in charge.

For his part, bin ^CAbd al-Karim now began to talk about specific policies. He said that he wanted to set up a force, similar to the Spanish Native Police, which would have officers and salaried soldiers; he would pay two pesetas a day to anyone who joined. Preparations began at once - guns were bought from Sidi Hamidu in Snada and Muhammad bin Sadiq al-Khamlishi in Targist; defensive trenches were dug in the Timsaman and Banu Tuzin; a census was taken showing that at least 19,600 men were available to bear arms; pickets were established on the Timsaman coast and at the end of May bin ^CAbd al-Karim appointed his first field commander, Muhammad bin ^CAli, the "Faqiḥ Bu Lahya" to be commander of the haraka in the Timsaman⁶⁵.

Nor was this all. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was openly proposing changes in the political structure of the central Rif. He was determined to replace the fragility of the haqq fines with another method of preventing crime and feuding. At the end of May, bin ^CAbd al-Karim announced that in future murderers would themselves be executed "on the orders of the tribe". Death in return for murder was not new in the Rif, but the term "orders of the tribe" concealed no less than the will of bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and that certainly was new. The qadi of the Banu Bu ^CAyyash, Muhammad bin Fuit, realised this and was disposed to argue. He declared that there was no basis in the shar^C for shooting murderers and that he anyway refused to recognise bin ^CAbd al-Karim as his leader. When bin ^CAbd al-Karim called a conference of the Banu Waryaghal shaykh-s asking them to sign a declaration giving authority as their leader, bin Fuit was the only one to refuse⁶⁶.

It was an autocratic control which bin ^CAbd al-Karim was

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demanding as he showed in an incident in the mosque in Ajdir. After he, in his function as qadi, had dealt with a number of land questions, the talk turned to politics. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim remained firmly in control, a Spanish agent reported, and "did not allow anyone to speak. When Si Abdallah Budra tried to say that the Island should be closed off, Si Mohand (i.e. bin ^CAbd al-Karim) told him to be silent at once"⁶⁷.

Around the same time, bin ^CAbd al-Karim was asked what it was he intended in the Rif. He replied that he wanted to set up "a country with a government and a flag"⁶⁸. The phrase was pregnant with meaning. What he was saying was that he was looking for a permanent restructuring of the Rif as a whole - a country -, a centralised authority - government -, and symbolic manifestations of the Rif's independence - flag - which could be recognised both by its inhabitants and by the outside world.

Meanwhile the haraka continued to grow, and bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own prestige grew with it. So far he may have been only the leader of a small anti-Spanish coalition in one tribe, the Banu Waryaghal; but his leadership was undisputed. He had made the first steps at changing the political structure of the Rif, and at changing the legal structure, both of which had the same effect, of centralising more power in his hands. He had begun to organise the nucleus of a permanent army and had over-ridden political opposition. Above all, he had great charisma amongst the people of the Rif mountains. Even a long standing Spanish informant in the Banu Waryaghal recognised that. He described him in almost heroic terms: "People say that Si Mohand is very brave and is the most powerful leader in the Beni Uriaguel . . . He goes about like a man from the mountains, completely bronzed by the sun, covered in sweat, for he has no time to care for himself nor to rest"⁶⁹.

That was in mid-May. Much had changed in the previous few months. The haraka-s organised by Sidi Hamidu in 1919 in the first years of the Spanish protectorate, had been shown to be ineffective, undermined by lack of unity and the fragility of the system of order based on haqq fines. The resistance now had been put on a new basis. Despite the efforts of the Spanish to prevent it, a wider unity had been built around the leadership of a single man. That leadership was already taking on a highly personalised, not to say autocratic, form. Power was beginning to be centralised in his hands, the nucleus of a regular army was being built up, and order being guaranteed by him. However, bin ^CAbd al-Karim still needed two things: to bring in the harvest and to prove himself worthy of the leadership he had assumed. His first victory and his first harvest followed in June.

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6. VICTORY

The first victory was achieved with some ease, even though the Spanish were becoming increasingly cautious. On 29 May, Silvestre told Berenguer that he would make further advances only with the agreement of the Timsaman, "because otherwise we could be faced with a series of bloody battles quite unlike any we have so far encountered in the area"¹. Silvestre, at least, was well aware of the danger from the Rifis. However, at the end of May a group of Timsamanis came to Silvestre and asked him to put troops across the Wadi Amqaran into Timsamani territory, and promised they would help. Accordingly, on 1 June Silvestre sent a group of Spanish troops and Moroccan Regulares, somewhere between 200 and 500 men, to occupy the hill of Dahar Abarran². There they immediately came under fierce attack from the Rifis.

The Rifi attack was very successful. It is not clear whether the deciding factor was a mutiny by the native troops, the severity of the attack, under the leadership of the Faqih Bu Lahya, or a combination of both. In any event, on 2 June the Spanish post on Dahar Abarran fell. On the same day other positions came under attack as well: the post at Sidi Idris on the coast was saved only when marines were put ashore³.

Berenguer, even with the benefit of hindsight, considered the defeat at Abarran to have been of little importance. "Abarran was a painful episode, a misfortune of colonial war, but such a thing is a common occurrence in these wars and generally without consequence"⁴.

He was wrong. The death of 179 soldiers and the loss of large quantities of arms and ammunition (4 mountain cannons, 250 rifles and an ammunition dump)⁵, may have been unimportant to him, but it gave an enormous psychological boost to the Rifis and greatly added to the reputation of bin 'Abd al-Karim. Until 1926 girls sang ballads about the victory at Dahar Abarran⁶.

Bin 'Abd al-Karim took immediate steps to consolidate his position. He went to the battlefield and announced that any mistreatment of prisoners would be severely punished. Two days later the threat was repeated by Sidi Hamidu of Snada when

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occupied area who were visiting it. They were told:

If you are truly Muslims hear us. To those present from the Beni Said, Beni Ulichek, M'talsa, Taferset, and Guelaia: if you join us, we will be as one. We will defeat the Christians with your help or without it. Any member of the (Spanish) police who comes over to us will be well received¹⁶.

These calls found an audience. By beginning of July, anti-Spanish propaganda was being reported in the Banu Bu Yahyi, several Matalsi shaykh-s had already promised to help, there were calls in the Gaznaya markets for everyone to buy a gun and join the haraka, and letters were sent to the haraka from shaykh-s in the Banu Sa'id and Banu Walishak promising support¹⁷.

Bin 'Abd al-Karim's other task was to build up his organisation. A customs post was set up on the beach at Ajdir, in order to raise revenue, and he carried out his earlier threats to impose civil order. A sharif from the Banu Waryaghal was accused of killing a man from another clan in his tribe. When bin 'Abd al-Karim found him guilty he was shot¹⁸. In the first week of July, final troop dispositions were made¹⁹ and final plans laid: a Spanish agent reported that the Rifis planned an "expedition", a dash across the Banu Sa'id and Banu Walishak into the Qal'aya, once the harvest was over²⁰.

The Spanish were unconcerned. With 25,790 troops in the eastern zone they felt secure enough against a few thousand Rifis. On 8 July, Berenguer told the War Ministry that Melilla was adequately protected. However, the troops were scattered in numerous garrisons, large and small, across the countryside: 17 posts in the Anwal sector, 10 in Dar Driush 22 in Kabdani, 12 in Thalatha (Qal'aya) and so on²¹. They were badly supplied and organised. There was absenteeism by officers from their commands; there were practically no doctors on the front; airmen slept far away from their machines, and could not reach them in time if the airfields were attacked; military supplies had been stolen and warehouses were empty²².

The third week of July showed just how illusory was Berenguer's sense of security. With the harvest gathered in, more Rifis were brought up, and on 16 July the attack was launched. They ambushed supply convoys to Ighariban. On the following day the last Spanish supply column to the position managed to fight its way through. On 18 July Tizzi 'Azza was attacked, and its garrison fled to Anwal, the main forward base. On 20 July, Ighariban was ordered to withdraw; of the 300 soldiers in the post only a few survived the retreat.

On the night of 21 July there were 4,000 troops in Anwal. From the hills surrounding the camp, the Rifis were firing down on them. The Spanish position was impossible. The next morning, Silvestre ordered the troops to withdraw on Issumar and Bin Tayyib. On the same day, General Navarro, his second-in-command, telegraphed Berenguer to say that Midar and Tafarsit were also under attack and could not be held²³. The Rifis had

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begun a general attack.

Silvestre's retreat became a rout, in the course of which Silvestre himself was either killed or committed suicide. His body was never found. The troops who managed to reach Dar Driush rested for a few hours and then withdrew to Batil, running across the burning plain of Garat in the summer heat, harried all the way by the local people²⁴. The women joined in too, "because of what the Spanish soldiers used to do"²⁵.

The confusion and the disorganised retreat made Navarro's attempt to stand and fight impossible. He was surrounded in Dar Driush while the rest of the zone collapsed around him. To the east, the tribes in the Qal'aya rose, except for one: the Banu Shikar which was restrained, with great difficulty by its qaid ^CAbd al-Qadir bin al-Hajj Tayyib²⁶. On 27 July the main detachment of the haraka at Tistutin wrote to him and his fellow shaykh-s telling them to join the jihad. The letter was an exultant cry of triumph; the millenium, it declared, was to hand:

Oh our brothers! Be on your guard, be ready to make your stand with firmness and diligence, for the hour of happiness has arrived for the Muslims. Do not imagine that any other path (is open to you) because (Muslims should be) as one person. We wish that you, oh our brothers, should be attentive and passionate in carrying out the jihad. As the great God has said, "Make holy war with your possessions and your bodies and so on". As for your brother Muslims, do not harm a single one of them, but the unbelievers, may God destroy them and scatter them, them you should kill, them you should flatten into the ground. Do not (hold back from) them until you have removed their every trace. We know and think in our hearts that, with the agreement of God and his Prophet we shall meet you, God willing, in the city of Melilla and that you will be as one body. This is what we have to tell you and your companions. And Peace . . . On the order of your brothers the mujahadin of the tribe of Banu Waryaghal and those who follow them from the other tribes, may God protect them. Amen²⁷.

The letter was signed by the "Banu Waryaghal", who clearly saw themselves as the leaders of the movement. In fact, the Waryaghliis had only carried out the initial attacks. The brunt of the action was borne by local people who fought the fleeing army as it crossed their territory. The siege of the remaining Spanish garrisons at Jabal ^CArrawit, al-Nazur and Dar Driush was conducted by them as well.

Indeed, the Spanish defeat had been so rapid that bin ^CAbd al-Karim was hardly in control at all. One of the most serious problems was that several prominent shaykh-s who had taken Spanish officers prisoner refused to hand them over. Qaddur bin ^CAmar of the Banu Sa^Cid, for instance, held one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, four captains and two other officers at the end of July. The issue was one of power. Prisoners

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represented a powerful bargaining counter with the Spanish and both Qaddur bin ^CAmar and bin ^CAbd al-Karim were determined to control that counter themselves²⁸.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was equally mistrustful of the Qal^Cayis. When they asked for help, he told their leaders that if he did send a haraka, they would first have to send their families into the "safety of the Rif"²⁹ or, in other words, provide hostages. Unable to rely on the Rifis, many Qal^Cayis became fearful of a Spanish return and the reprisals which might follow and began to cool their ardour for the anti-Spanish cause. At the end of July some Qal^Cayi clans, along with others in the Awlad Sittut and Kabdana, agreed not to form a haraka. But not everyone felt like this: leaders in the Banu Bu ^CGafar, Banu Bu Siddal and Banu Bu Ifrur, were anxious to press the attack home on Melilla itself³⁰.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim most decidedly did not want an attack on Melilla. There were two objections. If it succeeded it would create international problems, because of the European consuls there, since it might, in Al-Bu ^CAyyashi's phrase, turn the victory into "primitive savagery". On the other hand it might fail: Melilla was not Anwal or ^CArrawit. Berenguer had 14,000 troops in Melilla at the end of July. An attack on the city might have led to crushing defeat³¹. The problem of Melilla, and the need to gain custody of the prisoners, made it imperative for bin ^CAbd al-Karim to take control in the Qal^Caya.

The Qal^Caya, however, was not easily controlled. Many of the anti-Spanish groups there were acting independently, with bloody results. Although al-Nazur, one of the few remaining Spanish garrisons, was permitted to evacuate by train to Melilla on 2 August, when, on the following day Siwan surrendered, many of the troops there were killed³². On the same day a large Rifl force arrived in al-Nazur, and set up its headquarters, which was called the dar al-Makhzan (House of the Makhzan), in a former church. A letter from bin ^CAbd al-Karim was read out, which said that all booty should be handed in "in order to set up a proper government". "Booty" meant arms captured in the fighting. There was considerable opposition to this, especially from the Mazuja and Banu Bu Ifrur tribes, but it was silenced when a huge Rifl force of up to 600 men, headed by the Faqih Bu Lahya, arrived on 4 August. Bu Lahya, it was announced, had been appointed by bin ^CAbd al-Karim as his personal khalifa (representative) in al-Nazur, and he was not willing to tolerate any opposition. By 6 August everyone in al-Nazur had handed in his rifle; to keep even tighter control Bu Lahya announced that anyone who killed a prisoner would himself be executed³³.

This left the problem of 1,200 Spanish troops under General Naarro who were besieged in Jabal ^CArrawit by 5,000 Moroccans, only 900 of them Rifis. There had already been attempts at negotiating a surrender, organised by a Qal^Cayi, Shaykh bin Shillal who made contact with Bu Lahya. Between them they

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tried to work out terms, a difficult task since there was a strong feeling in the haraka in favour of taking revenge for Moroccan casualties³⁴. Throughout the Rif War, the burning desire for outright war on the Christians would be in a precarious balance with more controlled political considerations. In Jabal Arrawit, the balance swung towards violence.

On 9 August an agreement of sorts was reached. The Spanish agreed to hand over their guns and in return would be allowed to return to Melilla³⁵. The agreement broke down immediately after the surrender. Whether there was deliberate treachery, as the Spanish alleged, or whether the Moroccans thought the Spanish were trying to trick them when a rifle went off accidentally, as a Rifi historian says, is unclear. In any event, a large number of prisoners were slaughtered. Of the 1,200 men in Jabal Arrawit only 400 reached bin Abd al-Karim in the Rif, itself a denial of the agreement, since they should have been taken to Melilla³⁶. However, once they arrived in the Rif they were well treated³⁷.

The slaughter at Arrawit, and the argument over the fate of the prisoners, made bin Abd al-Karim even more aware that he needed to take control. It took him a great deal of effort to convince Qaddur bin Amar, who now held 86 prisoners, including 18 officers, to hand them over, but he eventually succeeded³⁸. Bin Shillal was a more difficult proposition. In mid-August his correspondence with the Spanish was intercepted. It showed that he was making detailed arrangements for handing over the prisoners. To distract attention from his plans he offered to marry off his daughter, who was the widow of Abu Himara, to Bu Lahya, bin Abd al-Karim's commander. The ploy did not work. Bin Abd al-Karim acted quickly and sent Shaykh Yazid bin al-Hajj Hammu, of the Waryaghil clan of Banu Ali and later a member of his government, to remove the prisoners from bin Shillal's control by force if necessary. This he did³⁹.

That bin Abd al-Karim had forced bin Shillal to hand over the prisoners did not solve the underlying problem, however. The fact that bin Shillal was working with the Spanish was a sign of the insecurity that he and many other Qal'ayis felt; he was simply trying to protect himself. Despite the defeat inflicted on the Spanish, the victory was not complete. The Spanish army was regrouping in Melilla and the disparate groups opposing them were beginning to break up. If the Spanish returned, it would be useful for local leaders to have a bargaining position.

By mid-August, less than a month after the victory at Anwal, things were beginning to look rather bleak for the anti-Spanish groups. The economic effects of the fighting were now beginning to take their toll in the Qal'aya. Immediately after the Spanish withdrew, sugar and salt had risen in price. By 13 August sugar cost 2/3 more in the market of Farkhana in the Mazuja tribe, which borders on Melilla itself, than it did in the Spanish markets of the city. In the Banu Waryaghil, things were

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even worse. On 9 August, sugar there cost 5 pesetas a kilo, 138 per cent higher than in Melilla⁴⁰.

Quite apart from the economic difficulties, there was a growing mood amongst the Qal'ayis that something horrible was about to happen. The Islamic year 1339 was drawing to its close, and a general feeling began to spread that the next year would be catastrophic. A prophecy of doom spread through the Qal'aya:

In the land of the Guelaya there will unfold events of such magnitude that they will lead to the extermination of its inhabitants. Some will be forced to flee to far-away lands, others will be drowned and a third part will also perish by violent means. The forests and villages will become fields of flames and all will be destroyed so that no vestige will remain of what existed. The River Silwan will overflow with the blood of the Guelayas . . .⁴¹

By the end of the month the prophecy had spread throughout the Qal'aya⁴².

The presentment of doom aside, what really concerned some Qal'ayi shaykh-s was the possibility that the Spanish might return. They repeatedly asked bin 'Abd al-Karim for troops, help which he was very chary of supplying. One request was turned down on the grounds that since the Qal'ayis had ignored his advice once, they should now look after themselves. When news of his refusal reached the haraka, at Silwan on 17 August, it caused great argument over what to do next. The disagreement turned to fighting and the haraka collapsed⁴³. Several tribes were now beginning to edge back towards the Spanish - the Kabdana, Banu Bu Gafar and Banu Siddal in particular. This, of course, made the Rifis even more wary of the Qal'ayis and less likely to come to their assistance. Bin 'Abd al-Karim even refused refuge in the Rif to people from the Banu Bu Gafar, telling them that it was their responsibility to defend their own lands⁴⁴. Such a pronouncement implied a Rifi identity, one which excluded the Qal'aya. It may have had its origins in the traditional distrust of the Banu Waryaghal towards the Qal'ayi tribes but it had strategic implications too, for the obvious defensive boundary of the Rif mountains lay in their eastern foothills.

Nevertheless, some Rifi troops were sent to the Qal'aya. On 28 August 400 men arrived in al-Nazur. Their main task was not, however, to fight the Spanish, but to take the prisoners back to the Rif. With any troops that were left after this job had been completed, their commander had instructions to "administer justice, be the tribes' representative in all things, listen to complaints, recruit police and watch (the Spanish) movements"⁴⁵. Given the doubtful loyalty of the Qal'ayis, it was clearly a hopeless task to undertake any major action against the Spanish. Numbers were against it too, for by the end of August Berenguer had massed 36,000 men in Melilla⁴⁶. It is therefore not very surprising that the man sent to the Qal'aya was Muhammad bin Fuit, bin 'Abd al-Karim's old opponent⁴⁷.

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An impossible, or even irrelevant, task had been given to a political rival.

Despite the internal disagreements in the Qal^Caya, it appeared to the outside world that bin ^CAbd al-Karim's domination was complete. To the opponents of the Spanish in the Jibala it was a moment of supreme relief.

On the eve of the Rifi victories in July the Jibala had been about to fall to the Spanish. Since March 1920 Berenguer had been trying, through political and military means, to occupy more and more territory in the Jibala and Ghumara. Politically he was not very successful, the result of rivalries between his intelligence officers⁴⁸, and of pressure on pro-Spanish shaykhs from what the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan described as "the younger elements" in their tribes⁴⁹. The military success was more obvious. On 26 June, Spanish troops began to advance slowly up the road towards the holy town of Shawin. In the face of considerable opposition from the Akhmas tribe, in whose territory Shawin lies, it was occupied on 15 October⁵⁰.

Once it had been occupied, however, Shawin was very difficult to supply. The routes led up through hostile country and the Spanish troops, ill-equipped against the cold, were virtually besieged in the city by a haraka organised by the Akhmas with Ghumari and Rifi support⁵¹. It was not until the following spring that Berenguer was able to relieve the city. On 1 May 1921, after moving forces up the valley of the Wadi Law, he forced the Akhmas off their positions on Jabal Qala^C a which overlooks Shawin and lifted the siege⁵².

Once Shawin had been relieved, Berenguer turned his attention to al-Raisuli who, from his base at Tazarut in the Banu ^CArus, was encouraging attacks on the Spanish in the western Jibalan tribes of Ahl Sharif and Banu Gurfit. On 10 May, Spanish forces began operations which led to the occupation of a large area of the Banu Gurfit. On 21 June the main thrust against Tazarut, al-Raisuli's home base on Jabal ^CAlam began⁵³. Columns were moved up through the Banu Lait, and many of al-Raisuli's erstwhile supporters wavered and then changed sides. The Sharif himself began to look for a way out. He suggested to his followers that they should surrender in order to preserve the sanctity of Mawlay ^CAbd al-Salam. The proposal was rejected on the grounds that the Spanish had broken pacts in the past and could not now be trusted⁵⁴.

By 11 July Spanish forces were in sight of Tazarut; on 16 July it was practically surrounded. In al-Raisuli's words - "Disease spread in the villages for the cattle were unburied in the pastures . . . Men had ceased to tighten their belts, and their eyes were like wolves"⁵⁵. Then the news came of the Rifi victories over the Spanish. Al-Raisuli's remaining supporters came to him and asked him how it would affect them. "I listened to them for a little while and then I said 'Allah has sent this thing to save us. Praise be to him, for it is just in time'"⁵⁶.

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It was indeed just in time. The Spanish at once suspended their operations in the Jibala, "cut short in their moment of triumph", as Berenguer later complained⁵⁷. The exhausted Spanish troops were hurriedly transferred to Melilla.

News of the Rifi victory immediately spread through the Jibala. Letters were sent from the Rif to tribes in the Ghumara calling for Jihad against the Christians, and people began to buy arms⁵⁸. The victory in the Rif, followed by the withdrawal of the Spanish troops raised hopes that the Spanish could be completely expelled from the Jibala. The general euphoria grew. A Wad Rasi shaykh told fellow opponents of the Spanish:

I inform you that this enemy has been punished by God and our Lord Mawlay ^C Abd al-Salam, may God give them no help, Amen. The mujahids of the Rif went to them and inflicted a great disaster on them. I inform you that of the troops that they had here, in this territory, only a few guard posts remain, and the greater part of them have been taken to Melilla . . . At midnight the train was loading up with soldiers. The land is empty. Bear this in mind⁵⁹.

All sorts of people seem to have felt that this was a golden opportunity to attack the Spanish. Pro-Rifi propaganda cropped up even on the evening train from Tetuan to Ceuta. On 29 July, two of the passengers, one a soldier in the Regulares the other a Moroccan civilian from Melilla, began to 'explain' the Rifi successes to the others. They were promptly arrested⁶⁰.

In Tetuan, the Protectorate capital, the Rifi victory was celebrated, amongst other things, by two wall posters. One appeared on the wall of the main mosque and was dated 21 July, 1921, the other, dated 3 August, was fixed to the wall of the Darqawi zawiya . The French translation of these two documents is bad at times - the mosque poster is described as being signed by "The Muslim Muhammadan Assembly of the Rif", a most unlikely title - but there are striking similarities between them. Both posters rely heavily on sura IX (Tawba) of the Quran, which is mainly concerned with the protection of the new Islamic state founded by Muhammad from attack by the Byzantine Empire, and the necessity for Jihad . The Darqawiya letter drives the theme home from the very beginning: it starts with Muhammad's words on entering the Ka'ba in Mecca to destroy the idols: "Truth has come, falsehood has disappeared". This millenarian quality in the argument is repeated later in the Darqawiya letter, using words from sura LIV (al-Qamar, the Moon) "The Hour is coming. The Moon is divided in two".

The imminent arrival of the millenium is not the only basis on which the letters rely: both attack the betrayal of Islam by the Culama , and imply that the traditional leadership having fallen into unbelief, or into the hands of the Europeans, it was now the duty of all Muslims to work together so that the Sultan could once again lead the community. Moreover, it was in their

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interests to do so - Spain had not only ruined Islam, but possessed itself of the Muslims' goods, a point the Darqawiya letter makes great play with, looking far back to the losses of the Muslims when the Christians reconquered al-Andalus in the late Middle Ages, and bringing in the depredations of the French in Algeria as well. "England", however, is praised for not taking part in the attack on Morocco, conveniently forgetting the British occupation of Egypt, for it is Morocco which is the important question, not Islamic countries elsewhere⁶¹.

What is to be made of these letters? It is of course very hard to know if they genuinely came from the Rif itself, but they do reflect a number of themes which were to be the common currency of propaganda throughout the Rif War: the call for Jihad , the underlying feeling that the millenium was very close, the attacks on the ulama for betraying Islam, the mistrust of France, would all be repeated again and again.

Yet, despite the propaganda the Jibala did not explode into violence. The Spanish continued to hold Tetuan and many posts in the countryside, where their clients - fearful of what might happen to them if their masters were defeated - were obliged to hold the pro-Rifi movement in check⁶². Propaganda aside, the Rifis had done little in the Jibala so far, and al-Raisuli was so weakened by his experiences in June and early July that he was unable to take advantage of the Rifi victory. In any event he probably did not want to join the Rifi cause for it would have put an end to his own political dominance. So, when a delegation from the Akhmas asked him to form an immediate union with the Rifis, he temporised, and demanded time to consider. The Akhmasis answered that "he wanted too much time in considering, and the meeting broke up"⁶³. As Mr. Fox-Strangeways, the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan said in a report that, "Raisuli seems to have been the villain of the piece from the Moorish point of view, and his tergiversations have resulted in much valuable time being lost by Abdel Karim"⁶⁴.

Al-Raisuli was not the only prominent leader who did not join the Rifis. The events of 1921 thrust ^CAbd al-Malik onto the political margins, which made him feel most aggrieved. In a long letter of complaint to bin ^CAbd al-Karim, he explained that he attempted to join the Rifi movement, but his offer of help was refused. Indeed, he went on, bin ^CAbd al-Karim had undermined his power-base in the Sinjaha by propagandising there without seeking his support; worst of all, his warnings that the French were still dangerous were ignored⁶⁵. There is, however, a rather different version of events which is told by Spanish intelligence sources. They suggest that when bin ^CAbd al-Karim asked ^CAbd al-Malik for support, the danger from the French was his major excuse for not giving it. The reply came back from the Rif that the French had promised not to attack while the Rifis were dealing with the Spanish, a reply which, even had it been true, would not have pleased a longstanding enemy of the French like ^CAbd al-Malik. In any case had he joined the

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Rifis his support would not have been worth much, since he had only a few supporters left⁶⁶.

For very similar reasons, ^CAbd al-Malik and al-Raisuli did not join the Rifis. Neither wanted to lose what political autonomy he had. The consideration was finally worthless, however. By the end of August, though, it was bin ^CAbd al-Karim who had the most political prestige in northern Morocco. His victory over the Spanish had been overwhelming. The final report of the Cortes on the disaster put Spanish casualties at 13,192 killed and showed an enormous loss in matériel: at least 20,000 rifles, 400 machine guns and 129 cannons along with vast stores of ammunition and tinned food⁶⁷.

However, there were difficulties too. It had become apparent that the unity which joined the Rifis and the Qal'ayis was a fragile one, having only an immediate object in view: the defeat of the Spanish. Beyond that the Qal'ayis were not prepared to go, certainly not to put themselves under bin ^CAbd al-Karim's control - the ideology of jiḥād was not enough to guarantee their obedience. The Jibala and the Ghumara had not risen with the Rifis either: they too would eventually have to be brought under bin ^CAbd al-Karim's control by force. Nevertheless, the Rifi leader was in a very strong position at the end of August and in the Rif itself had concentrated considerable power in his hands. The problems which faced him from September onwards were enormous, but he had the basis from which to begin consolidating his rule.

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2. Sources differ on the number of troops involved. Berenguer 36, has 250; Martinez de Campos, 242 has 1,500 to occupy the position and 200 to hold it; Al-Bu ^CAyyashi, 11, 71 has 500.
3. Berenguer 36; Al-Bu ^CAyyashi, 11, 71-73; Martinez de Campos 242; Woolman 88; FO 371 / 7067 / W6905 / 184 / 28, Atkinson to White, Tetuan, 16 June 1921.
4. Berenguer, 34.
5. Martinez de Campos, 242.
6. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 375.
7. SHM Melilla 19, *Memorias Alhucemas*, Memoria 1^a quincena de junio de 1921.
8. Berenguer, 43; Martinez de Campos, 242-3; Payne, *Politics*, 166, says the action was on 8 June.
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15. SHM Melilla 19, *Memorias Alhucemas*, Memoria 1^a quincena de julio de 1921.
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20. SHM Melilla 19, *Confidencias Mayo*, Muhammad bin ^cAllush, 30 June 1921.
21. Payne, *Politics*, 166; Martinez de Campos, 251.
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31. Roger-Mathieu 104; Al-Bu ^cAyyashi, 11, 109-110; Berenguer 95, Payne, *Politics*, 169.
32. SHM Melilla 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Rafael Sequejo Sastre (of the *Regulares*), 4 August 1921.
33. SHM Melilla 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Muhammad bin Si al-Mukhtar, Muhammad ^cAmar al-Tayyib, 4 August 1921, ^cAllal bin Tahar bin Si Muhand, 5 August 1921, ^cCapt. Justo Fausto Ortoneda, Muhammad bin al-Hajj al-^cArabi, 6 August 1921.

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35. Martinez de Campos, 250.
36. Martinez de Campos, 250-1; Al-Bu ^CAyyashi, 11, 107.
37. SHM Melilla 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Muhammad bin Mimun al-Saghawi, 11 August 1921.
38. SHM Melilla 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Jacob Zarashi (a Melillan Jew), 12 August 1921, Muhammad bin Mimun al-Saghlawi, 11 August 1921, Muh al-Mu^Callim 14 August 1921.
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42. SHM Melilla 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Si ^CAli al-Hihi, Fatima bint Hammu, 29 August 1921.
43. SHM Melilla 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Si ^CAli al-Hihi, 19 August 1921.
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7. CONSOLIDATION

At the end of August the Rifis were still unbeaten. A Spanish attack was clearly coming, there was dissent and even despair in the Qal^aaya, but in the meantime they could continue their triumphant propaganda campaign. It consisted of that mixture of calls to Jihad , glorification of bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and demands for unity and obedience to his orders which was becoming the ideology of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's leadership. A letter sent to be read in the markets of the al-Matalsa, Awiad Sittut and Banu Issnasen (in the French zone) was typical:

There is no God but God. From he who implores the aid of the most just, the most strong, the munificent, Muhammad Abd el-Karim to his brothers the notables of Saf-Saf and Beni Snassen, M'taiza and Uiad Setut. God protect you and keep you from all harm. Mujahidin! Through God's will we have declared war on the Christian Spaniard, and have thrown him out of our beloved land, blessed by the Prophet. Our victory must be completed by the total expulsion of the Christians. To that end Jihad has been called throughout the Rif. You must not make war, sons of Mohamed, like bandits. We must go to battle in an orderly fashion, beneath a flag. We have the equipment. Each man will receive a Spanish duro (five pesetas) in payment as well as food and ammunition. Each will have his part and role in the battle.

We must make war as the Prophet commanded. Kill the enemy under arms, leave the old, the irresponsible, the children, the women. God gives you the right to booty and the enslavement of the defeated, but obliges you to forswear useless cruelty ¹.

Propaganda was one thing, action quite another. Despite the call to expell the Christians completely, the attack on Mellila never took place. Force of numbers saw to that. Spanish forces numbered 36,000 men, and they were better equipped than the Rifis, even if they were demoralised ². Substantial Rifi forces were sent to Qal^aaya at the beginning of September ³, although they were there not to attack the

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Spanish but to slow down their advance. Even that limited aim needed local support, and it was not forthcoming.

As a result, when the Spanish advance began on 12 September it was not seriously opposed. Al-Nazur was occupied on 17 September and the rail-head to Melilla was reopened in four hours. The Spanish carried on. The Kabdana submitted on 23 September, Silwan was taken on 3 October and Saghanghan on 5 October.

Not surprisingly, when, at this moment, ^CAbd al-Malik requested assistance he was ignored. As the Spanish reconquest was beginning ^CAbd al-Malik wrote asking for troops rather than "letters of support and sermons . . . which are no use in these parts"⁴. But bin ^CAl-Karim had more important things to deal with and no-one was sent.

On the eastern front, the Rifis had begun to go home. On 26 September the Faqih Bu Lahya pulled out, leaving behind 600 men to collect abandoned Spanish war matériel and bring it back to the Rif⁵. The small harrying parties left behind to hinder the Spanish advance were even refused food in some Qal^Cayi tribes. There may not have been enough food to give them: bin ^CAbd al-Karim was told that the Qal aya was unable to feed the haraka because many of the men had fled to the interior to escape the advancing Spanish, and because the fighting in July and August had disrupted the final stages of the harvest⁶.

With little to stop them, the Spanish troops pushed on. They reoccupied Jabal Arawit on 24 October, took Wiksan on 18 November, Hianan and Tawrirt on 30 November. The advance continued until the beginning of January, and by then most Rifi forces had withdrawn behind the Wadi Kart and Spanish troops had crossed it in the far south. On 9 January, 1922, they took Dar Driush. There, for a while they rested⁷. The rapid Spanish advance posed a serious problem for bin ^CAbd al-Karim. The nature of the war had changed. It was no longer possible to defeat the Spanish by surprising a few static Spanish positions. Instead it was the Rifis who now had to withdraw in reasonable order, saving as much war supplies and holding as many prisoners as possible. A long drawn out war was beginning, and in order to fight it bin ^CAbd al-Karim would need to keep a tight rein over the tribes.

This was very difficult because many people were not happy about the idea of outside control and particularly domination by the Banu Waryaghal. Continuous discipline was necessary. At the beginning of November a detachment of 500 men from the Banu Sa'id was put on the roads leading towards the Spanish lines to prevent people from leaving. That was not enough. Two qaid-s in the Banu Tuzin rejected bin ^CAbd al-Karim's authority and the Banu Walishak contingent left the haraka when they were fined for not fighting the Spanish hard enough. The Buquyya and Banu Yittuft refused to send any more reinforcements to the eastern front, saying they would protect only the

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borders of their own tribes⁸. This was a dangerous development indeed, because it undermined the whole basis of unity in the Rif, which depended on breaking down tribal divisions. The unity which bin ^CAbd al-Karim wanted was more than a temporary coalition; it was to be achieved by a total political restructuring of the Rif under his control. The tension between this demand of the leader for personal authority and the demands of the tribes for a return to their traditional "independence" was the single most important political problem which bin ^CAbd al-Karim faced during the war. In 1927, when the war was over, bin ^CAbd al-Karim would complain that, "Even those of the greatest knowledge and intelligence believed that after the victory had been won, I would allow each tribe to return to complete freedom, despite their realisation that this would return the country to the worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism"⁹. This, in his eyes, was what the Banu Yittuft and Buquyya were proposing.

To stop them, and to prevent other tribes from joining them, bin ^CAbd al-Karim began to clamp down on dissent. At the end of November, pro-Spanish leaders in the Banu Sidal were imprisoned in Anwal and three men from the Banu Tuzin were shot for contacting the Spanish. On 1 January 1922 the market at Bu Irmana in the Banu Sa'id, one of the main haraka positions, was told that anyone who tried to cross to the Spanish lines would be shot¹⁰.

A policy of intimidation was beginning. The first victim was Qaddur bin ^CAmar of the Banu Sa'id, who, in the second week of January, along with many others of his tribe, came to the conclusion that it was pointless for his tribe to continue fighting once the Spanish had occupied Dar Driush, which they did on 9 January. Other shaykh-s, having met at Bu Irmana, agreed. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim reacted quickly. He deputed two qaid-s to organise guard units to stop people from crossing to the Spanish lines, telling them to shoot anyone who tried to do so. The two qaid-s were Qal'ayis who had moved back with the Rifis, Ismail wuld al-Shadli of the Mazuja and Idris bin Mimun Khujja of the Banu Bu Ifrur, who would stay with bin ^CAbd al-Karim to the end of the war. Then Qaddur bin ^CAmar was arrested and some 4,000 troops, mainly Waryaghliis, were moved into his tribe - partly as a defence against the Spanish, partly to back up bin ^CAbd al-Karim's authority¹¹.

The intimidation did not work. The Banu Sa'idis were too demoralised by the repeated Spanish bombing which accompanied the move to the west to carry on. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim could not hold Qaddur bin ^CAmar for long because it caused too much political dissent. Nor, despite the pickets, could bin ^CAbd al-Karim prevent people from leaving. 368 families crossed to the Spanish lines in February alone; it had been 80 the previous month. As a final blow, leaders of the al-Matalsa refused either to hand over their arms or to join the haraka¹². Sheer force was not enough. What bin ^CAbd al-Karim needed was detailed control.

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At the end of 1921 and the beginning of 1922 bin ^CAbd al-Karim began to appoint gaid-s in every tribe under his control. One of their first tasks was to collect taxes. Taxation was important because it did not just provide revenue but it simultaneously demonstrated bin ^CAbd al-Karim's political authority. The first taxation consequently caused an uproar.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim explained that the purpose of the tax was to raise money to buy aeroplanes and demanded 5 pesetas a head¹³. This was not such an absurd idea as it might seem - later in the war the Rifis did buy aeroplanes, although they never flew - and it served a useful propaganda purpose, for the haraka had been greatly demoralised by Spanish bombing. However unrealistically, the Rifi leader was showing that he was intent on fighting off Spanish air attacks by using modern techniques rather than relying on "supernatural" powers. He was a long way from al-Sharif al-Idrisi.

The purpose may have been modern but the tax was collected in traditional Moroccan fashion. The actual amount which was levied was up to two times the nominal amount, the excess being kept by the gaid. This was a political gift to his opponents, who took the opportunity to blacken bin ^CAbd al-Karim's reputation. At the end of February he backed down and reduced the tax to 2.5 pesetas a head. Then he eased up even further and released some of the shaykh-s he was holding prisoner, and restrictions on commerce with the Spanish controlled sector were reduced, which improved the economic situation. As a result the Banu Sa'id haraka began to grow again¹⁴, proof that intimidation could be counter productive.

The tax was collected in the end and power continued to filter into bin ^CAbd al-Karim's hands. Power was centralised in other ways, too. Most importantly he gradually achieved a superiority of force over all rivals. As Rifi forces withdrew from the Qal'aya in October 1921, they gathered not only Spanish prisoners but also abandoned military equipment and returned them to the Rif. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's agent was Haddu bin Hammu al-Buquyyi, another partially Europeanised Rifi, who had left as a young man after Bushta al-Bahgdadi's expedition in 1889, and gone with his family to Algeria where he was educated¹⁵.

Haddu's education is important, for it brought him into the small elite of educated people, with a relatively technocratic outlook, which was now running the Rif. At first he was fairly successful; he organised the collection of so much equipment, field guns, machine guns and other weapons, from Dar Driush that he needed all the men he could find to transport them back to the Rif. But with the prisoners he ran into political problems. In a report to bin ^CAbd al-Karim Haddu told his master: "We have announced in the markets that all those who have any Christian captives should bring them to us in Dar Driush and anyone who conceals one will have to be punished"¹⁶.

This announcement led to opposition from some of the

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shaykh-s, particularly in the Tafarsit, and Haddu considered forming an "army" of men from the al-Matalsa, Banu Tuzin and Banu Walishak to fine anyone who caused trouble. But he did not want anything without bin ^CAbd al-Karim's permission: "I look to you in this business, so tell us what you want for we are waiting for your word"¹⁷.

By December the problems of transporting heavy equipment to Anwal were enormous. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had forbidden him to use the labour of Spanish prisoners and he knew that to requisition baggage animals from the tribes might have alienated them further. What, he asked bin ^CAbd al-Karim in another report, was he to do¹⁸? Haddu was nervous of taking political initiatives of his own because he knew that he was an administrator, an outsider among the tribes of the eastern front. But the difference between him and the local people was not simply one which resulted from his job. There was half a world of cultural difference. He was educated in a partly Europeanised way and the ordinary people were not. The difference showed very clearly when he tried to explain why he could not collect up all the material. "As for the two cannons that are on the road in the Banu Walishak. I have ordered Sayyid Hammush to take them from there, but he has disobeyed me, and they are still there, and the shepherds are playing with them and breaking them"¹⁹. The disdain of the educated official for the simple people of the tribes shows through.

The policies which Haddu bin Hammu was carrying out so loyally had, as their main inspiration, the idea of a centralised authority. The Qal'aya since July 1921 had shown how vital this was. The Rifi intervention in the Ghumara and Jibala, drove the point home.

Although the euphoria of the Rifi victories had led to no immediate rising in the Jibala and Ghumara, al-Raisuli eventually picked up the threads of his resistance in a minor way in early September²⁰. By then, however, a group of Ghumaris had gone to bin ^CAbd al-Karim to ask for his assistance. That was in August and unlike the Qal'ayis they were well received. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim told them to go home and prepare the ground politically, and he would send his brother, Si Mahammad, to help them when sufficient troops had been collected²¹.

The Ghumaris were very successful. By the end of September a loose coalition between the Akhmas and the Ghumara had been formed and they had raised significant haraka-s in the Banu Silman and Akhmas tribes²². Meanwhile, in the Rif, Si Mahammad assembled between 600 and 1,000 troops, a field gun and machine guns (presumably war booty from the Spanish). Accompanied by his brother-in-law, Si Ahmad Bu Dra', and another Waryaghli military leader, Si Sha'ib al-Falah, Si Mahammad set out and arrived in the Banu Ziyat, in the Ghumara on 19 October 1921. At the same time, Muhammad al-Akhmalish was also moving into the Jibala from the south and reached the Akhmas on 19 October²³.

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The Rifis received a fulsome welcome from Muhammad al-Raisuli, the Sharif's eldest son, but one which nevertheless put Si Muhammad firmly in his place. The Jiblis, he was told, knew local conditions better than the Rifis and had been fighting the Spanish for a long time. He was welcome as an ally in that fight, but the leadership should remain in the Jibala - that is with the al-Raisulis. He explained:

As for your request that we make strenuous efforts to encourage the tribes, that is something we have been doing for some time - may God accept our efforts - and it is still our intention . . . you ask us for advice about the military and political plan which you must follow. Certainly the only way to an effective and far-reaching advantage that occurs to us, which lights our conscience, which our understanding has settled upon, and which is based on our knowledge of the customs of the people of our country - as it was said 'the people of Mecca know best their own ravines'. . . ²⁴.

He then went on to give detailed advice about the plan of attack the Rifis should follow, though he gave no promise of practical support. He did however, warn against trusting the Ghumaris: ". . . the tribe of Ghumara is a nest of depravity and all its educated men and ^Culama are addicted to treachery in negotiation, to rebellion and to what is of benefit to the enemy"²⁵.

The Ghumaris behaved as he predicted. The Rifis did well in the first attacks on the coast. Tigisas, Tandaman, where they used field guns, and Qa^Casras were all besieged in the third week of October, but when they tried to take the main Spanish base at Wadi Law, the Ghumaris refused to help and the haraka began to collapse²⁶. The collapse was achieved by Spanish political action or, as the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan described it, "their original tactics of wholesale bribery", to the disgust of some senior officers who would have preferred to continue a military campaign²⁷. The Ghumaris even tried to capture Si Mahammad and Ahmad Bu Dra^C and hand them over to the Spanish, but they managed to escape to the Rif. Muhammad al-Akhamlish's column broke up in early November after disagreements among its members²⁸. The Rifi incursion into the Ghumara had failed.

The Spanish followed their success by moving back into the Banu Lait in December and into the southern Akhmas in January 1922. Before bad weather stopped operations, they had once again surrounded Tazarut and mopped up the rest of the haraka²⁹.

The failure in the Jibala did not prevent bin ^CAbd al-Karim from trying again. The second sortie, in February 1922 was better prepared politically. It started at the beginning of February with the arrival of the Faqih Bu Lahya, who began by writing letters to the tribes which he signed Al-Faqih Bu Lahya Khalifa Na'ib Dawla al-Islamiya al-Faqih Sayyid Muhammad bin Sayyid ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi al-Waryaghli. (The Faqih Bu

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
Lahya Deputy of the Head of the Islamic State al-Faqih Muhammad bin al-Sayyid ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi al-Waryaghli³⁰. The formula was a deliberate attempt to capitalise on three things - Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own charisma, Islam, and the concept of a "state", an autonomous political entity in the Rif. Having made this point, the Rifis began an intensive propaganda campaign against al-Raisuli. In mid-February Bin ^CAbd al-Karim tried to win over a number of minor leaders who had fled the Spanish occupied areas, and who were now acting independently. He told them that if they needed help he would provide more than the Sharif³¹.

The propaganda was effective. The Matiwa al-Bahar agreed to a new haraka and to collect taxes, the Ghumara rallied to the Rifi cause, promising contingent of 150 men from each tribe, and Bu Lahya persuaded the Akhmasi haraka facing Shawin to join him³². Having formed a loose coalition, Bu Lahya then took control of the Ghumara. On 4 April, accompanied by 600 Rifis and supporters from the Akhmas and Banu Ahmad he arrived in the Banu Ziyat, arrested leaders who were opposed to him, and sent them off to the Rif. He at once started on a military reorganisation of the region; he announced the formation of a haraka paid at 35 pesetas a month, forbade banditry, brought in strict regulations about the issue of ammunition and ordered that all money collected in fines should be used to buy cart-ridges³³.

However, the Rifi presence in the Jibala and Ghumara was still fragile, and depended on continued success. As had been the case in the Qal'aya, the Rifis were not fully in control, and their cause accordingly suffered from the same weaknesses as it had in the Qal'aya: a tendency for each clan to split off from the rest. As a result, it collapsed at the first defeat, although ironically that defeat, which led to the failure of this second sortie into the Ghumara and Jibala, was inflicted not on the Rifis but on al-Raisuli.

In the late spring of 1922, Berenguer resumed the operations which he had halted because of bad weather in January. On 2 May Spanish troops moved back into the Banu ^CArus, and on 12 May entered al-Raisuli's refuge. To drive the victory home Berenguer appointed as administrator there, al-Raisuli's old rival as Pasha of Asila, Idris al-Rifi³⁴. Al-Raisuli himself escaped to the Jabal Bu Hashim from where he made a feeble attempt to rally support, and to get help from the Rifis. He proposed to bin ^CAbd al-Karim that they should split the Spanish zone between them. The proposal was ignored³⁵.

The Spanish occupation of Tazarut and other advances in the west led to the rapid collapse of the haraka, which not even the powerful hand of Bu Lahya could control. By the beginning of July everything west of the Matiwa al-Bahar was once again lost to the Rifis³⁶. By this time, however, the west had become a sideshow, for along the eastern front, the Spanish advance had begun again.



3. Rifi incursions into the Ghumara and Jibala


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A new Spanish government, headed by Jose Sanchez Guerra, came to office in March 1922. It was the eighth conservative government in three years, and was faced with growing demands for the punishment of those responsible for the disaster in Morocco in 1921. The "cry for responsibility" was growing³⁷, but that was only one problem. There was a major political and financial crisis, which the Moroccan war made very much worse. The amount spent in Morocco was half as much as was being spent in Spain³⁸, so budgetary pressures alone weakened the government's resolve to permit a full-scale invasion and conquest of Morocco³⁹. There were also political demands within Spain, even in the army, to withdraw. Nevertheless, Berenguer was allowed to continue a limited advance in the east. In mid-March Spanish troops moved into the Banu Sa'id, and took Dar Kabdani on 8 April⁴⁰. Madrid's patience did not last long and at the end of March Berenguer was told to change his policy, to lessen the scale of military operations, to increase the number of troops recruited in Morocco itself, and to "invite the Moors to cooperate more freely in the administration of the protectorate"⁴¹. Operations were wound down, but before they stopped, Spanish troops moved into the al-Matalsa and took Shaif on 19 April⁴².

The bald statement of dates makes it appear that the advance was easy. It was not. It was fiercely resisted by Rifi forces who were better organised and supplied than before. The advantages of centralised control and the efforts of Haddu bin Hammu to collect up arms were paying off, in contrast to the situation in the Jibala. They gave a convincing demonstration of this on 3 April when they began a diversionary attack on the Penon de Velez and almost took, using heavy guns they had brought through the Rif from the former Spanish posts on the Plain of Garat⁴³.

Nor was bin ^cAbd al-Karim faced with any serious challenge to his authority on the eastern front. The contingents from the central Rif were quite able to control any dissent that broke out there. On 13 April there were 200 men in Azib Midar, 400 in Tafarsit, and another 400 in various places in the Banu Walishak. One man who eventually managed to flee to the Spanish lines told them that as a "suspected friend of Spain" he had been imprisoned in Ajdir, chained by the feet and neck and was only freed when he paid a fine of 5,000 pesetas and allowed his 200 sheep, 144 goats, 10 cows, two mules, two asses and one horse to be confiscated, along with 60 quintals of barley. He may well have been exaggerating, but the intimidation was real enough⁴⁴. By the beginning of May, 2,500 men were camped on the eastern front. Towards the end of May, when the opposition, particularly that of Qaddur bin ^cAmar of the Banu Sa'id, had still not been completely silenced, another 2,000 were brought in⁴⁵.

A wave of arrests followed, including those of Qaddur bin ^cAmar and the inveterate bet-hedger and side-changer,



4. The Eastern Zone

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Muhammad Bu Qaddur of the Timsaman. Heavy fines were imposed, people were forced to join the haraka, and two men were shot on the suspicion of being spies⁴⁶. However, bin ^CAbd al-Karim's policy was not simply repressive. In the Banu Walishak he appointed new qaid-s who were more acceptable to the local people than his own original choices⁴⁷. The question of qaid-s was very important, because bin ^CAbd al-Karim needed to strike a balance between men who were acceptable locally, and men who were acceptable to him.

This was no easy task, even in bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own tribe, the Banu Waryaghal. The strongest man in the powerful mountain clan of the Banu Hadhifa was ^CAmar bin Sadiq, and it was politically difficult to appoint anyone else. But ^CAmar was a long-standing Spanish pensioner, and his loyalty was by no means certain. In the equally important Banu Bu Ayyash clan, he was obliged to appoint as qaid Muhammad Azarqan (not to be confused with bin ^CAbd al-Karim's Minister of Foreign Affairs), who would later be dismissed for incompetence and treachery⁴⁸. In the Banu Yittuft, the obvious candidate for qaid of the whole tribe was Sidi Hamidu, the head of the zawiya at Snada, and he insisted on being appointed. When this was done, however, Sidi Hamidu announced that it was not the job of a sharif to organise a military haraka and that he would not do so⁴⁹. This was a delicacy of feeling that he had not shown before, when he sent repeated assistance to al-Raisuli in 1919, so it could only have represented an attempt to preserve his local autonomy. In the Targist tribe, Si Mahammad, who had been sent to arrange matters in the Sinhaja, gave up in despair because of the totally fragmented political structure he found there. He wrote back to his brother:

You know all about the differences between the people of Targist over qaid-s. At first we reconciled them and divided them according to the wishes of the people who wished to be under one qaid or another. Now the dispute has broken out again over the jama^C-a-s of Tawriat and Ansa^Cadiya. Opinions have changed and among the jama^C a of Tawriat there are people who want Qaid Ahmad and refuse to serve under Qaid ^CAllush, while there are those who do want to serve under Qaid ^CAllush and refuse to serve under Qaid Ahmad. The same has happened in the Ansa^Cadiya and when I saw that the quarrel had started, I wrote to them telling them to keep the peace that I made for them the first time, and if they would not do this then everyone who wanted Qaid Ahmad should serve under him, and he who wanted the Qaid ^CAllush should do likewise. God did not allow them to agree on this . . . The people of Ansa^Cadiya reject what we said to them. They have brought disgrace upon us . . .⁵⁰.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim solved similar problems by splitting clans and tribes so that old liff-opponents were not forced to live under one qaid, on other occasions he accepted candidates put

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forward by their tribes or clans in an effort to keep the peace, only to find that they were incompetent - which happened in the Banu Tuzin⁵¹.

These problems were solvable in the central Rif, because there bin ^CAbd al-Karim had the power to enforce them. The argument was about who he, or his brother appointed as qaid, and in the final event he could reject a candidate. Authority was becoming more and more centralised in his hands. Things were rather different, however, on the Rif's southern flank, where there was indeed considerable opposition to bin ^CAbd al-Karim. In the Gaznaya, for instance people were not very willing to accept his authority. They proved it when they held a British socialist John Arnall, a sympathiser with the Rifis who lived in Tangier. When he tried to enter the Rif from the south they refused to release him to bin ^CAbd al-Karim. The latter told them that they were "Rifi by language and must not go against these decisions", and sent a haraka to back up this new basis for Rifi solidarity - language⁵². Far more serious opposition came from the old power broker in the Sinhaja, ^CAbd al-Malik, and his ally, Qaid ^CAmar bin Hamidu of the Marnisa.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had ignored ^CAbd al-Malik's requests to be allowed to join the Rifis at the height of the successes of July and August 1921. Consequently, from then until his death in 1924, ^CAbd al-Malik's attitude would be totally opposed to bin ^CAbd al-Karim, who was anyway intent on keeping good relations with the French in order to maintain his supply routes to the south. However, apart from an attempt in November 1921 to raise a haraka in the Marnisa in order to attack the Rifis at Azilaf, which collapsed within days⁵³, ^CAbd al-Malik did nothing very threatening until the summer of 1922.

^CAbd al-Malik spent the intervening period building up a base in the Sinhaja, from where he formed a three-way alliance between himself, ^CAmar bin Hamidu of the Marnisa, with whom he already had good relations dating back to 1920, and al-Hajj Bil-Qish of the Gaznaya⁵⁴. This was the beginning of a long duel between bin ^CAbd al-Karim and ^CAbd al-Malik. ^CAmar bin Hamidu and Bil-Qish, although they were long-standing opponents of the Rifi leader, were less than consistent allies, for they had to participate in the political game within the Rif, and had positions to protect; so on occasion both they and bin ^CAbd al-Karim had to come to terms with each other, at least temporarily. ^CAbd al-Malik was an outsider, and could maintain his enmity unsullied by such local considerations.

Bil-Qish was the weaker partner, and bin ^CAbd al-Karim put most pressure on him. At the end of June he told Bil-Qish to persuade ^CAmar bin Hamidu to submit to his authority. To back the demand bin ^CAbd al-Karim sent a haraka of 1,000 men into the Marnisa. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim, however, did not want to use force. His preferred tactic was to try to incorporate his opponents. He appointed ^CAmar bin Hamidu as his qaid in the Marnisa and, hopeful of his loyalty, took the haraka on,

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south-west, into the Banu Zarwal. There he hoped to convince ^CAbd al-Rahman al-Darqawi, the head of the Darqawiyya order in ^CAmajutt, to join the Rifi causes⁵⁵.

As soon as the haraka had gone, ^CAmar bin Hamidu began, as Skiraj puts it, to "disturb the peace"⁵⁶, and it looked as though Bil-Qish was about to join him. Si Mahammad and Muhammad Azarqan were deputed to try to persuade him otherwise. This they did, for bin ^CAbd al-Karim's large haraka provided a rough balance of forces so that things did not get out of hand, but the underlying opposition was strengthening. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim responded with propaganda, attacking ^CAmar bin Hamidu as an "unbeliever": the damning of opposition as irreligious was a recurring theme throughout the Rif War since questions of power would always be seen in religious terms. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim, after all, represented both shar and jihad, so those who opposed him would necessarily be seen as apostates. Propaganda, however, did not defeat his enemies. Only force could do that, and it was the arrival in the third week of July of the ubiquitous Bu Lahya at the head of another haraka which forced ^CAmar bin Hamidu and Bil-Qish to accept a temporary truce. It did not last long; by the beginning of August the two local leaders had got the support of their ally, ^CAbd al-Malik, and were once again strong enough to oblige the Rifi commanders to withdraw⁵⁷. This was a serious loss of prestige for bin ^CAbd al-Karim. Political life had been returned to the level of the tribe, precisely the state of affairs which bin ^CAbd al-Karim wanted to transcend. At the same time ^CAbd al-Malik's prestige increased markedly in the Marnisa, Sinhaja and Gaznaya, his old base during the First World War.

The defeat was doubly dangerous because it encouraged opponents of bin ^CAbd al-Karim on the eastern front, in the Beni Tuzin, Tafarsit and Banu Walishak⁵⁸. ^CAbd al-Malik and ^CAmar bin Hamidu tried to take advantage of this to spread the political contagion further. The first organised another haraka, the second had it announced in the markets of the Banu Tuzin that all their problems had been caused by bin ^CAbd al-Karim, "who is neither sharif nor sultan", and that the only people who could restore order were the Spanish. ^CAmar bin Hamidu was now overtly a Spanish agent, and was supplying them with intelligence information⁵⁹.

The Rifis had little to fear from the Spanish themselves because their new "political policy" was disastrous. Berenguer, for his part, was in no position to administer these or any other policies. He was under repeated attacks over his part in the Anwal disaster and had several times offered to resign. The offer was eventually accepted in July after the Supreme Military Court began the prosecution of 37 officers, including the High Commissioner.

The new High Commissioner was General Burguete whose task, in essence, was to put an end to the fighting. To do this he first of all proposed to deal with al-Raisuli by recognising

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al-Raisuli's "rights", then he hoped to negotiate with bin ^CAbd al-Karim for the return of the prisoners, by ransom if necessary, and finally to lay the foundations of a civil protectorate⁶⁰.

The negotiations with al-Raisuli had the desired result. Even while they were going on the Sharif was given a subvention of 50,000 pesetas in return for preventing any attacks on the Spanish, and at the end of September a final agreement was reached. Al-Raisuli would be allowed to stay in Tazarut, with a haraka of 4,000 men, paid and equipped by Spain, and if he kept the Jibala peaceful for a year he would be reinstated as Pasha of Asila. In return he would submit to the Khalifa although, to spare his feelings, he did not have to do this in person. It was al-Raisuli's nephew who made the gesture, by proxy, when he came to Tetuan in December with 400 men and was received in some style by the Spanish⁶¹. The policy worked and attacks on Spanish positions in the Jibala noticeably declined. In May 1923, al-Raisuli briefly returned to his post in Asila⁶².

In the eastern zone, Burguete tried similar policies. He issued a proclamation saying that Spain wanted to restore order in the Rif, that it would rule only indirectly, through an amil (governor). If he was not accepted, however, force would have to be used⁶³. Burguete was relying on the disruption caused by ^CAbd al-Malik and ^CAmar bin Hamidu to distract bin ^CAbd al-Karim's attention, and in August military action started again. On 24 August, Azib Midar was reoccupied, then Azru, Issan Lissan, and Ushshan⁶⁴. The Madrid government was not entirely happy with these new advances, but Burguete assured them that they were only minor operations⁶⁵, and was allowed to continue.

The advances greatly encouraged bin ^CAbd al-Karim's three main opponents. Amar bin Hamidu collected more men to attack the Banu Waryaghal, and Bil-Qish made contact with the main Spanish negotiator for the return of the prisoners, Idris bin Sa'id. At the end of October he announced that he was pro-Spanish and demanded that the Banu Tuzin should make common cause with the Gaznaya, Marnisa and Wargha tribes that is with ^CAbd al-Malik and ^CAmar bin Hamidu. He was ignored; despite all their efforts on the southern edge of the Rif, bin ^CAbd al-Karim was still firmly in control on the eastern front⁶⁶.

Nevertheless, encouraged by these further signs of dissent, Burguete decided to push ahead. On 26 October Spanish forces advanced along the whole front from Dar Kabdani in the Banu Sa'id to Azru in the Banu Tuzin. Bu Hafura, Tafarsit and al-Nazur were occupied and then, on 28 October, Tizzi ^CAzza. This last position immediately came under a heavy Rifi counter-attack on 1 November and the Spanish lost almost 2,000 men before it was relieved. At the beginning of November a few more positions were occupied - Anwal, Issumar, Afraw - and then the advance finally stopped. It had reached roughly the same front lines as Silvestre had occupied immediately before the Anwal disaster⁶⁷.

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From now on the Spanish blockaded the Rif, to which end Burguete kept 30,000 men on the eastern front, to allow time for a "political" approach to be put into effect. "Political" meant "subversive", the only policy which could be adopted because the Rifis were still strong militarily. The Spanish had only been able to occupy their final positions with few casualties because the Rifi forces had withdrawn. However, when they withdrew the Rifis managed to keep their forces virtually intact. Now the front line was in the very foothills of the Rif, a frontier which would be very difficult for the Spanish to attack and one which protected the Rifi heartland; it was behind this boundary that the new order which bin ^CAbd al-Karim wanted would fully take shape. It was well guarded - there were estimated to be at least 4,000 men in the countryside surrounding forward Spanish posts⁶⁸. Subversion was the only option.

The policy was dressed up in the robes of local self-government. Soon after the Spanish reoccupied Tafarsit in October 1922 they appointed a pasha there. It was al-Raisuli's old rival, Idris al-Rifi. Considerable facilities were put at the new Pasha's disposal - the officers in charge of the military control offices (mias) were instructed that the qaid-s they administered were to be allowed to telephone him whenever they wished⁶⁹. As a result Idris al-Rifi became an intermediary between the Spanish and the tribes, as the Spanish intended.

This did not please everyone, certainly not long-standing Spanish agents who saw their position being undermined. Complaints soon began. On 13 December 1922 seven Timsamani shaykh-s wrote to the Spanish saying they would deal with the Native Police, but not with Idris al-Rifi. A shaykh from the Banu Waryaghal told them the same thing⁷⁰, and so did a Gaznayyi shaykh who explained:

I saw Senor (i.e. Captain) Alonso and gave him the good news that some people want to meet him, that is Alonso, and he ordered me to see the Pasha Sayyid Idris in Tafarsit, and when I met him I found that he does not fulfill the word of the Makhzen and there is no benefit in meeting him and he is no use . . ." ⁷¹.

There were similar problems in the Wargha valley. The Sinhaja tribes, had considerable strategic importance. If they could be won over to Spain they would further divert bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and might, in the future, provide an avenue of attack from the south and west. The Spanish made considerable efforts to bring about this desirable state of affairs and failed, more because of the self-defeating nature of their policies than of any action by bin ^CAbd al-Karim.

Their first mistake was to involve an extraordinary number of agents. Their principle agent in the Wargha itself was ^CAbd al-Salam bin al-Tayyib of the Fannassa tribe. He was joined by ^CAbd al-Qadir bin al-Hajj al-Tayyib who had been rewarded for keeping the Qal'ayi tribe of the Banu Shikar loyal to Spain in July and August 1921 by being given important posts in

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Spanish Intelligence. Then there was Idris bin Sa'id, a former class-mate of bin Abd al-Karim's at al-Qarawiyyin⁷², who was now working for the Spanish as the principal negotiator for the release of the prisoners. Abd al-Malik bin Muhyi al-Din had now become a full-time Spanish agent, and he was involved, and so was Idris al-Rifi. These agents distrusted each other.

Abd al-Salam al-Fannassi alleged in a letter to Abd al-Malik that Idris al-Rifi was in league with Idris bin Sa'id and another friend of theirs, bin Nuna, a wazir in the khalifa's administration in Tetuan, to distribute 5,000 pesetas among shaykh-s of the Wargha tribes to persuade them to write to the Spanish asking that Idris al-Rifi should be the intermediary between them and the Spanish. Idris al-Rifi, al-Fannassi surmised, was trying to build up his domains, specifically at the expense of Abd al-Qadir bin al-Hajj Tayyib, his principal rival⁷³.

All this poaching of each others' preserves may have annoyed the participants, but far more seriously, it confused and infuriated the Wargha shaykh-s. A letter from a group, claiming to represent them all, asked in November 1922, "What is happening? We heard that Spain was pure (as gold) unadulterated with copper. Today we are astonished at what you are doing. Relations have been damaged by the huge number of Moroccans involved . . ." ⁷⁴.

By the end of January 1923 they were furious. They wrote a letter to al-Fannassi whose invective rings with disillusion:

Praise be to God alone - May God Bless our Lord Muhammad and his descendents.

To his excellency our brother Abd al-Salam bin al-Tayyib al-Fannassi. On you be peace and mercy and blessing for ever. To continue: May God bless you for your service to the tribes of the Wargha in the way of lying and iniquity. They had great trust in you when you said that Spain was the best of all nations. We did not know anything about it, but you told us it was so to such an extent that people listened and our recognition (of the Spanish) spread throughout the land and we went back on Islam and our brotherhood with the Rif, and we tied ourselves to Spain and unbelief and we went into rebellion (against Islam). The battle came and we entered the territory of the Banu Waryaghal on account of the Spanish prisoners and the captured women. Today Wuld Abd al-Karim who was a friend, companion and beloved of the Spanish has changed sides so that he makes rebellion against the Spanish to such an extent that even the Indians have heard of him, while we have found our protection with them (i.e. the Spanish) and our reward has been disgrace and the tribes have laughed at us. The French have called to us abusing us and saying: 'Look at the nation for which you have toiled'. Wuld Abd al-Karim has been given money to win him back for Spain, and has been treated better than us, while the

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tribes of the Wargha have been rewarded with humiliation and disgrace. This is our reward from Spain. Before this France befriended us and told us to exchange Spain, a nation of disgrace, for a powerful nation. Today we know that their words were sincere whilst yours and those of your friends were false. This is how they have rewarded us. So know that you may not come (into our lands at this time). And Peace.

On the tenth of the last month of Jumada, thirteen forty-one.

All the ^Cayan of the Wargha, may God protect them⁷⁵.

The letter does not express just disillusion, however, but also an emotional conflict between a need to cooperate with a more powerful European state - as they had supposed Spain to be - and their loyalty to Islam. Notwithstanding their distrust of him, they felt a brotherhood with bin ^CAbd al-Karim and his Rifi supporters, one which they knew was recognised even by Muslims in British India, a reference to the attempts of Indian Muslims to send help to the Rif, which continued throughout the Rif War⁷⁶. The Warghis felt that they had been excluded from this solidarity, and hence from Islam, and had got nothing in return.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had played no part in these manoeuvrings. Spanish political action in the Wargha collapsed without him having to do much. He was, however, quite well aware of what was going on. He was able to intercept letters between Idris bin Sa'id and his agents in the Rif. Forewarned and forearmed, bin ^CAbd al-Karim could cope with subversion. He proved it in early December by executing a shaykh from the Banu Waryaghal itself, because he had contacted the Spanish to arrange the escape of the prisoners⁷⁷.

Nevertheless, despite bin ^CAbd al-Karim's control of the Rif, ^CAmar bin Hamidu still posed a very dangerous threat, for he might cut off supplies from the French zone on which the Rifis relied. At the beginning of December ^CAmar bin Hamidu attempted to do just this, by trying to persuade the Banu ^CAmart to leave the Rifi alliance. The move was stopped by a haraka led, as usual, by Bu Lahya. The victory was nowhere near complete, because Bu Lahya could not force ^CAmar bin Hamidu to release the Rifi qaid of the Banu ^CAmart whom he had captured⁷⁸. They had reached a political stalemate. The alliance of ^CAmar bin Hamidu and ^CAbd al-Malik with the occasional support of Bil-Qish was nowhere near strong enough to defeat bin ^CAbd al-Karim on his home ground, but he was unable to dominate them in the southern slopes of the Rif and the Wargha valley. What bin ^CAbd al-Karim needed now was to put his command on a more stable footing in the Rif itself. To do it he required an overall acceptance of his political leadership, and some financial security; in short, money and a bay^Ca.

The money was obtained easily enough by ransoming the Spanish prisoners who had been taken by the Rifis in the summer

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of 1921. The Spanish were perfectly willing to pay up in order to get them back. Since his appointment as High Commissioner, Burguete had made the prisoners' recovery one of his main aims. However a deal was equally earnestly desired by bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and not only for financial reasons. He was worried that the continued presence of the prisoners provided the means for the Spanish to put pressure on disaffected Rifis. He had very good grounds for concern, for the chief negotiator on the Spanish side for the return of the prisoners, Idris bin Sa'id, had taken the opportunity to cultivate such people. The brother of Haddu bin Hammu, for instance, was suspected of being involved in subversive attempts to free the prisoners and bin ^CAbd al-Karim had him executed for his pains. The presence of the prisoners also caused dissension amongst the hard-line anti-Spanish shaykh-s who felt they should be even more harshly treated than they were. Why should good food go to infidels? one of them asked⁷⁹.

With this willingness on both sides an agreement was quickly reached. Idris bin Sa'id brought in an old family acquaintance of the al-Khattabis, Horacio Echevarrietta, of the huge Basque industrial conglomerate Echevarria y Cia, who had known Si Muhammad in Spain before the First World War when they had studied at the Mining school in Madrid. Later, Echevarrietta had represented the German Mannesman company in Morocco⁸⁰. On 24 January, after Echevarrietta visited bin ^CAbd al-Karim in Ajdir, an agreement was reached, and four days later, on 28 January, the prisoners and the ransom, just over four million pesetas⁸¹, were exchanged.

At the same time the political dominance of bin ^CAbd al-Karim was being secured. Between the middle of January and the beginning of February bin ^CAbd al-Karim was given a series of bay a-s in different places. The first was on 18 January on Jabal Sijjum, the hillock which hid the Burj al-Mujahidin from the Spanish on Alhucemas Island⁸². This first bay a, although its text does not seem to have been preserved, was the most important. Skiraj's account of the ceremony is entitled "A description of the swearing of the bay a of the Amir Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim, the agreement of the Muslims upon him, and the complete imposition of his command". It is very apt, for "the complete imposition of his command" is precisely what the bay a represented. It was the affirmation of loyalty of many of the most important men in the Rif, and the list of those present was almost a roll-call of the Rifi leadership⁸³. Among them were the Faqih Bu Lahya and the Faqih Muhammad al-Shargi, who were jointly to be responsible for the policy of imposing the shar^C in the Rif, ^CAbd al-Salam bin al-Hajj Muhand of the Banu Bu ^CAyyash, and Ahmad Bu Dra^C, bin ^CAbd al-Karim's brother-in-law respectively his first and second "Ministers" of War. There was a host of lesser Waryaghli leaders - Muhammad bin Sadiq, the powerful qaid of the Banu Hadhifa clan, and representatives of the Imrabadhen and Banu ^CAbdallah

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clans. Finally, there were leaders from other tribes, among them al-Hajj bin Misa'ud Sha'ra of the Banu Bu Frah, a rich man whom the Spanish in 1917 had described as an "old fanatic", so great was his dislike of them⁸⁴. However, some very important men were absent: Si Mahammad, Azargan and 'Abd al-Salam al-Khattabi. So was Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Karim himself. To all appearances, his acceptance of the bay'a was only a response to the wishes of his people.

The first bay'a started a wave of similar declarations. On 22 January two Waryaghli shaykh-s except themselves had proclaimed bin 'Abd al-Karim. Similar reports came in from the Banu Tuzin as well⁸⁵. On 2 February a large meeting of Ghumari's, Walshakis and Timsamanis came to Ajdir and gave their bay'a too⁸⁶.

The consolidation of his hold over the Rif, and the strengthening of its unity, which bin 'Abd al-Karim achieved between September 1921 and the beginning of 1923 was carried out in the face of a Spanish advance. The advance, far from weakening the control which he had and the will to fight, strengthened it in the Rif. However, the Qal'aya collapsed, and in the Jibala and Ghumara, the resistance fell apart under the Spanish threat. These were areas which the Rifis did not properly control, and their instability pointed up the necessity for a central authority if the resistance was to hold together. However, centralising power in the hands of bin 'Abd al-Karim necessarily cut away the authority of local leaders, such as 'Amar bin Hamidu and Bil-Qish. For these men political methods had not changed from the period before the Rif War. They still sought to find a way of preserving their local position by finding a level of autonomy from the central authority, and the central authority was willing, to some extent, to play the game, to incorporate them into the new system. However, although methods had not changed, the political environment had. The central authority was not remote from the region, in Fez, but just across the mountains in Ajdir. Bin 'Abd al-Karim demanded a far closer cooperation than the Sultan needed, and that Bil-Qish and others were not too willing to give. So the strategies - incorporation on the one hand, apparent cooperation on the other failed, except as temporary expedients.

The Spanish had equal difficulties with their agents who were acting in their own interest rather than those of their masters. So, despite the difficulties, the cards were still stacked in bin 'Abd al-Karim's favour. He could claim that he, and not his opponents, not even the Darqawiya, represented the shari'a and Islam. He was conducting resistance to the Europeans and they were not. He had access to large amounts of arms, he controlled the fate of the prisoners. He had very considerable power centralised in his hands.

Thus it was that, even with 'Amar bin Hamidu and his allies undefeated, he had unchallenged control over the central

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Rif. On 21 February 1923, when it was clear that the bay^Ca-s had been given throughout the Rif, bin ^CAbd al-Karim formally accepted them. In his speech he told his audience that his Amirate would not be like government by a king, and he would not allow them to treat him as one, for he was their collective voice. His aim was quite simply to defeat the Spanish: "I served with them and I discovered that misfortune had come down on our land from above when they came into it . . . Let us dedicate ourselves to rescuing ourselves, our people and our land"⁸⁷.

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8. A GOVERNMENT IN THE RIF

The enormous ransom paid by the Spanish appalled bin ^cAbd al-Karim's opponents in the Wargha valley. They complained, in a letter of ironic fury, to the Spanish. "You have increased the importance of your beloved friend Wuld ^cAbd al-Karim - may God curse him and all his works! Four million! That money will be used against you and against us"¹.

That was precisely what happened. The four million pesetas were used to lay the financial basis of bin ^cAbd al-Karim's stable overlordship in the Rif. They allowed him to make his growing administration more stable and permanent.

It was stability and permanence which were the most important objectives at the beginning of 1923, and the traditional structures which depended on the old political system of the tribes were inherently unstable, because they could not preserve a wider political unity. That was the sum total of the experience not only of the collapse of the Qal'aya and the difficulties of 1922 in the Rif but also of the period before the battle of Abarran, when resistance to the Spanish was spasmodic. That experience formed a major theme of the bay'a which conferred complete authority on bin ^cAbd al-Karim at the beginning of 1923.

The bay'a-s that were traditionally given to a Moroccan sultan were usually no more than a simple reaffirmation of the status quo, a recognition of his rule and no more. The bay'a given to ^cAbd al-Karim on 2 February 1923 in Ajdir was not like that. It resembled the one given to ^cAbd al-Hafiz in Fez in 1908, for it was a political document, a statement of ideology and policy but, unlike it, it laid down no conditions; it was more a detailed, ideological justification of bin ^cAbd al-Karim's leadership, a statement of why he should be obeyed. The difference is fundamental: ^cAbd al-Hafiz was seeking power, bin ^cAbd al-Karim already had it. Its purpose was to confirm his legitimacy in religious and political terms, as far as those two aspects can be distinguished from each other, rather than to grant it. As such, bin ^cAbd al-Karim's bay'a is almost an official document, a statement of the political orientation of the new regime in

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the Rif.

It begins with a religious and political justification of the caliphate as an institution, praising its advantages: unity, order, morality, the preservation of the shar^c and its rejection of factionalism. It emphasises the religious necessity to obey the leader of the community, the amir, "be he a slave or an Abyssinian". (For Abyssinian understand "black man").

After this general introduction the bay^a moves on to specifics. It describes the anarchy, violence and disruption of Rifi and Jibli society which had existed before a man, as yet unnamed, came to reorganise society, restore the shar^c, bring about order and, using the techniques of modern warfare, lead the people to victory over the Christians. Now all was peaceful, and "the reins of the imamate" had been joined in this man's hands. The caliphate had come to him, "dragging its long robes behind it". Only now is this man identified by name. He is, of course, "Muhammad, son of our learned and distinguished lord, Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi al-Waryaghli al-Rifi".

The point at which bin ^cAbd al-Karim is named comes about three quarters of the way through the bay^a. By this stage, a number of points have been made. Order and the rule of the shar^c are needed to overcome the violence and factionalism of the Rif and Jibala. This is not only desirable, but a religious and a moral imperative. It is a precondition to the defeat of the Spanish, which must be brought about, in a military sense, by using modern - that is European - methods of warfare in defence of the fatherland (watan).

This point having been reached, the bay^a promises that the signatories, in this case the ayan^c of the region around Ajdir, will help bin ^cAbd al-Karim and will obey him, in return for his carrying out the conditions in the bay^a. "We have given you our bay^a and we have invested you with authority so that you may direct us with justice and kindness and in sincerity and that you should judge between us in truth . . .". Everyone, it again asserts, is agreed on this, everyone great and small, scribes, ayan^c, even the bull-headed, "those who persevere in their views, be they right or wrong", agree. The bay^a ends with more pious wishes for victory and the protection of the shar^c².

It is an extraordinary document, in many ways. It seems to state quite clearly that the Rifis were engaged in a jihād against the Spanish "the servants of the cross and the worshippers of idols". Bin ^cAbd al-Karim himself said the same thing when he finally accepted the bay^a, telling his supporters, "There is no doubt that jihād is a duty for us, to attack the enemy which has come on us in our land. We shall defend our religion and our land"³.

This was, however, not how bin ^cAbd al-Karim would later present himself to Europeans and modernist Muslims. He would describe himself as a modern man, who rejected jihād as a medieval concept, no longer relevant to the modern world. "I wish to state, since I am accused of leading a holy war, that

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this is incorrect to say the least. We no longer live in the Middle Ages, nor at the time of the Crusades. Quite simply, we wish to be independent and to be governed by God⁴. In the Rif in January 1923 the audience was rather different.

Even more problematic is the question of the caliphate. Caliphate, after all, implies authority as the absolute head of the universal religious community, the leader of the whole Islamic umma, whose function is to defend the Dar al-Islam; anyone who opposes the caliph is an unbeliever. Yet later admirers portrayed bin ^CAbd al-Karim as a leader who accepted that the Sultan of Morocco was still the leader of the Islamic umma in Morocco; he was merely setting up a temporary regime in the Rif against the time when the whole of Morocco could be liberated⁵. The bay'a gives some credence to this: if he was claiming the caliphate, it implies, it was only in the context of the war against the Spanish, for the Rif and the Jibala. The Spanish were the primary enemy, a point which bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself emphasised when he accepted the bay'a. He told his supporters that his aim was to defeat the Spanish, although he recognised that there was a possible threat from the French.

You must picture yourselves as a prey between the claws of a ferocious beast which is always ready to ravish you. So that I fear that if God gives us victory over it, there is another nation . . . that will not allow us to enjoy our lands in peace and silence. For unbelief is one nation and they will inevitably interfere in our affairs⁶.

But the Spanish were the principal and immediate enemy.

The apparent contradictions are difficult to tease out, but they do fit into a pattern, one established by ^CAbd al-Qadir in Algeria in the 1830s. He referred to himself as amir al-mu'minin, a title which was often applied to the Sultan, and when he accepted his own bay'a in November 1832 he did so in words very similar to those of bin ^CAbd al-Karim. He said:

I accept this position of amir with reluctance, hoping that it will be a vehicle for uniting the Muslims, for preventing strife and dissension among them, for assuring the safety of the roads, for terminating activities which are contrary to the pure shari'a, for protecting the country from the enemy (i.e. the French), and for establishing law and justice for the powerful and feeble alike . . . know that my utmost goal is the unification of the Islamic community and the execution of Islamic practices⁷.

In another proclamation at the same time, ^CAbd al-Qadir stressed his role as the leader of Jihad ⁸.

^CAbd al-Qadir's claim to be amir al-mu'minin provides an important point of comparison with bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and the claim to the caliphate in the bay'a. It is clear, from the history of the use of the title amir al-mu'minin in eighteenth and nineteenth-century North Africa, that neither bin ^CAbd al-Karim nor ^CAbd al-Qadir posed an overt challenge to the theoretical legitimacy of Moroccan Sultans: by and large they

were not concerned with theory. For them the use of titles such as amir al-mu'minin signified that, in the areas they controlled, they were responsible for jihād, for the maintenance of the sharʿ, and for relations beyond the borders⁹. Claims to such titles have symbolic values: and one of the most important aspects of the use of the caliphate in bin ʿAbd al-Karim's bayʿa was to emphasise the importance of the sharʿ, and the personal role of ʿAbd al-Karim. The point is made in the description of the first bayʿa by Muhammad Azarqan: the account of it in his autobiography is headed: "A description of the swearing of the bayʿa of the Amir Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Karim - the agreement of the Muslims upon him, and the complete imposition of his command"¹⁰.

"The complete imposition of his command" was indeed what was at stake, but bin ʿAbd al-Karim could not rule alone. He needed helpers, men to enforce his rule, to carry out particular functions in the administration, people who could be trusted to ensure the consent of the ruled; people, in short, who could run a government. Here he faced problems.

One difficulty was common to the pre-colonial Moroccan system of government as a whole. There was, as David Hart has aptly put it, an "over-abundance of legitimacy: there are . . . far more claimants to office than there (are) jobs to go round"¹¹.

Bin ʿAbd al-Karim needed both people whom he could trust and people who could be brought to support him by offering them positions. Candidates came from his immediate family (a large one, adding to the potential claimants to office), various local leaders who had to be incorporated into the system, and a group of long-term and irreconcilable opponents of the Spanish.

A glance at bin ʿAbd al-Karim's family tree shows the extent to which he drew on members of his family. No fewer than eleven of his close relatives, by blood or marriage, were at some time involved in the government. They included important figures like his uncle ʿAbd al-Salam, Minister of Finance; his cousin (and brother-in-law), Ahmad Bu Draʿ, a Minister of War; and his brother-in-law Muhammad Azaqan, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and second or third-rankers like another brother-in-law Muhammad bin al-Hajj Muhammad, who was a secretary. Many of the other ministers were members of the Banu Waryaghal. Such appointments were vital because they represented a group bound by a family or clan loyalty to bin ʿAbd al-Karim.

However, one area of bin ʿAbd al-Karim's policy was more ideological than political: the drive to see that the sharʿ was fully enforced. The deciding factor here was personal commitment to that policy, rather than mere family loyalty. Thus successive Ministers for Justice, the Qadi al-Shargi and the Faqih Bu Lahya, came from the Banu Tuzin, and the chief Qadi (qadi qudat), Muhammad bin Salah, came from the Timsaman. Their loyalty was not at issue: Bu Lahya had a long history of fighting



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the Spanish, and was present at the swearing of the first bay'a¹².

In fact, the term "minister" implies too rigid a definition of function. The word used in Rifi documents was nazir, that is "overseer"¹³, and the functions were rather more flexible. The Faqih Bu Lahya was a military leader; he led the sorties into the Qal'aya in 1921 and into the Ghumara. But he had considerable education, had studied in Fez, and was a very good propagandist for bin 'Abd al-Karim and the shari'a-isation policy.

Whether or not they were members of bin 'Abd al-Karim's family, they were all young men, not the old tribal leaders and ayan. They represented a new generation, one defined not by holy lineage - Sidi Hamidu was never a member of the government, for example - nor by traditional learning. Bin 'Abd al-Karim had studied in the Qarawiyyin, but had learned ideas of modernisation from Europeans; his brother was a Spanish-trained mining engineer. Even those who had no book learning had picked up a working knowledge of Europe through personal contacts - in the case of Sibara in a European jail¹⁴. Educated or not, people were given jobs suited to their backgrounds: 'Abd al-Salam al-Khattabi, who had already been entrusted with four million pesetas ransom, was made Minister of Finance; the old smuggler, Sibara, was made Minister of Marine; and Azarqan, a trader, was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Whatever their backgrounds, all of them owed their loyalty to bin 'Abd al-Karim. However, the first appointments were made in the name of the "Council of the People", the majlis al-umma, a shadowy body, of ill-defined function. 'Allal al-Fasi, desperate to prove the democratic credentials of the Rifi movement, works it up into a "National Assembly" (al-jam'ia al-watania)¹⁵ but David Hart is probably nearer the mark in describing it as little more than a large-scale meeting of tribal ayan¹⁶. From the beginning it was pretty much dependent on bin 'Abd al-Karim, and went along with his will. When, after the swearing of the bay'a, the majlis al-umma made its first "choices" - 'Abd al-Salam al-Khattabi, Muhammad Azarqan and others - the new Amir told its members that those were just the people he would have chosen himself. Even when it tried to exercise some independence, it paid due respect to bin 'Abd al-Karim; three days before the first bay'a it deliberated who was to be the Minister for Justice, and declared:

Praise be to God alone.

When the majlis al-umma had examined and consulted and circulated the suggestion of the sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali (i.e. Bu Lahya), who is second in command, that the man who should take charge of justice is the faqih and erudite man Muhammad al-Shims, they all replied in the negative and refused to accept it, and they decreed that the undersigned should register their lack of agreement so that a statement of it may be placed before the great Amir, may God prolong his power and give him victory. On the

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twenty-seventh of the first month of Jumada in the year one thousand three hundred and forty-one. The servant of his God, Sha'ib bin Ahmad al-Hatlati . . . (illegible)¹⁷. Nevertheless, the pronouncement of the majlis al-umma does show that there was an element of give-and-take between bin 'Abd al-Karim and his supporters. The final decision was his, but he clearly had to pay some attention to the advice and desires of his followers. In any event he could not possibly choose every occupant of every post on the basis of personal knowledge.

So he often fell in with the wishes of local people, particularly in the matter of local officials. In February 1924, for instance, the people of Burid in the Gaznaya tribe wrote to him asking that a certain Qaid Muhammad Amziyyan bin al-Hajj Tajunti should be appointed their amil¹⁸. Apparently bin 'Abd al-Karim immediately acceded to their request, for on the same day a local bay'a, recognising Muhammad Amziyyan was issued signed by the jama'a of Burid¹⁹. Clearly the clan councils of notables continued to exist under bin 'Abd al-Karim; equally clearly it was his authority which confirmed their choice.

Bin 'Abd al-Karim's own officials also gave him advice on whom to appoint to certain positions. In April 1924, the chief Qadi (qadi qudat) recommended that a certain Ahmad al-Wajdiri be appointed as qadi of the clan of Rba'a al-Fawqani in the tribe of Timsaman. The letter is addressed to "Sidi", but as it ends "It is this that I have the honour to lay before your majesty (jilalatikum)" it is clear that the recipient was bin 'Abd al-Karim²⁰. Once again the final authority was the Amir.

This is not to say that consultation meant any more than finding a man who was reasonably acceptable. The final point of reference was always bin 'Abd al-Karim's own central authority. The point is made fairly clearly in a letter of appointment in the Wargha, issued in this instance from the main military command post at al-Muzimma on the coast:

"Praise be to God alone. God's mercy on our Lord Muhammad, his companions and family.

The Mahakma of al-Muzimma.

Let it be known from this letter - may God elevate it and make it effective - that with the help of the power and might of God we have appointed the excellent and distinguished Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Umar al-'Umarani to be our chief amin in the Wargha. On being informed of this, everyone should act in accordance with his (instructions) and not disobey him.

And Peace. On 2 Jumada II 1342"²¹.

That is clear enough, and it may be that the uncompromising tone was best suited to the politically unreliable Wargha region.

Such appointments were symbols of another tendency - the growth of a bureaucratic system. Not only were officials appointed in each tribe, but a centralised authority grew up in Ajdir, bin 'Abd al-Karim's home village in the Banu Waryaghal

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which became his capital.

There were officials to oversee the habus (waqf) property, numerous secretaries and assistants to the various ministers - particularly those of justice and war - and people to keep the increasing volume of government records, taxation, prisons and military supply²².

The most important state agent of all was the nizam army. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had attempted to create a regular trained force even before the battle of Anwal, but the real impetus came when the equipment the retreating Spanish had left behind had been gathered together by Haddu bin Hammu, and the ransom of four million pesetas had been paid.

In order to form a regular army, bin ^CAbd al-Karim needed military leaders. He faced the same problem that confronted many other leaders in the Middle East and North Africa when they attempted to set up European-style armies: that of finding trained officers. His first choice was Sha'ib bin Hammadi al-Falah, who had helped to lead the abortive attacks on the Ghumara in 1921 and 1922. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had met him at Anwal and been impressed both with his ability to repair captured Spanish guns - which suggests he may well have received some sort of European military training - and with his caution in hiding vital parts of the gun he was working on when he was called away, thus disabling it and rendering it useless to any thief. It was Sha'ib al-Falah who raised the first contingents for the regular army by recruiting them in the old way in the markets²³.

The traditional way of recruiting a haraka was in the markets, and that was how the bulk of the army was recruited, but at its centre was a small group of European-trained specialists - mainly artillerymen, whose names recur regularly at various points on the eastern front in the early salary accounts of the Rifi army. Most of them - as far as can be ascertained - came from the Rif, mainly the Banu Waryaghal²⁴. Where these men learned their skills is uncertain, although it may have been in the Spanish native forces, the Fuerzas Regulares, many of whose members deserted during July and August 1921. The most celebrated was one of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's best officers, Muhammad Buhut, a Qal^Cayi who had been a Fuerzas Regulares officer. He had joined the Rifis during the aftermath of Anwal, and quickly became one of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's most enthusiastic supporters. He even killed a shaykh from the Banu Bu Ifrur who recommended negotiating with the Spanish²⁵. Later he led the rump of the Rifi forces in the Qal^Caya, when the main body had withdrawn²⁶.

Others, too, came from outside the Rif: artillerymen such as Ahmad al-Susi (from the south of Morocco), a certain al-Matali (from the Gharb, in the north-west), and another non-Rifi named al-Mufaddal²⁷. Undoubtedly such men had learned their military skills in European employ - either Spanish or French. However, contrary to European rumour, the result of a conviction

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that the barbarous Rifis could not possibly be as successful as they were without European help, there were very few Europeans who worked for the Rifis, and then only in lowly jobs. There was the Spaniard "Antonio el Mecanico", who performed a number of useful functions, including the training of small boys to run the telephone system²⁸, a Norwegian doctor, Walter Hutyens, a Serbian captain who was later killed by a bomb, a German telephone expert, and the famous Josef Klemms, a German adventurer who had deserted from the French Foreign Legion and joined the Banu Warrayn in the Middle Atlas in their resistance to the French in 1920. He joined the Rifis in 1924 and did sterling work as a cartographer and gunnery instructor²⁹.

These men were a nucleus: the bulk of the regular army consisted of ordinary Rifis recruited in the markets. But they were organised, European-style, on a regular basis into units - taburs - of between 300 and 500 men³⁰. Each tabur had a qaid, and beneath him the unit was divided up into smaller units of 250, 100, 50, 25, and 12 men, each with its own qaid³¹. They were paid according to rank³², which was indicated by the insignia of their uniform turbans: red for officers, with three green stripes for a qaid tabur, two for a qaid of 100 men, one for a qaid of 50 men, half a stripe for a qaid of 25 men and no stripe for a qaid of 12 men. Ordinary soldiers wore green turbans, except for machine gunners who wore black. Each man had a number stitched to his turban to identify him³³.

This organisation of ranking was accompanied by tight discipline. A list of army regulations found on a dead soldier in 1926 included the obligation to carry out the instructions of a strict hierarchy of commanders (headed by "the Amir"), strict obedience to orders, punishments for absence without leave or being late for duty and the responsibility of each soldier to maintain his arms. Punishments, policy and posting were all to be the direct prerogative of bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself³⁴.

As all this might suggest, the army was tightly administered. Officials were named to oversee supplies of food, and matériel. A paymaster (mutasarraf) looked after the salary ^Caccounts (unsurprisingly he was another brother-in-law of bin ^CAbd al-Karim, Si Muhammad Bu Jibar), and records were kept of the distribution of arms³⁵.

Like any army, this one needed an efficient and quick method of transport, particularly of supplies. Despite the building of roads which the Rifis undertook throughout the war, the easiest method of transport was by sea. This led to the formation of a very small "navy", headed by Sibara, which in reality consisted of no more than a few rowing boats and, later, two motor launches. Its purpose was never any more than to move supplies and people up and down the coast and to smuggle in arms and ammunition through Tangier, an art at which Sibara was well practised. Sibara, however, was murdered in unclear circumstances in November 1924 and was replaced by Haddu bin ^CAli al-Muqaddam, a man from Ajdir, who bought one of the

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motor launches from an American in Tangier to improve the sea route between the city and the Ghumaran coast³⁶.

However, the regular army was itself only the nucleus of the total Rifi forces: it was never a very large force. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself estimated its strength at only between 6,000 and 7,000³⁷, and other figures put it much lower - 2,000 to 3,000³⁸. This was not really large enough to protect the Rif from the Spanish, so irregular haraka-s were raised in the old way. In February 1923 two pro-Spanish shaykh-s from the Banu Tuzin reported that bin ^CAbd al-Karim had told them, "'Be on your guard against the Spanish and form an army under your authority and we will send supplies', and we replied 'We shall consult among ourselves over what is better for all concerned' "³⁹. They were delaying in order to do nothing, and the tactic was common enough for responsibility for raising the haraka-s to be shifted to the tribal qaid-s whom bin ^CAbd al-Karim had had appointed⁴⁰. Recruiting in the markets went on throughout the war.

The divisions between regular and irregular troops reflected a distinction of function. For, while the fighting against the Spanish relied on the manpower of the irregular forces, the regular army was used as a fundamental prop of the government. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim not only had to fight the Spanish, but to administer the area under his control, and to extend it into areas which were not yet occupied by the Spanish. This, as will be seen later, was the job of the regular army.

There was nothing particularly new about this. The whole history of nizam armies in North Africa shows the extent to which they were interwoven with the attempts of the central government to impose their authority internally, rather than coping with external challenges from Europe. Hammuda Pasha (1782-1814) had attempted this in Tunisia in the eighteenth century⁴¹, as had Ahmad Bey in the same country in the nineteenth century⁴², and Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli (1795-1832) in Libya⁴³. In all these cases the foundation of a nizam army can be seen as part of a direct attempt by the ruler to impose his will over the old politico-military elite. In the case of previous "states of resistance" - ^CAbd al-Qadir and Ahmad Bey in Algeria in the 1840s, for example - the organisation of an autonomous political system under the control of one man had been accompanied by the organisation of nizam-style armies, which were then used against internal enemies. The external threat was dealt with by tribal forces⁴⁴.

Obviously, this military and bureaucratic structure had to be paid for. The Rifis started off with the advantage of having captured many of their supplies during the Spanish retreat from Anwal, and the four million pesetas ransom was a further addition. As a result, Rifi finances were fairly steady for some time. Unfortunately no overall accounts of the Rifi government appear to have survived, or if they have are not available. However, al-Bu ^CAyyashi gives what he says are accounts of the Rifi

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expenditure in the first half of 1924 - some 533,301.75 pesetas (of which the army budget represented 311,165 pesetas and the pay of officials 221,936.75 pesetas - which leaves very little on expenditure on other things, such as road building, so the figures must be treated with caution). He also says that the total income for the whole year was some 6,000,000 pesetas, which if that is correct would leave a very large surplus⁴⁵.

However, it is certainly true that there were considerable funds available to bin ^CAbd al-Karim, apart from the ransom. Recalcitrant tribes were heavily fined - 30,000 was taken from the Ghumara in 1923, 20,000 from the Akhmas in 1924, 50,000 from the Banu Zarwal in 1925. In addition the regular taxes were levied: again according to al-Bu ^CAyyashi, the product of zakat tax on harvests was 75,000 pesetas a year⁴⁶.

Fines and taxation had another function too. Not only did they provide revenue, but they provided an affirmation of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's control over the people who paid them. Conversely, refusal to pay taxes was the signal for rebellion. There was an element of sovereignty involved here too.

The symbolic elements of political power were always important, and the proof provided by taxation was only one of them. There were more visible symbols as well. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim attempted to create his own currency, the "Riffiya", a paper money which he had printed, but which never went into circulation⁴⁷. In fact, the currency of the Rif throughout the war remained the Spanish peseta, although in February 1923 bin ^CAbd al-Karim announced that from then on, only French or the old pre-colonial Moroccan money should be used⁴⁸.

There was anyway a far more potent symbol of the Rif's independence. At the very beginning of the war, bin ^CAbd al-Karim had promised to create both a government and a flag. The government grew up after the bay'a-s were declared. The flag, a red background with a white diamond or square in the middle of which is a green six-pointed star and a green crescent moon, is preserved in the army museum in Madrid. The use of the colour green - the favourite of the Prophet - and the crescent moon is a clear religious statement, one emphasised again on what Skiraj says was the battle flag of the Rif, which added the words "la Allah ila Allah Muhammad Rasul Allah" ("There is no God but God and Muhammad is the Prophet of God") in gold⁴⁹. The same words were used on the flag of Ibn Sa'ud.

What was the political entity that these symbols and the regular army and administrative system in the Rif underpinned? Its official title was al-dawla al-jumhuriya al-rifiya (The State of the Rifian Republic), itself a reflection of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's concepts of modernity. Jumhuriya was a neologism coined from the Arabic word jumhur, crowd or mass, to describe the European concept of "republic". By the 1920s the title was, to some extent, in vogue, having been used for the first time to describe an Islamic entity by the short-lived "Republic of Azerbaijan" in

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May 1918⁵⁰. Rather nearer home, but equally short-lived, for bin ^CAbd al-Karim, was the title of the "Republic of Tripolitania" set up by Ramadan al-Shatawi in November of the same year⁵¹. The latter was also founded on the need for resistance, in this case to the Italians, but it was never so powerful as the Rif under bin ^CAbd al-Karim.

Jumhuriya was not what the Rifis themselves called it. Some of the participants later referred to it as al-jibha al-rifiya, that is the "Rifian Front", a reference to its role as a preliminary resistance in the battle for the whole of Morocco⁵².

In other words, it was defined by its opposition to the Europeans, the reason for its existence in the first place. This identity was a religious one - defending the Dar al-Islam - and from this sprang other obligations: the defence of the shar', the maintenance of order and peace. These were the responsibilities of the Makhzan in pre-colonial Morocco - hence the recognition in the bay'a that bin ^CAbd al-Karim was carrying out the functions of the caliphate, albeit on a local basis.

In addition, the title of Makhzan was used both by the Rifi administration and of it. In March 1926, for example, one of the financial officers of the Rifi government laid down the fines to be paid by members of the haraka-s (not the regular army) who were absent without leave. His note ended. "This is an order from the fortunate Makhzan, may God protect it"⁵³. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim used the same formula in another document in which he gave exemption from taxation to a family in the Rif, "having taken into consideration the services rendered to the Makhzin" by their father⁵⁴.

On the receiving end, the people of Burid, asking for an amil to be appointed over them, said that they wanted him to serve as "an intermediary between us and the Makhzan", and they repeated this formula in their letter of acceptance⁵⁵. Spanish agents and supporters did not of course see things the same way. They used the term makhzan to describe the Spanish: at the time of the swearing of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's bay'a-s two shaykh-s from the Banu Tuzin wrote to the Spanish and referred to Spain in precisely that way⁵⁶. As always, the makhzan depended on outside recognition.

Thus, the government headed by bin ^CAbd al-Karim was perceived as a makhzan. The usage of the term may have fitted ill with bin ^CAbd al-Karim's ideas of modernity - as the use of the term jumhuriya suggests. But then the perception of ijihad seems to have been the rallying point in the Rif and that was out of key with his rejection of it as an outmoded medieval notion unworthy of modern times. What is clear is that the Rifi government fulfilled the traditional description of a makhzan having the traditional form, legitimacy, and responsibilities of the pre-colonial Moroccan government.

Nevertheless it was a makhzan with a difference, as the French soldier-sociologist, Robert Montagne, pointed out at the time. "The authority of the new Sultan is harshly used . . .

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and it is held in the unlimited respect which force commands in this country. We are far from the vague submission of old to the Sultan in Fez"⁵⁷. The social and political transformation which this brought about was profound indeed.

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1. SHM Melilla, Leg, *Cartas Arabes*, 2 *Marnisa y Wargha*, "from the tribes of Matiwa, Banu Walid, Fannassa, Awlad Bu Salama, Banu Wanjil, and Marnisa to the august nation of Spain and the governors of Melilla and Tetuan", II Jumada 2 1341 / 29 January 1923.
2. A text of the *bay^Ca* is found in MAEF Maroc 517, 180, dated 14 Jumada II 1341 / 2 February 1923. The original is signed by a number of people, whose names - or at least those which are decipherable - are listed at the end of the text of the *bay^Ca* whose text in English translation is given in Appendix 3.
3. Skiraj, 83.
4. Gabrielli, 50.
5. Al-Fassi, 121.
6. Skiraj, 80-82.
7. Danziger, 72.
8. Danziger, 72-3.
9. Pennell, "Amir al-Muminin".
10. Skiraj, 80.
11. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 385.
12. Skiraj, 80.
13. E.g. MAEF Maroc 520, announcement on behalf of the *majlis al-umma*, 27 Jumada I 1341 / 15 January 1923.
14. Skiraj, 90.
15. Al-Fassi, 121-122.
16. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 371.
17. MAEF Maroc 520, 34 dated 27 Jumada I 1341 / 15 January 1923. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 387, gives "Qadi al-Shims" as the first Minister of Justice; this is clearly incorrect in the light of this pronouncement.
18. MAEF Maroc 519, 206, "all the people of Burid to Muhammad

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- bin ^CAbd al-Karim, 12 Rajab 1343 / 18 February 1924.
19. MAEF Maroc 519, 53, *Jama^Ca* of Burid accepting Muhammad Amziyyan bin al-Hajj Ta^Cjunti as *amil*, 12 Rajab 1343 / 18 February 1924.
 20. MAEF Maroc 519, 185, Muhammad bin al-Salih to (bin ^CAbd al-Karim, 23 Ramadan, 1342 / 28 April 1924.
 21. MAEF Maroc 519, 196, unsigned statement of appointment, dated 29 Jumada II 1342 / 6 February 1924.
 22. "Maghzen Riffain", p.3ff; Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 378.
 23. Al-Bu ^CAyyashi, II, 176.
 24. MAEF Maroc 519, 80, list of soldiers and payments, 19 Safar 1341 / 11 October 1922 and 81, list of artillerymen, 15 Muharram 1341 / 7 September 1922.
 25. SHM Melilla, Leg 18, *Informacion Agosto*, Si ^CAli al-Hihi, 19 August 1921.
 26. SHM Melilla, Leg 18, *Informacion Septiembre*, Si ^CAli al-Hihi, 26 September 1921.
 27. MAEF Maroc 519, 78, list of soldiers and pay, 6 Safar, 1341 / 28 September 1922; Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 386.
 28. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 387. MAEF Maroc 520, 164, has the design of a mechanical boat which he made for the Rifis. It is signed "Antonio Rojado".
 29. Woolman, 151-152.
 30. There are various estimates of the full complement of a *tabur*. Skiraj, 93, puts it at 500, Goded 97, at 400, while some of David Hart's informants put it at 300 and others at 500. Hart himself, *Aith Waryaghar*, 386, opts for 500.
 31. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 386; Skiraj 93.
 32. See Appendix 4.
 33. SHM Melilla Leg 27, *Informacion Alhucemas*, information of ^CAbd al-Salam bin ^CAmar bin ^CAbd al-Karim, (Banu Waryaghal), 29 November 1925 and Goded 94.
 34. SHAT Maroc E24, *Propagande Riffaine*. The orders are enclosed in French translation in letter from Resident

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General (Steege) to Ministre de la Guerre, Rabat, 10 April 1926. An English translation is given in Appendix 5.

35. "Maghzen Riffain", 3 & 6; MAEF Maroc 520, 77, has a number of slips dated Sha^hban 1344 / February-March 1926 showing weapons distribution.
36. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 378, Goded, 102; Al-Bu ^CAyyashi, II, 175. According to ^CAbd al-Karim bin al-Hajj ^CAli, SHAT Maroc Riff 14, Dossier 3 March 1926, "Reseignements donnees par Abd el Krim el Hadj Ali el Boucouyi, Tangier Mars 1926", Sibara was killed by a servant of Muhammad Azarqan. According to Spanish Intelligence sources he was killed as the result of a quarrel over land by a brother of Haddu bin Hammu. SHM Melilla 25, *Informacion Noviembre* nota 3, 6 November 1924. Hart, loc cit. says he defected to the Spanish, but this is clearly incorrect in the light of this information.
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9. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RIF

The triumph of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's government in imposing its will on Rifi society was the victory of technology, bureaucracy and force. Jihad was not enough, either to bring about military success or to guarantee the Islamic society which the Amir believed was as important in achieving victory as that victory was in bringing about an Islamic society. The two were inter-dependent, and both depended on him.

Nevertheless, bin ^CAbd al-Karim did not rule alone. The traditional political structure was highly fragmented, and the social structure mirrored that. If he was to centralise authority in the hands of his Makhzan - and give it power which no Makhzan had ever enjoyed before - then that political structure had to be forced into new moulds. To do this the political authority of the centre had to be exercised throughout society, not only in each tribe, but invading the lives of individuals with a pervasiveness previously unknown. It was this pervasiveness of government which was the hall-mark of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's Rif, and it profoundly changed Rifi society.

In the first place it was a physical pervasiveness, a presence in every area. The appointment of qadi-s and qaid-s alone was not enough. The Rifi government demanded direct control of every tribe. The basis of this presence was the network of military command posts, the mahkama-s, centred on the military headquarters at Ait Qamara in the Banu Waryaghal. It was at Ait Qamara that bin ^CAbd al-Karim kept his family, safe from Spanish bombing, and had one of his principle camps for prisoners of war ¹. The main civilian mahkama was at al-Muzimma, the front line base against the Spanish on al-Hucemas Island. A third and vitally important mahkama was at Akshab Amghar in the Timsaman, which covered the defence of the eastern front. The western part of the Rif, and political activity in the Ghumara and Jibala, was coordinated from the mahkama at Targist ². Each of these mahkama-s and the military region which it controlled was placed under a military commander - pasha - who was appointed by bin ^CAbd al-Karim. Under his command were smaller mahkama-s dealing only with tribes, or

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
groups of small tribes. Significantly, when bin ^CAbd al-Karim started his expansion into the Ghumara in 1924, and began building mahkama-s in the tribes there, they were referred to by the Ghumaris as fissina-s, a corruption of the Spanish oficina - the Native Affairs "Office" of the Spanish Army³. Their function appears to have been similar - as representatives of an outside (that is, outside the tribe) force, whose function was simultaneously to ensure the political penetration of the tribe in question and to control it. It was a permanent reminder of Rifi presence: a letter of 1924 from a Rifl official in the Buquyya tribe asks for the despatch of black and white paint with which to make a sign for the mahkama in that tribe⁴. Thus through the chain of mahkama-s, the centre was linked with the tribes in a chain of command.

They were linked physically as well. A centralising government needed fast communications between its various parts. To provide them, the Rifis built a network of roads, or rather tracks. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself made the link between his authority and the building of roads in February 1923 when he wrote to the Timsaman and other tribes giving them one month in which to submit to his authority, and informing them that he would then begin building roads⁵. Eventually, when the Jibala and Ghumara had been added to Rifi domains, the road system would stretch from Hassi Wazangha in the east to Shawin in the west and ^CAin Midyuna in the south, with Ajdir as the hub. "Roads" is perhaps a rather grandiose description of the system, since many of them were no better than improved tracks, and only one sector - from Ajdir to Targist - was suitable for motor vehicles⁶. It can be seen today, winding beside the main road from Al-Husayma to Shawin, still in good condition in places. In any event the Rifis had only a handful of motor vehicles, and the track system was perfectly suitable for the rapid movement of men and pack animals.

Road building was a major undertaking. The man in charge of the building of the route between Targist and Ajdir wrote to Si Mahammad, who was in overall charge of engineering projects, to ask for measuring implements, shovels and other equipment to be sent "because the road in the Buquyya is very difficult with many stones in it. Unless (we receive) this equipment quickly it will be impossible to set the road to rights as quickly as Our Lord (i.e. bin ^CAbd al-Karim) has ordered"⁷. The workforce was prisoners - either Rifis or Spanish and later French⁸.

As important as the roads was the telephone system, using equipment and wire bought from the French or stolen from the Spanish on the bounty principle - people were paid by what they brought in⁹. The lines connected Ajdir with all the main positions in the Rif and Jibala, serving partly military objectives, and partly the purposes of internal control.

The control that the telephone gave bin ^CAbd al-Karim's officials was very powerful, and as Rifi power expanded into



6. The communications network

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new areas, the telephone lines followed very quickly. They were perceived by the local people not only as the means by which bin ^CAbd al-Karim's rule was maintained, but as a symbol of it. As such they were loathed by his opponents. When, in 1924, the Ghumara rebelled, the rebels quickly cut the telephone lines leading into the Rif¹⁰. Foolery followed: one man took a sizeable length of severed line and tried to shout down it to a companion listening at the other end. The companion, of course, heard nothing, whereupon they declared that the telephones were a trick, that bin ^CAbd al-Karim's technological superiority was a lie; others said that if the lines did indeed work, then they must be the work of Satan. Was this "foolishness or a pretence at foolishness", as one Rifi historian has suggested¹¹? Possibly, but perhaps mockery also played its part, mockery of a potent symbol of Rifi power and a vital part of it.

The system of communications provided a framework for a government bureaucracy which continued to grow. By February 1925 the amount of sheer bureaucratic control which Ajdir - the hub of the communications and administrative networks - exerted over outlying areas was enormous. In that month a man named Ali al-Majawi, who came from one of the tribes of the Middle Atlas which was still unsubmitted to the French, turned up at the French post at Berkine, after a trip to the Rif. It is not clear whether he was a French spy, or simply someone trying to capitalise on his assets - a first hand report of conditions in the Rif - by selling information. In any event his information was believed.

He told the French that he entered the Rif from the south, making contact with Rifi forces at Sakka in the al-Matalsa. There, in the most forward position was that symbol of the Rif - the telephone line to Ajdir. All around him were signs of feverish military activity and the building of defence works. When he eventually reached the Rifi capital, he found himself in an administrative tangle. In order to stay in Ajdir, he had to obtain permission from the mahkama; when he came to leave he needed another pass to go. And like many bureaucracies this one was not always very efficient - on a number of occasions he was kept waiting and told to come back on another day. Nevertheless Ajdir was a hive of activity: military equipment was being manufactured - bombs, cartridges, gas-masks in particular - and he gained access to the offices of senior officials. When he was seen by Ahmad Bu Dra and Ahmad Shiddi in their offices, sparsely furnished in a European style with desks and chairs, the silent figure of ^CAbd al-Karim listened in the background. Al-Majawi's answers were carefully recorded in an official register¹².

This bureaucratic machine served a very important purpose: putting all power in the hands of the centre. Yet, from the beginning of the war bin ^CAbd al-Karim had made it clear that political unity was dependent not only on centralising power in this way, but on preventing disorder. It was disorder which had

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prevented unity from the beginning. Not only did the imposition of the *shari'ah* give an ideological legitimacy to the new regime, but it brought social order with it and extended the Amir's power.

Thus the nature of crime was changed. Because it threatened the order and the political unity of the new system, crime became not simply an offence committed by an individual on an individual, in which each protagonist was backed by his kinship group, but an offence against society as a whole, and thus one to be settled by government. The record of sentence given when a man was sentenced to death for murder in March 1926 made the concept very clear. It stated:

. . . killing is the ruination of what was intended to be the aim of creation and He (God) ordained that the killer should be killed, as a discouragement to murder, so that the killing (of a murderer) should be a punishment that reduces the number of murderers . . . The Imam (bin ^CAbd al-Karim) must therefore punish him . . . It was announced that the pardon of the relatives of the dead man - either all of them or some of them - is not valid in a case of murder and fighting because the death penalty for it is one of the laws of God which must not be set aside . . .¹³.

The duty of upholding the law and of maintaining the peace was no longer that of the kinship group - the tribal or clan council - but of the government of the imam, bin ^CAbd al-Karim, and only the government could impose the penalty of death. A whole area of social control had been taken away from the traditional political structures.

This attitude, that it was the duty of the government to ensure social order, was extended even into areas which in the Rif had always been seen as private matters. The Rif, of course, was at war, and in those circumstances there was always a special political and security risk from spying and treachery. In any society, there was a risk of social disruption from crimes against public order - murder, fighting and so on. But bin ^CAbd al-Karim was not simply trying to lead a war of resistance to colonialism. His regime had, as part of its ideology, the mission reform to society, and its vision of crime went far further than questions of security or public order and took it into the arena of "private" morality, bringing the government into areas that had previously been considered personal. It is this third category of crimes which in many ways is the most interesting.

The bureaucratically scrupulous records of the prison at Ajdir provide some insight into this. These documents recorded the names, tribes, lengths of time for which a prisoner had been held, and his (or sometimes her) crime. Amongst them are the case of a man who was imprisoned because of "the length of his tongue and the frequency with which he says ugly things"¹⁴, another because "he hit his wife and knocked a tooth out of her head"¹⁵. Punishment for wife-beating was doubtless a

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new experience for Rifl men. Another was imprisoned because he did not pay his debts¹⁶. These cases were examples of intervention by the government in very personal matters indeed, but others were punished for crimes which verged slightly more towards the "public" end of the legal spectrum. These were cases connected with the shar^C. A man was imprisoned "because of a woman . . . whom he promised to marry without it being valid in the shar^C"¹⁷. Others were imprisoned "for reasons of the beloved shar^C," without the offences being specified¹⁸, although it is almost certain that the crime in question was that of sodomy, which was often punished by death¹⁹.

The implications are clear: people were expected not only to keep the peace, but to behave in a moral and socially responsible fashion. If they did not, they would fall foul not of society as a whole but of the government as an institution. In this way, not only was the shar^C strengthened, but the authority of the government was enhanced as it came to control the personal behaviour and morals of individuals. However, it was the government alone which made these decisions. Individual initiatives were not permitted. In May 1924 two Tuzanis were fined 4,000 riyals because they "attended the killing of a man and a woman for adultery without the permission of the government". They did not pay and were imprisoned²⁰.

In fact such "social offences" were only a minority of those recorded in the registers. Of crimes of violence, murder seems to be the most commonly recorded, more so than mere fighting, possibly because fighting which did not involve serious injury or death would have been over before the authorities were called upon to deal with it. Significantly, however, most of the people held were recorded as being "suspected of murder" and few indeed for proven murder. (see Appendix 6) The conclusion that must be drawn is that proven murderers were executed. The same rule seems to have been applied to those who were suspected of spying (a large number). There are few proven spies, and certainly spies are reported to have reached gruesome ends on several occasions. One man, who was found carrying messages to the French after hostilities with them had broken out in 1925, was sentenced to death by drowning. He was bound hand and foot and thrown into the sea where, it is said, the water at that point was so shallow that he survived for fifteen days before he died. Six spies were stoned to death in a market, and another was sentenced to death by firing squad for helping Spanish prisoners to escape²¹.

Such an attempt to impose discipline and order was only effective if the government had the means to carry out its will and to prevent both political subversion and breaches of the peace. It was well able to do this. The basis was an extensive secret police. Once the Rifis had occupied the Jibala in 1924 they employed five men and five women in each village to report on anyone who spoke ill of the Rifis or of bin ^CAbd al-Karim²². So strong was the level of political control that this

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gave them that when al-Raisuli was captured by the Rifis and taken into the Rif in 1925 a complete security screen could be thrown around him. The Sharif was a man of international fame, yet when he died of illness on 3 April 1925, while still being held in the central Rif²³, the news was kept secret for some time. It was not until 17 April that rumours of his death began to reach areas outside the Rif²⁴, and even on 26 April the Spanish were still unable to confirm them to their own satisfaction²⁵.

Moreover, if subversion did get out of control, the Rifi authorities had adequate coercive means to deal with it. On two occasions there were major rebellions, and they were put down with considerable energy. In May 1924, when tribes in the Ghumara rebelled, many villages were burnt. The same happened in late 1924 in the Akhmas tribe in the Jibala, when the burnings were accompanied by very heavy fines. Similar energy was put into preventing such outbreaks. A most important policy was that of disarming the tribes, which had the triple effect of depriving dissidents of the means of opposing the new system, emphasising that the monopoly of force should be in the hands of the government, and preventing the possibility of feuding. After mahkama-s had been set up in the tribes in the Rif, bin ^CAbd al-Karim announced as there were no Christians in the area and as he was responsible for order, it was not necessary for individuals to own guns, and they should hand them in to the mahkama-s²⁶. It was the attempt to carry out this policy in the Akhmas which would lead to revolt there, and its extremely firm repression.

There were of course lesser problems of order than those which ended in imprisonment. There were other less severe social regulations as well. Those who smoked kif (hashish) would be heavily fined. Men were told that they were to trim their beards and were to wear slippers or sandals, rather than go bare-foot²⁷. Beyond this however, bin ^CAbd al-Karim tried to prevent disputes from starting in the first place. An obvious area to police was the markets, and he appointed market inspectors, muhtasib-s, to do it. This was another innovation in the Rif, although it was quite normal practice in the cities - and was thus another example of the centralisation of control in the Rif. The officials concerned were therefore unsure of the extent of their powers. A scribbled note from one of them is evidence of this:

Sir, the muhtasib Sidi ^CAmar al-Jamusi asks for a clarification of his duties.

(His questions) are: does he have any jurisdiction in the matter of the collection of long-standing debts that are contracted in his market, or not, after the complainant has left the collection to him?

What is (his) jurisdiction in the case of two antagonists who challenge each other over a contentious matter in the market, if one of them refuses to meet him and the

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complainant then comes back to me? Do I have a free hand or should I send my helpers behind his back and refer it to the council of the shar. I have already referred the matter to the amil-s, and they refuse to take it under their jurisdiction. Also in the case of a man buying and selling animals and cattle who comes with the permission of his amil to buy and sell, is he free to do as he wishes in that matter, because of the permission of the amil, or is he forbidden it all²⁸?

That, at any rate suggests a very detailed control and a strong centralisation of power. The same implication can be seen in a document issued by bin Abd al-Karim's pasha in the Gaznayya which set down the fines for stealing nuts, grain or fruit and in cases of illegal grazing on another man's trees²⁹. Certainly such regulations had existed before the Rif War, but then they were the result of agreements between in ayan, sitting in council. Like the muhtasib-s, the pashas were entirely new.

These policies were very effective. Order was maintained until the very end of the war. Certainly there was brief feuding when the Spanish first landed, indicating a temporary failure of political control, but bin Abd al-Karim soon reasserted his authority, and as late as April 1926 a Swedish journalist, Alexander Langlet, who visited the Rif for the Manchester Guardian in March and April, could write:

Abdel Karim's authority seemed to be absolute, and his laws - for example, against tribal and family feuds - seem to be kept. You can sleep on the road in the Rif, which you can do neither in the French or in the Spanish zone³⁰.

Langlet was quite right to draw the parallel between the absolute quality of bin Abd al-Karim's rule and his ability to prevent feuding and maintain the peace. The war had a political object, the defeat of the Spanish and the maintenance of political independence from their protectorate. It was towards this end that political unity was directed, and it becomes very difficult to distinguish between the political, legal and religious aspects of the maintenance of order in the Rif. Everything, every action taken by the government, had the effect of strengthening its political authority. Thus even interference in marital disputes brought the individual more and more under the power of the state, while at the same time they expressed the social and religious convictions of bin Abd al-Karim and his officials.

These social and political changes affected everyone. Men were told to cut off the distinctive scalplocks that underlined the differences between the tribes. Everyone was affected by the ban on conspicuous consumption at marriages, an effort to avoid waste in the time of war³¹. Especially interesting, however, were the effects on one particular section of society - women. For them, the changes were quite dramatic, and they sum up the extent of social change in general.

One important cause of change in their position was the

policy of imposing the conditions of the shar^C in full. Women's position in society is fairly closely defined in Islamic law, and both their rights and duties are set down. Bin Abd al-Karim and his legal officers tried to see that these and other provisions of the shar^C were carried out. This included, as we have seen, attempts to give a certain amount of protection to women from unwelcome abuses at the hands of men. However, it had its other face, for recognition of the legal rights of women was accompanied by a demand that they should carry out their duties. When bin Abd al-Karim ordered that in future all men were to perform the five daily prayers which are mandatory under the shar^C, he also decreed that women should do so as well. Those women who did not fulfill their religious obligations would be fined a chicken on each occasion when their failure was detected³².

Nor were they exempted from prosecution for crimes - a woman suspected of killing her husband was put into prison³³ or from suspicion of treachery, and women were held in Ajdir prison on these grounds too³⁴. The Rifis had good grounds for their suspicions, for some of the most useful informers of Spanish Intelligence were women who crossed the front lines to visit markets on the Spanish side³⁵. They also had first-hand experience of their use, for the Rifis employed women in the same way, in internal security work in the villages and as spies. Women had a great advantage over the men, for they could move across Spanish and Rifi lines without being molested by the authorities on either side. In fact, women had performed such a role in the Jibala before the Rifis occupied the area. By 1922, women had become so serious a security risk that one Spanish officer in the Jibala complained to his superiors that:

The most dangerous and prejudicial espionage of which the rebels in this tribe make use is that carried out by women, since they are confident that the (Spanish authorities) will not suspect or punish them simply because they are women. Thus, (many women) . . . are involved in actions which are prejudicial in the extreme and they must be punished³⁶.

Women had on occasion taken a direct part in fighting before the Rif War. Resistance to the Spanish, after all, went back a long time. It was a normal custom for women of the Anjara tribe near Tangier to accompany their husbands into action, there to load their rifles and help them when wounded, and in 1916 some of them took the place in the firing line of their men who were killed during one of the many Spanish military operations in the area³⁷. Again, in 1920, the women of a village in the Jibala used guns that they had hidden in the mountains to ambush a Spanish patrol which was burning their houses, while the men were away from the village³⁸. On occasion they also took part in the organisation of the political side of resistance. After the Spanish capture of Shawin, the women of the Akhmas tribe took a major role in encouraging resistance. In November 1920, the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan

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reported that "they have gone to the markets of the neighbouring tribes themselves and sacrificed to the women thereof to urge them to make their menfolk go to the aid of the Khmas (sic)" ³⁹. Sacrificing a bull or sheep on the threshold of another community's mosque was, of course, a standard way in which an alliance between two groups could be formed; but it was usually done by men. These were exceptional cases; indeed, that is probably why they were recorded. Moreover, they were acting within the constraints of society, as the men were - as individuals, or as members of a village or tribal group.

When bin ^CAbd al-Karim set up his centralised authority in the Rif, individuals and tribal groups were subordinated to the authority of the government, and as the political situation changed, so did their social situation. Women, like men, were no longer able to act simply on their own account, they were incorporated, on a regular basis into the machinery of the state in the internal security groups, for example. Even where women were still employed in their more traditional jobs, their role in society was sometimes changed. Women, for instance had always been responsible for cooking and baking bread for their families, but now, with a standing army to be supplied, this task was organised by the government, and women were employed in bread factories at the expense of the state. The "expense" was not always so great, however, for the obligation of the government to pay its employees was not always carried out, particularly in the closing stages of the war, when the treasury was almost bankrupt. In January 1926, for instance, one man wrote to bin ^CAbd al-Karim on behalf of his mother to complain that she had not been paid for at least three months work in the government bakery ⁴⁰.

The circumstances of war also changed some of women's traditional functions. The almost total mobilisation of the men meant that women simply had to take on even the heavier agricultural work alongside the lighter work which they had always done. By late 1924, when the American journalist Vincent Sheean visited the Rif, the majority of the population of the villages appeared to be women who were working on the land ⁴¹. Towards the end of the war, when large numbers of men had been killed, women were incorporated, on a regular basis in military activities. At the end of 1925, conscription was extended to all boys over the age of 14, but even that was not enough, and women were gradually introduced into a few of the positions on the Ajdir front.

Most of these changes resulted directly from the needs of the war and of the new political system. They were not, generally, attempts at reforms in the status of women, except in the context of general social reform. One exception might be made: the (apparently short-lived) attempt by one of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's wives to set up a school for girls in Ajdir ⁴². But perhaps that should also be seen in the context of a general attempt to organise a modern educational system.

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The educational system is interesting, since it is comparable with other early attempts in the Middle East and North Africa (early in the context of each society) to reorganise education at the basic level. The schools were still based in the mosques, but the curriculum was extended to include mathematics and some knowledge of technology⁴³. However, the general level of education of the people responsible for the technological and engineering works which were carried out during the Rif War - road building, the raising and maintenance of telephone lines and so on - was low. The man in charge of road building in the Buquya, for instance, had only an imperfect command of written Arabic⁴⁴. A great deal of the responsibility for the telephone system was left to small boys, who acted as operators and as maintenance staff, and were trained on the job by a Spanish renegade prisoner named Antonio el Mecanico⁴⁵. There was no attempt, not surprisingly, to introduce any higher levels of education into the Rif, although a small delegation of students was organised to go to Turkey or Egypt, although it never set off⁴⁶. Once again, the experience of previous modernising states in North Africa and the Levant was being mirrored in the student delegation abroad.

Side by side with the attempt at education, was a limited one at setting up some sort of health service. There were no Rifi doctors, of course, although various well-meaning foreigners did spend some time behind Rifi lines⁴⁷, and a black negro pharmacist originally from Tangier was taken into the government's service⁴⁸. To help out, Indian supporters of the Rif attempted to send medical aid which never arrived⁴⁹.

However, these small-scale attempts at educational and health reform were only very minor aspects of the far profounder social changes in the Rif which were brought about by a combination of war and political action, for the actions of the government were not solely responsible for the transformations which took place. The conditions of war imposed their own changes. Quite apart from the problems of coping with the demands of the government, people in the Rif were faced with the demands of war.

Certainly, the war provided new opportunities for employment, and not only for women in the bakeries. There were roads to build, and defences to be dug, and while the prisoners, both Rifi and Spaniards could do some of this, they could not possibly do it all. There was a regular call on manpower for the *harakas* and the regular army. Above all there were new jobs to do, which provided good opportunities for enterprising Rifis. Spanish bombing, for instance, created a demand for safe shelters, and as early as February 1922 people in the Banu Sa'id tribe showed their commercial acumen by digging their own shelters and then charging 50 cents to anyone who used them during an air raid⁵⁰. The bombs themselves provided the basis of another Rifi wartime industry. Many of them failed to explode, and an American, Vincent Sheaan, who visited the Rif in 1924 noticed that many

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of them were dropped on completely empty countryside⁵¹. The administration paid local experts to dismantle the bombs and remake them into small hand-bombs for use against the Spanish. Al-Bu ^CAyyashl estimates that one 200 kilo bomb could be remade into more than 450 hand-bombs⁵². That was organised by the government, but there was still scope for private initiative in supplying the new authorities. One of the most infuriating manifestations of this, for both the French and the Spanish, was the repeated theft of their telephone lines for use in the Rif. While equipment was purchased in the normal way from the French in the earlier part of the war - Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim wrote to Azarqan in September 1923 to tell him that he had given Haddu bin Hammu 2,000 pesetas to buy telephone equipment in Algeria⁵³ - most of the wire was stolen. At the same time as bin Hammu was buying equipment, bin ^CAbd al-Karim was offering 24 pesetas for a telephone post, and an unspecified amount for wire, most of which was taken from just behind the Spanish lines on the eastern front. In 1924, other wire was stolen from the French⁵⁴.

Most of the effects of the war were decidedly not beneficial. Quite apart from the disruption to the economy caused by the demands for manpower, there were serious problems of distribution. Spanish air-raids disrupted the markets. Market sites were moved: in January 1924, for instance, all the markets in the Banu Walishak were moved to one place and held on only two days a week⁵⁵, in the Banu Tuzin the main market at Azilaf was held at night⁵⁶. Trade was disturbed as well: in February 1924 bin ^CAbd al-Karim forbade the export of eggs and chickens to be sold in the markets of the Spanish occupied tribes on the eastern front, which seriously reduced incomes in the region⁵⁷. He also forbade people to leave the Rif to work in the French and, especially, the Spanish zones. This did not stop the emigration, of course, but it did make it much more difficult⁵⁸.

Changes in patterns of employment, and the economy are the result of any war. The Rif was not exceptional in this. Where it was exceptional was in the very radical social and political changes which were imposed on people not by the conditions of war, but out of political and ideological considerations. These were changes in the position of people in their society, in their religious lives, and in their relationships with each other. In short, as Robert Montagne - the sociologist-in-chief of the French protectorate - wrote in 1925:

The political and military events in the Rif, which for the past five years have so often surprised Spain, France and all Europe, have caused in this small corner of the Sherifian Empire a profound change in social and political attitudes, to the point at which the face of the country is quite unrecognisable and quite different from that in our own Protectorate⁵⁹.

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8. MAEF Maroc 519, 147, list of prisoners at Ajdir, 30 Ramadan 1342 / 5 May 1924 records prisoners 50-86 as being absent working on the road in Buqquya; SHAT Maroc Riff 3, *Interrogations indigenes evades du Riff*, Tirraillours Ahmed Beboy, November 1925, and Bashir Agraf, February 1926; SHM Melilla Leg 25, *Informacions diciembre* 23 December 1924.
9. MAEF Maroc 517, 139, Si ^cMahammad bin ^cAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi to Muhammad Azarqan, 16 Safar 1342 / 30 September 1923; SHM Melilla 23, *Informacion septiembre*, Resumen General 25 September 1923 and *Informacion octubre*, Resumen General de Confidencias 19 October 1923.
10. SHM Ceuta 23, *Informacion oficina central de mayo de 1924*, report of 14 May 1924.
11. Al-Bu ^cAyyashi, II, 203.
12. SHAT Maroc Fez 156, Territoire de Taza, Cercle de Guer-cif, Bureau de Berkine, Services des Renseignements 21, "Renseignements fournis sur le Riff" Berkine, 8 February 1925, Confidential.
13. MAEF Maroc 519, 45 Declaration of witnesses and condemnation to death of Ahmad bin ^cAli bin ^cUmar al-Hasrawani for murder, signed by Muhammad bin ^cAmar al-Midari, 25

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Shah^cban 1344 / 10 March 1926.

14. MAEF, Maroc 519, list of 17 Jumada II 1342 / 25 January 1924, prisoner not numbered.
15. MAEF, Maroc 519, list dated 1 Rajab 1342 / 17 February 1924, prisoner no. 77.
16. MAEF, Maroc 519, list dated 1 Rajab 1342 / 17 February 1924, prisoner no. 10.
17. MAEF, Maroc 519, list dated 1 Rajab 1342 / 17 February 1924, prisoner no. 10.
18. MAEF, Maroc 519, list dated 1 Jumada 1342 / 26 December 1923, prisoners nos. 52 & 53.
19. I am grateful to David Hart for this explanation of the crime. See Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 390.
20. MAEF, Maroc 519, 146, prisoner no. 30.
21. Al-Bu^c Ayyashi, II, 150; Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 388.
22. SHM Ceuta 25, *Politica Abril*, nota, 20 April 1925.
23. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 393.
24. *The Times*, 18 April 1925, 10.
25. SHM Melilla 28, *Informacion Matalsa*, nota 26 April 1926.
26. SHM Melilla, 27, *Informacion Alhucemas*, evidence of a Rif deserter, Abd al-Salam bin^c Amar bin^c Abd al-Karim, 29 November 1925.
27. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 390.
28. MAEF, Maroc 519, 183, note from Sidi^c Amar al-Jalmusi, no date, no recipient named.
29. Quoted in Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 389-390.
30. *Manchester Guardian*, 29 April 1926, 9.
31. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 390; Coon, *Tribes of the Rif*, 133.
32. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 389.
33. MAEF, Maroc 519, list dated 27 Ramadan 1342 / 2 May 1924.

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34. MAEF, Maroc 519, list dated 27 Ramadan 1342 / 2 May 1924.
35. For example Fatima bint al-Hadi and Fatima bint Hammu who reported on 21 and 29 August 1921 respectively; SHM Melilla, 18, *Informacion Agosto*.
36. SHM Ceuta, 15, 3^a *Mia Informacion Abril-Mayo*, note, 30 April 1922.
37. Forbes, 231.
38. Forbes, 281-282.
39. FO / 4527 / A8463 / 2209 / 28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan 15 November 1920 and A9106 / 2209 / 28, Atkinson to Kerr, Tetuan, 14 December 1920.
40. MAEF, Maroc 519, 134, Sa^cid bin al-Qa'id al-Sharif to Muhammad bin ^cAbd al-Karim, 6 Rajab 1344 / 20 January 1926.
41. Sheean, *Adventures*, 231.
42. Personal information, Idris al-Khattabi, September 1977.
43. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 389; al-Bu ^cAyyashi, II, 185.
44. MAEF, Maroc 520, 109, Sadiq bin al-Shadli to Si Muhammad bin ^cAbd al-Karim, 21 Ramadan 1342 / 28 April 1924. The letter is difficult to read and contains many grammatical errors.
45. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 387. Antonio's surname was Rojano, and his signature appears on a design for a mechanical boat that he drew for the Rifis - MAEF 520, 164.
46. SHM Melilla 25, *Informacion Confidentes*, Muhammad bin ^cAbd al-Qadir al-Fahsi, 28 February 1924; personal information, Idris al-Khattabi, September 1977, who says it was Egypt, not Turkey.
47. E.g., Walter Hutyens, a Norwegian captured by the Spanish in 1926. MAEE, Leg R966 Exp. 13, *Sospechosos en marruecos Viajes Detenciones*, Nota Verbal Legation de Norvege to Ministro de Estado, Madrid, 5 October 1926 etc.
48. Al-Bu ^cAyyashi, II, 181; personal information, Idris al-Khattabi, September 1977. His name was Mahhub - died in the 1970s in Tangier.
49. E.g., FO 371 / 10081 / 240 / W8609, Laronce (French

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Consul-General) to Secretary of Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Calcutta, 27 March 1925.

50. SHM Melilla 20, *Informacion Febrero* , minuta para la informacion de hoy, 27 February 1922.
51. Sheean, *Adventures*, 53-4.
52. Al-Bu ^cAyyashi, II, 163.
53. MAEF, Maroc 517, 139, Mahammad al-Khattabi to Azarqan, 18 Safar 1342 / 30 September 1923.
54. SHM Melilla 23, *Informacion Septiembre* , Resumen General 25 September 1923; *Informacion Octubre* , Resumen General, 19 October 1923; Melilla 25, *Informacion Diciembre*, nota 15 December 1924.
55. SHM Melilla 24, *Informaciones Enero* , Resumen General, 21 January 1924.
56. SHM Melilla, *Informacion Febrero* , Resumen General, 23 February 1923.
57. SHM Melilla 24, *Informacion Febrero* , Resumen General, 21 February 1924.
58. SHM Melilla 24, *Informacion Enero* , Muh Qaddur Tahar, 21 January 1924, Resumen General, 31 January 1924; *Informacion Abril*, Resumen General, 6 April 1924.
59. Montagne, "Quelques Aspects", 1.

10. TAKING THE JIBALA

The new political order in the Rif had many opponents. It called the traditional political structures into question and that was necessarily a challenge to individual local leaders. Before the Rif War, their position had depended on having considerable autonomy from the old Makhzan so that they could operate within a system of alliances and relationships without much reference to any outside power. When a new Makhzan, and a much more powerful one, grew up in the Rif, that political environment was destroyed. Local leaders either joined the Rifis and subsumed their political authority in the wider movement, laying aside their relationships and alliances with other local leaders, or they attempted to maintain their own autonomy and became rebels against the new order. Faced with this stark choice many local leaders hedged, cooperating where it was unavoidable, but always probing for opportunities to regain their slowly evaporating prestige and autonomy. These tactics caused considerable trouble for bin 'Abd al-Karim after he was given his bay'a. Indeed, relations with local leaders posed the most important problem faced by his government, since Spain offered little threat. Spanish policy was vacillating even more ineffectually than usual.

The Spanish authorities were once again attempting to reorganise the Protectorate. That brought with it the usual difficulties over policy between the government and the army. The latest plan was to set up a civilian Protectorate. This was a forlorn hope when much of the Spanish zone had still to be conquered. However, on 14 February 1923 a civilian, Francisco Silvela was appointed as High Commissioner in Tetuan. The army was, predictably, furious and one Commandante General in Melilla resigned after another. The rapid turnover included the bellicose General Severiano Martinez Anido, a man who had earned a reputation for brutality when as Captain-General and later Civil Governor of Barcelona he had attempted to deal with the syndicalist movement by arming gangs of thugs to assassinate trades union leaders¹. However, he lasted only a short time - from 6 June to 14 August - resigning when the

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Spanish government rejected his plans for a landing at Alhucemas. Matinez Anido himself estimated the landing would cost 6,000 casualties, and that was a price which the government, faced with a war budget of 750 million pesetas a year, was unwilling to pay². The government's unwillingness to allow further sacrifice was shared by the troops. On 23 August, troops embarking for Morocco at Malaga mutinied and shot one of their sergeants³.

Clearly a civil protectorate was an attractive proposition. However, it meant that the Spanish would have to rely even more heavily on local Moroccan agents rather than on the army. Unfortunately, the man they chose to be their most important agent was most unsuitable. He was Idris al-Rifi, who since his appointment as Pasha of Tafarsit in October 1922 had done much to undermine Spanish action on the eastern front. The flood of letters of complaint about him continued through the spring. By the end of February 1923 shaykh-s of four clans of the Banu Tuzin had become so angry that they agreed not only to break off relations with the Spanish, but also to join the haraka around Tizi ^CAzza. Their explanation was that Idris al-Rifi deprived them of benefits - firewood, straw, work in the Spanish convoys - which they had enjoyed before, but were now confined to the Pasha's friends. The allegations about his misbehaviour got more and more bizarre: two others, shaykh-s from Banu Tuzin, wrote in to say that these same friends had stolen telephone wire and destroyed bridges near Tafarsit⁴, others alleged he had deceived the Commandante General himself:

We must tell you about the men to whom you were introduced by Idris al-Rifi when you came to Tafarsit last Thursday and who were from the clan of Banu Bil-^CAiz. Idris al-Rifi told you 'these two are notables (ayan) of the Banu Tuzin'. It is not true that they are our notables. One of them is employed in the selling of eggs and chickens. The other sells lemons . . .⁵

Anonymous letters are not always truthful, but they worried the Spanish Military Intelligence enough for them to keep a watch on Idris al-Rifi's house. They could find no proof of any misdeeds. On 9 May 1923, as part of the policy of local self government, Idris al-Rifi was appointed amil of the Rif⁶. Walter Harris, Morocco correspondent of the Times, reporting this, pointed out the main difficulty of the appointment, "The Pasha's chief work for some time will be to endeavour to take possession of his province"⁷. In other words, the same problem faced him as had faced the Spanish: a change of personnel had achieved very little.

The appointment brought the new ^Camil little satisfaction. The whole Spanish enterprise in Morocco was now under attack in the Spanish press and Idris al-Rifi suffered his share of invective as one of their principal Moroccan officials. He was only prevented from resigning in June, the British Vice-Consul

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in Tetuan, Mr. Were, reported, by "the earnest entreaties of the High Commissioner" ⁸. The following month his wish was granted - he was promoted to an administrative position in Tetuan which eased him out of contact with the tribes. Recalcitrant shaykh-s then began writing in to re-open relations with the Spanish ⁹.

The removal of Idris al-Rifi did not end the civil protectorate: that staggered on for a few more months. Even by its own lights, it was a failure. Under military rule the Protectorate authorities had spent 815,000 pesetas in three months on education and the development of trade and commerce. The civil protectorate only managed to spend 383,000 pesetas on such things in an equivalent period ¹⁰.

The army was in no better shape. It was torn by the scandal over the Anwal disaster - the report of the investigatory committee was about to be published - and by dissension within the officer corps over the right of junior officers to organise Juntas de Defensa, which were virtually trades unions intended to protect their pay and conditions of service and promotion. The central government was no better, having shown itself unable to control either the mounting corruption or the growing wave of terrorism in the Peninsula. In these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that elements in the army were plotting a coup, nor that their discussions should centre on the person of the Captain-General of Barcelona, Miguel Primo de Rivera, almost the only senior officer who was touched neither by the Anwal investigations, nor by the Juntas de Defensa difficulties. Moreover he was known to have expressed firm views in the past about the need to withdraw from Morocco to defensive positions on the coast: no mean political advantage in a Spain which was largely opposed to the Moroccan adventure. It was hardly an attitude which would appeal to some of his brother officers, but over the course of the summer of 1923 he managed to persuade many of his co-conspirators that he had moderated his views, and that he no longer felt the need for a total withdrawal ¹¹.

On 13 September 1923, Primo declared martial law in Barcelona and announced that a Military Directorate had taken power. Two days later he formed a new government in Madrid, with himself as dictator of Spain.

On taking power, Primo at once replaced the civilian Silvela with a general, Luis Aizpuru, as High Commissioner in Morocco. Despite this apparent militarisation, he kept to his largely moderate policies on Morocco, and on 16 December explained,

The military character of the movement excites the suspicion . . . that everything there (Morocco) will be done by military action, giving way to an era of permanent war. This suspicion is both reasonable and logical, although it is quite incorrect ¹².

Morocco, he said, needed two things: "A plan, and silence"

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¹³. His plan was to cut down on the money being spent in Morocco and to withdraw as many of the conscripted troops as possible. In December 1923, 29,000 troops were sent home before their term of conscription had expired¹⁴.

In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Rifis had little difficulty not only in holding their own, but also in going on the offensive. Attacks on Spanish positions began on 1 June 1923 although they were not as successful as they might have been. There was very heavy fighting at Tisi Azza, which was cut off for a short while, but it was relieved on 5 June¹⁵. The failure of the attack showed, in bin Abd al-Karim's eyes, the inadequacy of his front-line commanders, and he reacted in the manner of many an impatient leader, by replacing his minister of war, Abd al-Salam bin al-Hajj Muhammad, with his brother-in-law, Ahmad Bu Dra, and 42 other qaid-s of varying degrees of authority¹⁶. At the same time, the troops on the eastern front were increased and more volunteers were called for, so that by the end of June there were well over 3,000 men there¹⁷. When this still achieved no better result, bin Abd al-Karim seemed to have finally lost patience, particularly with the feuding amongst the tribal leaderships - the al-Matalsa tribe was a particularly bad case¹⁸. In a second round of purges at the end of August, he replaced all the military commanders on the eastern front with people he could trust - all of whom came from the central Rif, with two exceptions, both longstanding supporters from the Qal'aya, Idris bin Mimun Khuja and Muhammad bin Tahar¹⁹. "Central Rif" in reality meant the Banu Waryaghal.

Under new commanders a new Rifi campaign was started. Beginning on 19 August several Spanish positions, including Afraw, on the coast, and Tifarwin were besieged, and were only just held. The Spanish suffered 800 casualties in Tifarwin²⁰. It was a near victory, the result of the greater centralisation of command, and the replacement of local commanders by men from the central Rif. The increasing reliance on his own tribe, the Banu Waryaghal, for support became very clear in all the areas under bin Abd al-Karim's control in the course of 1923. While it did not quite defeat the Spanish on the eastern front, in the west, in the Ghumara and Jibala, Rifi dominance was eventually ensured by precisely these policies. In any event the fighting on the eastern front, in 1923, was a sideshow - the real action was to be seen in the west.

The western front, at the beginning of 1923 was not a front at all, but an open territory where bin Abd al-Karim's enemies could shelter and build up support against him. It made the Rifis vulnerable to the rear and bin Abd al-Karim was determined to stop that.

There were three main objectives - the Sinhaja tribes in the Wargha valley to the south west, the Ghumara to the north west, and the Jibala to the west. There were some major enemies in these mountains. In the Sinhaja were the still

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undefeated ^CAmar bin Hamidu and ^CAbd al-Malik. Behind them, at ^CAmjutt in the Banu Zarwal, on the edges of the French zone, was the mother zawiya of the great Darqawiya tariqa, controlled by ^CAbd al-Rahman al-Darqawi. The Banu Zarwal was not yet under the control of the French, and ^CAbd al-Rahman looked with great disfavour on the threat to his authority which the Rifis posed. In the Jibala was an even bigger enemy, Mawlay Ahmad al-Raisuli, but before he could be tackled the Rifis had to control the Ghumara. Al-Raisuli and ^CAbd al-Rahman were rather more remote, and bin ^CAbd al-Karim's first problems were ^CAbd al-Malik and the Ghumara.

^CAbd al-Malik and his ally, ^CAmar bin Hamidu, were fairly easy enemies to deal with. Realising how dangerous was bin ^CAbd al-Karim to their local power, and the increased difficulties they would face once he had received the money for the ransom of the prisoners and been given his bay'a, they had made a last attempt to stop him. In January 1923, they organised a haraka of 1000 men to attack bin ^CAbd al-Karim's supporters in the Banu ^CAmart. In February they were joined by another threatened local leader, al-Hajj Bil-Qish of the Gaznayya, and together with him they appealed to the Spanish for money to buy supporters away from the proclamation²¹.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was not worried by this, since the haraka collapsed in March. This happened because ^CAmar bin Hamidu refused to pay a fine of 20,000 pesetas for a murder he was alleged to have committed. Once again it had been shown how great an obstacle to political unity was the instability of the haqq fines. From this point on ^CAmar bin Hamidu was politically isolated, and the Marnisa and five Sinhaja tribes announced that they would work only with ^CAbd al-Malik²².

The Marnisis and Sinhajis had backed the wrong man. In April bin ^CAbd al-Karim built up his forces and on 7 May moved against ^CAmar bin Hamidu, who immediately surrendered without a fight. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim fixed the peace terms at a fine of 50,000 pesetas and told ^CAmar bin Hamidu to stay in the Banu Waryaghal²³. In mid-May, Bil-Qish was brought under control and forced to join the haraka in Azilaf²⁴. That was the end of the alliance with ^CAbd al-Malik. The latter fled to safety with the Spanish, who put him in charge of a troop of Moroccan irregulars, named the "Harca de Abd al-Malik" in his honour²⁵, and was killed in a skirmish in 1924. It was an inglorious end to a failed career.

The invasion of the Ghumara was a more difficult affair. It began in January 1923 with a small haraka, formed mainly of Ghumaris who were followed, in the middle of the month, by a larger Rif contingent of about 300 men. This force moved through the Banu Khalid, in the face of some opposition from the Banu Silman, Banu Mansur and Banu Ziyyat tribes²⁶. However, the tide slowly turned in the Rifis' favour, and they defeated a number of pro-Spanish groups. Individual clans of the Banu Silman and Banu Khalid began to join the Rifis, slowly at

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first²⁷. Then a very powerful local figure came over, Si Muhammad bin Sadiq al-Akhamlishi, the prestigious head of the important family of murabit-s who controlled the zawiya at Targist. Along with 2,000 men he joined the Rifis in the Banu Khalid²⁸, and the slow trickle of support became a flood.

March brought another useful ally, Mawlay Ahmad al-Baqar of the Banu Mastara, in the unoccupied part of the French zone. This sharif was originally from the Banu ^CArus, like al-Raisuli, and had fallen out with him after the peace with the Spanish in 1916. However, al-Raisuli was much the more powerful and al-Baqar took refuge in the Banu Mastara, plotting revenge in his exile. In the intervening years he and al-Raisuli had quarrelled over stock-raiding²⁹, but it was only when the Rifis arrived that he had an opportunity to even the score. He took that opportunity with great enthusiasm.

As March wore on, and more and more groups joined the Rifis, they were joined by yet others from the Rif itself, including a party of 500 with two machine guns and four cannons at the end of the month³⁰. So the bandwagon continued to gather momentum. The Rifis were joined by the Banu Silman, Banu Ziyat, Banu Nu Zra and Banu Mansur. The Spanish were very concerned, because gaid-s who had previously been pro-Spanish were beginning to change sides under this political pressure, and they took several of them into "protective custody" in order to keep them loyal³¹.

The support for the Rifis may have been growing, but its motley character contained within it the seeds of self-disruption as well. Some people had joined for opportunistic reasons, others as the result of local political pressure, not all of them willing recruits. It was strong enough to undertake a series of attacks on Spanish positions, such as Talambut in the Wadi Law valley between the sea and Shawin³², but the Rifi commanders clearly did most of the fighting, under Rifi direction, the main bulk of the Rifi troops were kept in reserve, to be used to maintain order and for such Rifi innovations as tax-collecting. The taxes were heavy. In March, for instance, 1,500 pesetas was taken from each tribe³³.

At the beginning of July the mounting tension led to a short revolt against Rifi authority. The argument was partly over taxation³⁴, and partly over the refusal by the Akhmas to join the Rifis, even though they were still beselging the Spanish in Shawin³⁵.

The Rifis dealt with the revolt quickly using both punishments and rewards. Taxes were reduced, but 1,000 troops, commanded exclusively by Waryaghliis and Baqquyis, were sent to deal with the situation. They arrived on 19 July and by the beginning of August the rebellion was over³⁶. The revolt succeeded only in strengthening Rifi control over the Ghumara. Tribal gaid-s were replaced, and not necessarily by men from the tribe: on 6 August Mawlay Ahmad al-Baqar was appointed over the Banu Ziyat³⁷. In the eyes of the Ghumaris, the Rifis

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behaved like an occupying army. When, in mid-August 1923, the Banu Mansur complained about two Rifis whom they had caught red-handed with two local women, and demanded that they be executed, "as happens in the Rif if a Gomari commits a crime of this nature", they were practically ignored: the Rifis escaped with a beating³⁸.

Once it was clear that the Rifis were able to impose their will, other tribes began to join them. The Rahuna and Maziyyat, both in the unoccupied sector of the French zone, sent contingents in mid-August³⁹, and a new crop of more prominent individuals came in as well. Probably the single most important one was Ahmad bin Muhammad Isbu of the Banu Huzmar. More usually known as Akhriru, he had been one of al-Raisuli's most loyal and dependable lieutenants. However in August he quarrelled with the Sharif, probably because al-Raisuli would not appoint him as gaid of the Banu Huzmar, and joined the Rifis⁴⁰.

Akhriru was an extremely useful recruit. Not only did he bring in other local leaders, but he was an experienced guerrilla commander, well used to harrying Spanish lines. With his help, and that of other lesser local leaders, and relying on the very large haraka, the Rifis managed, by the beginning of September 1924, to bring most of the Ghumara and some of the Sinhaja under their control. The remaining Spanish positions on the coast and in the Wadi Law valley were more than ever isolated in a hostile countryside. The Rifis were nevertheless faced with rivals who would not join them and could not easily be coerced into doing so. Among them were the powerful Akhmas tribe, still beseiging Shawin, al-Raisuli himself and Abd al-Rahman al-Darqawi.

The most immediate danger was from the Darqawi sharif, who wielded enormous power from his zawiya at Amjutt in the Banu Zarwal, particularly over the Sinhaja and the Wargha valley tribes. The Banu Zarwal, quite apart from its political importance, was also a rich economic prize. Its immensely fertile gardens and fields produced an abundance of crops: barley, wheat, olives, beans, maize, oranges, figs and above all grapes - the "ancients" according to one writer had named the region jabal al-zabin, the mountain of raisins⁴¹. At the beginning of September, bin Abd al-Karim sent two emissaries to Abd al-Rahman to ask him to join the Rifis. They were ignored⁴². If Abd al-Rahman was to be brought into alliance with the Rifis, it would have to be by force.

The use of force against Abd al-Rahman was by no means an easy proposition. Between him and bin Abd al-Karim's slowly expanding empire lay the borderlands of the Wargha valley and the tribe of Marnisa, which were not yet under the complete control of the Rifis. To impose his authority, bin Abd al-Karim used the well-tried tactic of incorporating the opposition. He appointed Amar bin Hamidu, who came from the Marnisa, as his Pasha over the whole region in mid-November. The appointment was accompanied by the usual accessories of Rifi power:

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telephone lines were extended to ^CAmar bin Hamidu's house, and a road was begun to ^CAin Midyuna⁴³. For a while ^CAmar bin Hamidu was not only willing to cooperate with bin ^CAbd al-Karim, but was enthusiastic about it, confiscating habus property and imposing fines. One of these fines was particularly heavy, allegedly 80,000 pesetas, imposed on the Sinhaja tribes for their support of ^CAbd al-Malik⁴⁴. This was an outrageous example of double standards since ^CAmar bin Hamidu himself had been one of ^CAbd al-Malik's closest allies.

^CAmar bin Hamidu's activities soon aroused opposition, not only from the people of the Wargha tribes who suffered from the fines, but from ^CAbd al-Rahman al-Darqawi, who disliked the confiscation of the habus properties - an issue which affected him directly. As opposition to the Rifis mounted in December 1923 he sent men to help it⁴⁵. His was not an ideological opposition, but part of a determined effort to preserve his influence and his money. ^CAbd al-Rahman's ability to make trouble was increased by a growing rebellion to the east in the Gaznayya, a rebellion founded on a very similar basis: the preservation by local leaders of their autonomy.

The trouble in the Gaznayya centred on ^CAmar bin Hamidu's old ally, al-Hajj Bil-Qish, who saw his political influence being slowly whittled away by bin ^CAbd al-Karim's principal supporter in the Gaznayya, Muhammad bin ^CAmar Akhittu. Fighting had started in November and continued in a desultory way throughout December, but by no means all the Gaznayyis supported the rebels and Bil-Qish: in mid-December there were still about 4,000 Gaznayyis in various positions on the eastern front⁴⁶. It was this lack of support for the rebellion which allowed bin ^CAbd al-Karim to put it down. Before he did so, however, he decided to preempt any opposition from Bil-Qish's old ally, ^CAmar bin Hamidu, now his own Pasha in the Wargha. Whether or not bin ^CAbd al-Karim had grounds for his suspicions is a matter for conjecture. What is certain is that once Qaid Buhut and a haraka he had collected in the Jibala moved into the Marnisa to try to arrest him, ^CAmar bin Hamidu really did switch sides⁴⁷. This change of heart, in the middle of January 1924, certainly did not convince Bil-Qish that his old ally was about to help him, and when he discovered that bin ^CAbd al-Karim had transferred large numbers of troops to the region to deal with the rebellion, Bil-Qish promptly changed sides himself. On the following day, 28 January, ^CAmar bin Hamidu fled to the French zone with 700 Rifis in hot pursuit. Bil-Qish joined enthusiastically in the mopping up operations. The houses of ^CAmar bin Hamidu's supporters were burned, 85 Marnisis were taken prisoner and heavy fines were imposed. On 10 February 1924, bin ^CAbd al-Karim felt able, quite untruthfully, to declare ^CAmar bin Hamidu dead⁴⁸. He was not dead, at least physically, but politically the statement was true enough. ^CAmar bin Hamidu was finished as a force in the Rif. He had attempted to play the traditional political game of balancing

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between obedience to central authority and autonomy of it. It was a strategy which was no longer relevant in the new conditions in the Rif, for it had always depended on the central power being relatively remote, and willing to tolerate autonomy in the peripheral regions. The central authority, bin ^CAbd al-Karim's makhzan, was much closer now, only a few miles away over the mountains in Ajdir, and the Wargha valley was no longer a peripheral region. As a result the traditional political strategies failed.

Not all opposition to the Rifis can be dismissed simply as a matter of local leaders trying to preserve their power. They needed followers, and while there was a considerable latent loyalty based on the clan and tribal alliances, there was also a considerable practical advantage to be had for the ordinary people who provided support. The traditional system, when it worked properly, had provided reasonable peace without the weight of oppressive interference from outside. The coming of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's makhzan brought taxation and conscription. So there was the basis of a wider opposition to bin ^CAbd al-Karim based on economic and social considerations. This was particularly true in the Ghumara.

Since the revolt in the Ghumara in July 1923, the region had been quiet, not out of satisfaction with Rifi dominance but out of inability to do anything about it. Rifi control was extremely tight. There was forced conscription - half the men in one tribe were called up, for example. There were repeated demands for taxes - 15 pesetas a house in December 1923, one mudd of barley per house in January 1924, and so on⁴⁹. The economic demands of the Rifis only made worse an already difficult situation caused by the Spanish banning all commerce with the Ghumara from the coastal positions⁵⁰.

Caught between the Rifis and the Spanish the Ghumaris could do nothing. As one Spanish agent explained, "The whole Ghumara is like this, we have no . . . power, no news or information, no leaders of prestige or experience. No goods come in or out, buying and selling has been cut off; and we have already told you of the lack of salt and so on . . ." ⁵¹. It was the lack of leadership that most limited the Ghumaris' desire to resist. The Spanish were powerless to help, and the only alternative, al-Raisuli, was distasteful to many of them. So there was little that could be done⁵². Thus the Rifis carried on unopposed. They continued building their telephone lines, demanded that a mill-owner grind 70 mudd-s of barley each night for their troops, set up their mahakma-s - or fissina-s as the Ghumaris called them - and ordered that houses should be built for their troops⁵³. Prices went up and up; by the beginning of March 1924 one of the tiny Moroccan tea-cups filled with salt cost one peseta, and by the end of the month there was little or no barley. On top of all this, in the middle of April, bin ^CAbd al-Karim gave orders that the tribes were to be disarmed⁵⁴. That was the final straw for, if disarmament were carried out,

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it would finally seal Rifi power over the Ghumara, by depriving the discontented of the means to resist. A decision to rebel, if one was to be taken at all, had to be taken now.

The problem of who would lead the revolt in the Ghumara was solved when fighting started between Rifi forces, commanded by Muhammad Kwiyas of the Zarqat tribe, and ^CAbd al-Rahman al-Darqawi. The battle, at the end of April, led to a Rifi defeat despite the arrival of regular troops under Buhut and Bu Lahya⁵⁵. Kwiyas then tried to negotiate with ^CAbd al-Rahman and, leaving his men, went alone into the Banu Zarwal. While he was away ^CAbd al-Rahman attacked, and the Rifis were forced to withdraw. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was furious and ordered the arrest of Kwiyas, but he slipped back into his tribe, the Zarqat⁵⁶. Now with fighting between ^CAbd al-Rahman and the Rifis, and the disgraced Kwiyas as a potential leader, the discontented Ghumaris had both an opportunity and the possibility of outside support from ^CAbd al-Rahman. A meeting was held at Jibha, on the edge of the Rif, presided over by a sharif from the Banu Razin, Si Hassan bin al-Salib. It was attended by people from the Ghumaran tribes of the Banu Garir, Banu Khalid, Banu Gamil, and Banu Razin and some from the Matiwa al-Bahar in the western Rif. Kwiyas was appointed the military leader and the rebellion began, with the cutting of telephone lines. Then Rifi positions in the western Ghumara came under attack and some Rifis were killed⁵⁷.

Meanwhile ^CAbd al-Rahman was building up relations with powerful sharif-s on the eastern side of the Rif, in the Banu Tuzin. This was the Bujdayni family, of the Nasiriya tariqa. On 22 May one of the sons of Si Ahmad, the head of the family, was reported to be with ^CAbd al-Rahman and helping him⁵⁸. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was threatened by three sharif-s - ^CAbd al-Rahman, Si Ahmad Bujdayni and Si Hassan bin al-Salib - to the east and the west. But they opposed him not for ideological reasons, but for purely practical ones, the preservation of their position, prestige, authority and wealth. Their power derived from the fact that they were sharif-s, but it did not mean that all sharif-s automatically opposed bin ^CAbd al-Karim and his new order. Indeed Si Muhammad bin Sadiq al-Akhamlish, the head of the important sharifian family based at Targist, remained loyal throughout the Ghumara revolt, and provided considerable assistance to the Rifis, although two of his nephews joined the rebellion⁵⁹.

The rebellion spread throughout the eastern Ghumara, but was put down very quickly. Bu Lahya escaped to the Rif and brought news of the revolt to Ajdir. The Rifis then showed how effective was their technological superiority over the rebels. As Ahmad Bu Dra^C, the minister of war left for Akshab Amghar in the Banu Tuzin, to keep the Bujdaynis in order, Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim was alerted by telephone. In the Buquyya he met Azarqan, the foreign minister, who arrived by car, followed by 50 men from bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own bodyguard. As

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
they advanced westwards along the coast, repairing the telephone lines as they went, they met up with another group led by Akhriru coming from the opposite direction. Then, with the help of 600 troops, many of them Rifi regulars, they turned on ^CAbd al-Rahman's forces and almost succeeded in capturing their commander, a cousin of the Darqawi sharif-s named ^CAbd al-Karim⁶⁰.

By 30 May the Rifis were back in control and proceeded to a general settling of accounts. In the Banu Razin, houses and land were burned out. In the Akhmas 20 villages were burned. Crops and houses were destroyed at Tandaman, in the Wadi Law valley. By the end of the first week in June, all resistance had been crushed, and there were vast numbers of Rifi forces in the Ghumara to prevent any further trouble. Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim arrived at Targhassa with, reportedly, 15,000 men⁶¹. ^CAbd al-Rahman agreed to a truce, and on 12 June Rifi troops began to withdraw from the Banu Zarwal⁶². ^CAbd al-Rahman was still undefeated, but his potential allies in the Rif and Ghumara were sufficiently cowed not to rebel again. In any case, the Rifis had a richer prize awaiting them - the Jibala.

The taking of the Jibala was fairly simple. Primo de Rivera had already decided to withdraw to secure lines of defence. All the Rifis had to do was to attack the outlying positions and harry the withdrawal.

The Rifis were helped, as they had been in the fighting in 1921, by the way the Spanish had scattered their forces. In the lower Wadi Law valley, there were eighteen Spanish posts in the small region between Talambut and Kudia Darsa alone. In the countryside surrounding them the Rifis had gathered at least 3,000 men⁶³. The attack began on 27 June, and it was immediately successful - the road up the Wadi Law was cut, breaking supplies to the posts in the valley. More dangerously still, the Spanish were forced to supply their main garrison at Shawin only by the dangerous road through Suq al-Arba'a. On 23 July the Spanish succeeded in reopening road through the valley, but the Rifis regrouped, brought another 1,000 troops into the Wadi Law valley and attacked again⁶⁴. The attacks were accompanied by a new threat from behind the Spanish lines. First on 12 August, Akhriru led attacks on the Tangier to Tetuan road, a major supply route. Then the northern Jibalan tribes began to rise - the Hawz on 13 August, the Banu Hassan on 17 August⁶⁵.

Many Spanish positions, even Wadi Law itself, were completely cut off and some began to fall: Tassa on 25 August and Adu on 4 September. On the same day that Adu fell, the Times reported that the tribes in the far north-west, near Tangier, had risen, under the leadership of Sidi al-Tayyib al-Hadawi. Not only was this man a sharif, but he was a member of the same Nasiriya tariqa as the Bujdaynis, bin ^CAbd al-Karim's enemies in the eastern Rif. Clearly not all sharif-s, not all



7. The Ghumara, Wadi Lau valley and eastern Jibala

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members of the tariqa-s, not even all members of the same tariqa, were opposed to the Rifis. Indeed Sidi al-Tayyib only joined the movement when he had the approval of the head of the Nasiriya, who resided near Marrakesh, and when he had been assured by the Rifi representative in Tangier, Si ^CAbd al-Karim bin al-Hajj ^CAli Luh, that the Rifis were conducting "an Islamic national revolution against the conquering foreigner"⁶⁶. His motives, at least, were not a wish to preserve his position but to fight the Christian Spanish.

At the beginning of September, with most of his positions surrounded, Primo de Rivera began to withdraw. That was very difficult indeed. Some posts particularly those on or near the coast could be evacuated easily enough by sea: Amtar was taken off on 8 September, and Kudia Darsa, and Tisgarin on 13 September⁶⁷. The real problem was Shawin, where 3,000 Spanish troops were now completely cut off.

The relief of Shawin was a massive operation. On 19 September, 40,000 troops were brought up to the beginning of the road leading up to the city from Tetuan. Garrisoning various positions on the way - Suq al-Arba^Ca, Sharuta and Dar ^CAquba in particular - they eventually reached Shawin on 30 September. In the fortnight between 18 September and 1 October, the Spanish lost between 4 and 5,000 killed and wounded⁶⁸, and they still had to fight their way back from Shawin.

As the Spanish faltered, their opponents' morale soared. Walter Harris, Tangier correspondent of the Times, reported that he had great difficulty in dissuading Moroccans that the Rifis did not have the support of the British government⁶⁹, which would have convinced yet more people to join them by setting the seal of international approval on Rifi independence. At the beginning of October, Harris wrote to his foreign editor that he had been visited by several "more or less important rebels and they seemed intoxicated by their successes"⁷⁰. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim did his best to prevent this heightened morale from slipping by forbidding any mention of the casualties the Rifis had suffered, and ordering the faqih-s in the village mosques to pray and recite suitable verses from the Quran to give thanks for the victories over Spain, and "the proximity of Muslim liberation"⁷¹.

On 15 November, the Spanish began their withdrawal from Shawin. They left the city unmolested. The Rifis and Akhmasis deliberately held off their attack because a deputation from Shawin had asked them not to attack the city⁷². Instead, the attack came at Dar ^CAquba. From then on the road was a battlefield all the way to Tetuan, and a very muddy battlefield as well, for it was pouring with rain for much of the time. The "road" was not paved - it was more of a superior cart track in which the Spanish vehicles, including the armoured cars became embedded while Rifi snipers picked them off from the overlooking hills. Fighting was particularly heavy at Sharuta, and then at Suq al-Arba^Ca and Bin Quraysh. The confusion

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at Suq al-Arba^C was bitterly, but accurately described by a character in Arturo Barea's autobiography, very thinly disguised as a novel:

" . . . it was bad when we got there. Thousands of men coming up from every side, all hungry, eaten by lice, dying of thirst, without arms, and half naked. . . . Nobody knew what to do. The canteens had no water left. And two days after that, the Legion arrived at midnight. They had been stuffing uniforms with straw all day long and then they had got out of Xauen (Shawin) by night and joined us in the Zoco (i.e. Suq al-Arba^Ca). They'd left the puppets leaning on the parapets, with sticks at their sides as if they were rifles. . . . (Suq al-Arba^Ca is) on the top of a hill, and if you go from there to Tetuan, at first there's a steep slope with a wood on the right . . . You go down and pass through a gully all overgrown with trees - that's where the wood begins - and then you climb another slope. Afterwards the road goes straight to Ben-Karrick (Bin Qurraysh) . . . when we were going down the slope we ran into a hail of bullets . . . The Moors got all those who didn't duck quickly enough. It took us four hours to get to the bottom of that ravine, and two hours to climb that other slope until we were in open country. It was the worst butchery I've ever seen . . .

73.

It was not until 13 September 1924 that the last Spanish troops struggled into Tetuan. Their losses had been enormous, probably more than 10,000 dead⁷⁴.

Despite the Spanish retreat, a major task faced the Rifis and bin Abd al-Karim. The events of the previous three and a half years had shown that while it was possible to force the Spanish out, it was much more difficult to remain in control of the area afterwards. There were always problems with local leaders, be they sharif-s like Abd al-Rahman al-Darqawi or local strongmen like Amar bin Hamidu, who were determined to maintain their local autonomy and their wealth, and were prepared to fight to do so - if they felt they had any chance of winning. There was always a danger that a wider opposition to the Rifis might develop amongst tribes who saw their incorporation as a threat to their economic survival. Bin Abd al-Karim had learned from his experiences in the Qal'aya in 1921 that the only way to overcome these difficulties was to centralise as much power in his own hands and those of his closest supporters. In the Wargha valley and the Ghumara this meant relying, in the final instance, on the power of force which his regular army gave him, and making the central Rifi tribes - particularly the Buqquya and his own Banu Waryaghal - the backbone of his authority.

On their own, however, neither the Banu Waryaghal nor the army were enough. Throughout his campaigns in the Ghumara and Wargha, bin Abd al-Karim had the support of

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local people who joined his haraka, and of local leaders, including sharif-s and members of the tariqa-s, who helped him to lead the military operations. Despite the problems posed by powerful individuals and by general resentment of the economic problems caused by Rifi domination, there was a wide level of popular support for the cause of expelling the Spanish from Morocco. After Anwal bin ^CAbd al-Karim had been able to claim the leadership of this resistance, and his prestige was further advanced by the Spanish withdrawal from the Jibala. Neither of his two major opponents - al-Raisuli or ^CAbd al-Rahman - were prepared to acknowledge his leadership, but his power and influence had so increased by the end of 1924 that bin ^CAbd al-Karim was well able to deal with them and assert total control over the Jibala.

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II. THE RIFIS AT THE HEIGHT OF THEIR POWER

It was one thing to harry the Spanish out of the Jibala, quite another for the Rifis to take control of the area for themselves. The Spanish had been expelled by a combination of the Rifi forces and local groups, particularly from the Akhmas, whose siege of Shawin had been almost continuous since the Spanish occupied the city in 1920. The Akhmas did not now wish to exchange Spanish domination for that of the Rifis.

The Akhmas, however, were not united. This allowed the Rifis to seize the initiative. As soon as the Spanish left Shawin, Rifi troops, led by Si Sha'ib bin Muhammad Awqirih took possession of the city. Si Sha'ib appointed Muhammad Binainu as Pasha of Shawin. Binainu was later described by Skiraj as "foremost amongst the Muslims of his city"¹. In other words, he was the Rifis' most prominent supporter there. On the following day, Si Mahammad bin Abd al-Karim entered the city, showing great respect for its holiness. He removed his shoes before entering the gates, gave a speech in which he congratulated the "good Muslims who were prepared to fight for independence" and then left Shawin, for fear of Spanish air raids, and joined Bu Lahya, Ahmad Bu Dra and the main haraka in Talambut².

Once the mood of congratulation was over, the Rifis started to organise the Jibala along their own lines. The Spanish had left behind a huge quantity of supplies, military buildings and even a fully-equipped hospital in Shawin. "It will be curious", the Madrid correspondent of the Times remarked, "to see what the Moors will make of these elements of civilisation"³. The "Moors" were quite civilised enough to want them for exactly the same purposes as the Spanish. The hospital was prepared for use, and eventually put in the hands of a European doctor⁴. The normal technological and political accompaniments of Rifi victory soon followed: the road was extended from Talambut to Shawin, and telephone lines were strung up. Si Mahammad ordered the tribes to be disarmed, banned the carrying of guns in Shawin and imposed a tax of five pesetas a week on each household in the villages. Rifi troops confiscated the property of all the former Spanish supporters and began impounding habus property, including a large supply of olive oil which had been

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stored in a mosque in the Akhmas⁵.

These were the same policies which had provoked rebellion in the Ghumara. They smacked of Rifi occupation, not liberation, and, as they had in the Ghumara, the same stories about the Rifi regular army began to circulate in the Jibala: particularly allegations of rape⁶. As in the Ghumara economic difficulties caused discontent: it was a hard winter and there was hunger in the mountains. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim did try to help: at the end of December he ordered the Ghumaran and Jibala tribes to send pack animals to Ajdir to collect wheat, sugar, candles and cloth - but as a loan to be repaid later. It was too late anyway, and prices were already rising very rapidly. Between 12 December 1924 and 11 January 1925 the price of sugar went up by 25 per cent, candles up by 66 per cent and wheat reached 50 pesetas a mudd⁷. Hunger reached appalling proportions. In the Banu Huzmar, outside Tetuan, people were reduced to making bread from "flour" made from the dried and ground fruit of mastic trees. The people in the city did their best to help them by throwing food over the walls at night⁸.

The discontent that this caused was bad enough, but at the back of it lay a far more serious political problem. The Akhmasis rejected the whole idea of Rifi control, not because of its economic side effects, but simply because it was Rifi control. They explained to Akhriru, one of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's most important commanders in the Jibala, that they rejected his master's authority because they had never heard of a sultan in the Rif before and felt that with the Spanish gone: "Now each tribe should rule itself as it wished"⁹. As it had been in the aftermath of the Anwal victories, that demand was being made again, cutting at the foundations of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's authority. Al-Raisuli, of course, shared the same feelings, with the slight difference that he believed that if anyone should rule it should be he himself. So there was the basis of a possible alliance between him and the Akhmasis against the Rifis.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was always willing to compromise with powerful local leaders in order to bring them onto his side with the minimum of fighting, and al-Raisuli was no exception. In the closing stages of the Jibala campaign, he had written to the Sharif in his residence at Tazrut, asking him to join the Rifis. When al-Raisuli refused, bin ^CAbd al-Karim turned to threats, saying that if he did not come over, the Rifis would attack him in Tazrut "the Madrid of the Jibala", as he scathingly called it. The Sharif replied with defiance, using the most emotive religious language to justify himself:

Close your eyes, take stock and you will see that this is an ocean you cannot cross, for this is no way to make war. To make war in accordance with the law, you must first respect your brothers, then you must respect the law, respect the habus, in that way you can make war on the Christian, and God will help you. Moreover, the image fades and only reality remains. Our only desire is peace

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and to avoid the shedding of blood which is today quite useless¹⁰.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was just as well able to use religious language as al-Raisuli, to damn his opponent. He accused the Sharif of treachery to Islam out of self interest, for he would naturally resent the take-over of habus properties:

You should know, O Sharif, that we are quite aware of what you are. You aspire only to personal (greatness), scattering over your brothers the filthy mud of the Christians. Your love for them is public knowledge. Your rejection of your faith is also public and notorious. Those Muslims who believed you were like them, you have thrown into the sea of iniquity. As a result of this, soon, very soon we will come upon you and those who would defend you. This is our last letter to you¹¹.

The two men were expressing completely different concepts of Islam: for al-Raisuli principles were based on custom, the preservation of the prestige of the sharif-s, and their political and economic power. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim demanded that all resources be put at the disposal of the Islamic resistance. In practice, however, the argument came down to the same thing: who was to control vital resources? Since both men were determined to do so, no compromise was possible.

On 18 December Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim and Akhriru went to Tazrut to tell al-Raisuli that he "could no longer live on the mountain, and that if he did not leave the area he would be taken to Ajdir with his wives and children"¹². This had no effect whatever and so, on 22 December, Si Mahammad attempted to call al-Raisuli to the great shrine at Mawlay ^CAbd al-Salam to force him to join the Rifis. Even had he agreed to go, al-Raisuli would probably not have been able to do so. He was very sick, bloated with dropsy. In any event he did not even answer the letter¹³. It was not that he could do much to oppose the Rifis himself - he was far too ill for that. His role was now reduced to that of a figurehead for the growing opposition among the tribes.

That opposition was centred in the Akhmas. At the beginning of January men from the Akhmas went to their neighbours to the south, the Ghazawa, to ask for help. In traditional fashion, they made an ar sacrifice of a bull. They then organised a meeting for their neighbours at Dardara in the southern part of their tribe. It was attended by notables from the Banu Hassan, Banu Lait, Banu Idhir, and the Banu Huzmar, who agreed that they "could not allow a Rifi foreigner to come to rule over them, making himself rich at their expense and prejudicing their interests"¹⁴.

On 5 January the Akhmas, Banu Ahmad and Ghazawa refused to supply men for the haraka. Three days later, the Banu Idhir joined them and threw out 150 Rifi soldiers from their tribe. On 10 January, a fight broke out at the gates of Shawin, when Rifi guards tried to disarm an Akhmasi. A guard

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was killed and the Akhmasi arrested and executed¹⁵. That pushed many more Akhmasis into open rebellion: Shawin was in their territory and they resented Rifi control. They turned to al-Raisuli, who willingly gave them arms. In return, when the Akhmasi rebels captured Binainu, the Pasha of Shawin, they handed him over to al-Raisuli, who imprisoned him in "the most horrible cell in his prison". The rest of the Pasha's haraka was killed, and the heads of its soldiers cut off and exhibited in the villages¹⁶.

Rifi troops poured in: 500 men under Akhriru, and another large group from the Ghumara. Together they began burning villages in the Akhmas¹⁷. At night the lights of these fires could be seen as far away as Wazzan in the French zone, where many fugitives had sought refuge¹⁸. The punishment had only just begun. 800 more Rifi troops arrived on 25 January and within three days a large part of the tribe's houses had been burned. Within four days, most of the Akhmas had surrendered, but the burnings continued into February, when they were topped off with a fine of 250,000 pesetas¹⁹.

Once the rebellion had been crushed, Rifi forces turned on al-Raisuli, who had anyway almost given up in despair. When on 1 February he was told that the Rifis were approaching, he replied, fatalistically, "the sky is far above the barking of dogs"²⁰. However, he still had enough pride to make at least a token resistance, although his feelings were not necessarily shared by the villagers of Tazrut. When they appealed to him to surrender without a fight, he replied that, "only Jews ask for mercy"²¹.

Nevertheless, it was no more than a token resistance. When it came to the point, sick and ill and faced by a huge army commanded by some of the best Rifi commanders - Akhriru, Si Ahmad al-Baqqali and Bu Lahya - al-Raisuli gave up. After a short fight he finally surrendered on 8 February.

Rifi revenge followed. His supporters were made to bury the Rifi dead while their own were left unburied, to be attended to by the dogs and the crows. Hugely obese and prostrated by dropsy, al-Raisuli himself was loaded onto a special litter, taken down to the coast, put onto a boat, and carried off to the Banu Waryaghal to die. His death was quite natural. Although bin Abd al-Karim again accused him of betraying Morocco to the Christians, he refused to allow al-Raisuli to be executed for his crimes, as the faqih-s demanded. His family was confined in Snada, and he himself was imprisoned at Tamasind, where on 3 April he died²². It would take several weeks for news of his death to leak out. The capture of al-Raisuli brought bin Abd al-Karim great wealth - 75,000 Spanish pesetas were added to the Rifi treasury - ²³ and great prestige. The Rifis now controlled all the territory between the Timsaman and the walls of Tetuan.

That control was exercised in the customary manner. More telephone lines were linked to Shawin, and each tribe was told

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to build a mahkama, ready for a Rifi-appointed "administrator", and to collect up all their arms and hand them in. The tribes were being disarmed. By the end of April the Akhmas, all the Ghumaran tribes, and most of the other Jibalan tribes had handed in their guns²⁴.

The Jiblis may not have liked Rif control, but without any guns there was little they could do about it. Their attitude became one of grudging acquiescence. This had been noticed as early as February by Vincent Sheean, an American journalist who travelled through the Rif in the first part of 1925. When he reached the Jibala he saw a definite change of attitude amongst the people of a village in the Banu ^CArus, al-Raisuli's tribe:

I could see what had never appeared before in the whole journey across northern Morocco: a latent hostility, or at best an unwilling friendship, for the Sultan Mohamed ben Abd al-Krim . . . They were not unfriendly (towards Sheean and his Rifi companion), but they smiled slightly each time Mohammed and I referred to the Rifi leader as the 'Sultan'²⁵.

Opposition could only be symbolic. Even that was risky, as a qadi in Shawin, who had formerly been sympathetic to the Spanish, discovered when he made his own individual protest. When Rifi soldiers started to drill in the main square, in front of his house, he pointedly nailed up all the windows, so that he did not have to overlook the scene. For this piece of studied insolence he was fined 5,000 pesetas²⁶.

If Rifi rule in the Jibala was generally resented, bin ^CAbd al-Karim was wildly popular in the Rif itself. He had succeeded and success was the best propaganda of all. Some people were riding on a wave of exaggerated euphoria. For them, at least, bin ^CAbd al-Karim was the victorious sultan. When Sheean met several qaid-s from the al-Matalsa tribe in the eastern Rif one of them gave him an extremely colourful account of the Rifi victories in 1921:

And the Riffi killed and killed and killed, until there were one hundred and sixty-four thousand million Spaniards dead upon the field . . . And Generan Barro (sic - General Navarro) and all the coroneles and tenientes and many thousands and thousands of men worked for the sultan on the roads and as slaves. The sultan can defeat all enemies in battle. The sultan has many millions of fighting men who will sweep the French and the English and all the Christians out of the Arab's country. When the sultan has driven the Spanish into the sea, he will go to Spain and drive them out of there too. Spain is an Arab country. The Riffi will kill until he is tired, and he will take all the rest prisoners²⁷.

It was a fine performance to put on for a visiting American. But the hyperbole was born of a real feeling of confidence in bin ^CAbd al-Karim's leadership. By and large

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he had the Rifis behind him. Under him, jihad would lead to the liberation not only of the Rif but of the whole of Morocco and beyond. That feeling of euphoria, which sealed his leadership, would push bin ^CAbd al-Karim into his greatest mistake: the attack on the French zone.

The reasons for not attacking the French zone were overwhelming. The Rifis did not have many millions of fighting men; they had no more than a few thousand. They were already engaged with the Spanish on two fronts; to take on the French on a third would be very dangerous indeed. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was quite well aware of this. ^CAli al-Majawi, a French informant who visited the Rif in January 1925, reported that he was insisting that no overt action be taken against the French, saying that "he does not want to attack the French, because he cannot wage war on two fronts"²⁸.

This was a policy of long standing. As far back as November 1923 he had refused to appoint qaid-s over the Banu Mastara, telling the tribe:

You are not included in this zone and at this time we have no desire to interfere in the affairs of the French zone in which you are included. For this reason we cannot appoint a qaid over you at this time, although we greatly rejoice that you have come into the sphere of the Muslims who are vigilant in the defence of the land of their brothers, and you will be well rewarded by God"²⁹.

A second reason for not invading the French zone was economic. The Rif was short of food. ^CAli al-Majawi, the French spy, reported that Rifi soldiers were undernourished, and that food was very expensive; "life is expensive there and nobody gives you anything . . . the necessities of life are very difficult to find"³⁰. Certainly, the Rifis attempted to solve the problem by taking food supplies from Shawin - peas and beans - to Ajdir, saying that is was "war booty". That only increased the difficulties of the people of the Jibala. Misery grew there, and refugees poured into the Spanish-occupied towns of Asilah, Larache, and Alcazarquivir, and the International City of Tangier³¹. In any event, the supplies from the Jibala were not nearly enough, and the Rifis relied for much of their supplies on food brought to Rifi markets by the unsubmitted tribes of the French zone, either their own produce, or transit trade from the occupied area. ^CAli al-Majawi reported a great deal of propaganda in the Rifi markets to encourage this trade³². An attack on the French zone would have disrupted this supply line.

However, the very reasons which made a Rifi invasion of the French zone so undesirable, also made it a necessity. The agricultural riches of the Wargha valley - and particularly of the Banu Zarwal - were an important prize. Since the end of 1923, the French had been getting closer to the Banu Zarwal. In October of that year they had taken the Banu Mazgilda, and the following month, the Mazzyat, feeling threatened, told the Spanish that they were joining the Rifis because of the French

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advance³³. Lyautey himself declared that "So long as we are not solidly established North of the Quergha, our hold on Fez and our important line of communication Fez-Taza remain in the mercy of a thrust from the north"³⁴. At the beginning of June 1924, the French occupied Ain Midyuna in the Sinhajāt al-Masbuh without any opposition from bin Abd al-Karim's forces. The lack of resistance created such disgust among many of his supporters that troops were then sent to the Sinhaja and Matiwa al-Jabal. In mid-June, the French moved into the southern Marnisa and the Rifi haraka pushed them back. The Rifis acquitted themselves well, but these were only minor skirmishes³⁵. However, by the spring of 1925, bin Abd al-Karim was worried that the French were about to occupy the Banu Zarwal, which would put its economic resources beyond his reach and at the same time provide Abd al-Rahman with a shield behind which he could subvert the Rif. At the end of January 1925 bin Abd al-Karim called a meeting at Ajdir which was attended by all the most important Rifi leaders - his brother Si Muhammad, his uncle Abd al-Salam al-Khattabi, Bu Lahya, Muhammad Bu Jibar, the paymaster of the army, and Yazid bin al-Hajj Hammu, the Minister for Justice, among them³⁶. The Amir proposed the occupation of the Banu Zarwal.

That was only a limited objective, the occupation of a single tribe, albeit an important one. Behind it lay popular pressure for a far wider action. Bin Abd al-Karim was propelled into attack on the French zone as a whole, because his past successes raised demands for further successes, and because his propaganda made specific use of the appeal of Jihad . In the eyes of the majority of his followers, that was what the war was for: Jihad against the Christians. Later bin Abd al-Karim would deny that he was leading a Jihad , but his was a sophisticated argument. Many of his closest allies supported him out of a simple dislike of the Christians. Akhriru, one of his ablest Jihli commanders, expressed it most clearly in a letter to bin Abd al-Karim. In April 1924 he had written to the Amir describing his activities in the Tetuan area:

We were, before this, among the army of the enemies of God and his Prophet in the tribes of the Banu Huzmar, in the Banu Ma'dan (a clan of the Banu Huzmar), and the Banu Sa'id, and we kindled the war in all the tribes around the city of Tetuan, may God return it to the Dar al-Islam . . . We started fighting with five men from the (Spanish Native) police, may God annihilate them . . . Then the infidels from Tetuan arrested our brother Muslims from the Banu Ma'dan and Banu Huzmar . . . Then we went to the city of Tetuan and with the help of God and his Prophet we carried off six infidels, three adults and three children. The three adults were people who were held among them in honour as wise and respected, may God annihilate them³⁷.

This was the sort of feeling of which bin Abd al-Karim

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and his followers made good use and it formed the common currency of Rifi propaganda. In mid-March 1925 a Rifi agent wrote to four important qaid-s of the ^CAnjara tribe, who had risen behind the Spanish lines between Tetuan and Ceuta, but were now beginning to submit. The letter was a mixture of crude threats and the propaganda of Jihad:

Know that all the Muslims of the zone, from the (River) Muluya as far as your country, are agreed and united under a lord sent by God, who has great powers and facilities to fight and expel our enemies. We shall rejoice that you listen to the voice of God and come to join the rest of your brothers. From then you will hear the plans for the triumph of the mujahidin. If you do not heed the call, you will suffer the same fate as the Sharif (al-Raisuli) who lost everything: freedom, goods and money which has fallen into the hands of our Makhzan, and his children have been arrested. Be as quick as you can and at once decide to join your brothers³⁸.

The popular feeling for Jihad in the Rifi controlled zone was shared by those fighting the French in the south. For them bin ^CAbd al-Karim was the leader of a successful resistance, the only man who had real power at his disposal to help them. He represented their last hope and they looked to him for assistance. How, after all his successes against the Christian Spanish could the leader of the Islamic Jihad not come to their aid too? As early as April 1924, the leaders of the Banu Warrayan confederacy in the Middle Atlas wrote to bin ^CAbd al-Karim and described him as:

the man whose ancestry is good and pure, (whose ancestry) goes back to the Khalifa (of the Prophet), God have mercy upon him and grant him peace, ^CUmar bin al-Khattabi, may God be pleased with him . . . Sidi . . . Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim al-Rifi, the man who governs in the name of God, may He be exalted, God's peace crown all your works . . .³⁹.

They announced that they had emigrated in the cause of God and wished to submit to his rule, because it was founded on the principles of the shar^C. This was so despite the fact that the Middle Atlas was a considerable distance from the Rif and their resistance was to the French, not the Spanish. For the Banu Warrayan, however, the Rifi movement was the only hope of help. They looked to the Rif out of a sense of Islamic brotherhood and anyway, for them, unbelief was one nation, as bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself had declared. Then they appealed for assistance because they were cut off from the outside by French forces, isolated, cold and hungry:

Indeed we are like an island in the middle of the sea. . . so have pity on our state because of our weakness before God, may He be exalted, and His Prophet, God have mercy upon him and give him peace. You must come to our land from your own with your armies or however

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it seems best to you. You know what must be done (to help) us⁴⁰.

Quite apart from these appeals there was a practical consideration - part of the Rifi army had come from the French zone. They at least were guaranteed to be loyal, uncommitted to local rivalries; but equally they could be expected to demand the liberation of their own tribes. As ^CAli al-Majawi reported, they were organised by a man from the Banu Warryan itself, who claimed, somewhat curiously, to be a son of Abu Himara, "Sidi Khalil bin Mawlay Muhammad"⁴¹. Evidently, the old attraction of the name of the Sultan's mad - or holy - brother, which had moved people at the turn of the century, still had some attraction.

With all these pressures it would have been difficult to have avoided an attack on the French zone without bin ^CAbd al-Karim's legitimacy being undermined. But by the time he reached the Rif in early 1925, it was clear to ^CAli al-Majawi that the attack would come, for it was being carefully planned. The Rifis were building defence works on the southern slopes of the Rif and massing troops there⁴².

Nevertheless, as the construction of the defences showed, bin ^CAbd al-Karim was not going to allow the enthusiasm for the attack to overtake strategic considerations. He was prepared to attack the French zone only when he was sure that the Rifi heartland would be secure, that he had positions ready on which his troops could fall back if they failed. A great deal of planning went into the whole operation.

The plans were drawn up by a special general staff which was formed for the attack. Headed by Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim, it included the most able Rifi commanders: Idris bin Mimun Khuja, the Qal'ayi who had been with the Rifis since 1921, Qaid Abu Rahayl, the most prominent anti-Spanish leader from the al-Matalsa, a man who had been linked with bin ^CAbd al-Karim since the time of the contacts with the Germans during the First World War, and ^CAmar Bu Azza of the Banu Sa'id, who had stayed with the Rifis when most of his tribe was reoccupied by the Spanish. Their secretary was Sidi al-Hassan al-Qadiri al-Tilimsani, an Algerian, who headed the staff's own bureaucracy, with its own paymaster and officials. They set up their first headquarters at Targist to begin planning.

Preparations were begun in great secrecy. The mobilisation was done slowly in order to preserve security, and it was not until the beginning of March 1925 that all the troops were in place. Every position between Wazzan and the Gaznaya was reinforced, with six main groups near Wazzan, around Ghafsai, on the edges of the Banu Zarwal, at Tawnat in the Mizzyat tribe, on the borders of the Branis tribe, in the Marnisa and the Gaznaya. When that had been done, the entire general staff moved from Targist to the zawiya of Sidi Muhammad bin Sadiq al-Akhmalishi in the Zarqat. Not only was it closer to the front, but it gave the attack the benefit of the support

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of an important murabit who was an old supporter of the Rifi cause⁴³.

The first objective was the Banu Zarwal. On 11 April the Rifis sent letters to the clans of that tribe, inviting them to submit. Before they had a chance to reply, on 12 April, they were invaded⁴⁴. The Rifi troops were sent on their way with a harangue by an aged muqaddam from the Banu Walishak, said to be over 100 years old. He called them to " Jihad in the way of God", but he also warned them not to kill prisoners and to take all captives back to the command posts⁴⁵. Jihad was a good encouragement, but bin ^C Abd al-Karim was determined to remain in control throughout. This was a regularly planned military campaign, not the sort of uncoordinated rout which had been inflicted on the Spanish in 1921 and 1924.


The careful planning paid off. The attack was extremely effective. Within a day, all the clans of the Banu Zarwal which had not already been occupied by the French had submitted to the Rifis. ^C Abd al-Rahman al-Darqawi fled to Fez with his family and stayed there until the war was nearly over, and his tribe had been occupied by his French protectors. His zawiya at ^C Amjutt was burned. Then the Rifi forces pushed on to attack French positions.

Meanwhile, the Banu Zarwal were punished severely for ^C Abd al-Rahman's opposition. The Rifis took 400 hostages back to Ajdir, and imposed a fine of 200,000 livestock, a useful addition to the food supplies. As the fine was paid, so the hostages were released. All the habus property in the tribe was confiscated⁴⁶.


Once the Banu Zarwal had been punished, the tribe was incorporated into the Rifi system. An administrative structure was set up there as it had been everywhere else under bin ^C Abd al-Karim's control. Later, when the French reoccupied the tribe, the Zarwalis explained how the heads of the various military groups organised things. Each Rifi commander called a local meeting of the notables in his area and:

explained that holy war had been proclaimed by Abd el-Krim, the true Sultan of Morocco, to throw out the infidels, and particularly the French, in the name of the greater glory of regenerated Islam. He declared that the occupation of all Morocco by the Rifis was no more than a question of days, and invited the notables to tell him what positions they wanted to occupy in the tribes and towns. The posts offered were all those of makhzan officials, Pachas, Calds, Cadis, Nadirs, Oumanas, Mohtassebs (sic), etc. The posts most in demand were those of Pacha, Calds, and Oumanas. The registers were sent to Abd el-Krim to decide immediately after the ceremony⁴⁷.

Now the talk was not only of Jihad , but also of bin ^C Abd al-Karim as Sultan of Morocco. It must have seemed a realistic hope to the Rifis in those first days of their attack, for as they came into contact with the French, success appeared to



8. The Southern Front - Western Sector, 1925



9. The Southern Front - Eastern Sector, 1925

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be within their grasp. As they advanced, their victories brought them closer to the greatest prize of all, the Moroccan capital of Fez. In the last fortnight of April, Rifi troops poured down towards the Wargha and the French called for reserves from Algeria. On 25 April, Rifi columns crossed the Wargha and numerous French posts were surrounded. For ten days from 4 May, the strategic position of Biban was cut off, and there was intense fighting at Tawnat⁴⁸.

During May 1925 some posts were taken and retaken several times. By the end of the month the French had had enough and on 26 May they announced a strategic withdrawal. They said they would evacuate most of the posts north of the Wargha. All European civilians were evacuated from Wazzan, and on 5 June Biban, "the gateway to Fez", fell. The Rifis were 40 kilometres from the Moroccan capital, and they promised that they would enter the city⁴⁹.

To prepare the way, bin ^CAbd al-Karim tried to win over the ^Culama of Fez. If they could be rallied to the Rifi cause, it would be of great political value to the Rifis. On 21 June he sent a letter to the head of the Qarawiyyin mosque university to be passed on to other important ^Culama. It was an appeal from one ^Calim to others, and was based on a legalistic religious argument: since all other Moroccan leaders had failed, he, bin ^CAbd al-Karim, was the only one who was entitled to be sultan. It was the same argument which the Tlemsanis had used nearly a hundred years before to justify their abandonment of the Ottoman sultan and their transfer of allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco that a ruler who could not protect the Islamic lands and enforce the shar^C was illegitimate and should be removed⁵⁰.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's letter began with generalisations: "We tell you and your colleagues, the Imams, who are men of good faith and have no relations with hypocrites and infidels, of the state of servitude into which the disunited nation of Morocco is sunk"⁵¹. It soon moved on to specifics. Mawlay Yusif, the reigning Sultan and his "perfidious entourage" had been corrupted by Christian gifts, but he was only one of a line of corrupt sovereigns. In a rapid survey of recent Moroccan history, the whole ^CAlawi family from Mawlay Hasan onwards was condemned:

We have exposed . . . the perfidy of the entourage of Sultan Mulay El Hassan (sic) from the beginning to the end of his reign. We have pointed out each traitor by name, and made known their actions. We have also exposed the perfidy of the entourage of Sultan Moulay (sic) Abd el-Aziz and pointed out each swindler individually, including those who destroyed (Moroccan) sovereignty, such as el-Menebhi and others⁵².

^CAbd al-Hafiz was a : " . . . heretic and a liar, a leader of holy war in Marrakesh, where sorcerers built for him imposing minarets, although he belonged to a family of base origins and who, having seized great wealth, sought refuge in Spain"⁵³.

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The alternatives had been no better. The pretender, Abu Himara, who claimed the throne as Mawlay Muhammad in 1902, was dismissed as "one of the sorcerers without religion" and al-Raisuli as a schismatic⁵⁴.

There was no other solution but that "power should be given to him who has the people with him in accordance with the Book of God and the . . . law"⁵⁵. That of course was bin ^CAbd al-Karim. Since the leaders of Morocco had sacrificed the Jihad to their personal ambition and greed, the letter continued, unless a new leader - himself - was acclaimed society would collapse, "Know, oh Ulama, that if the reign of the unbelievers continues, ten Moroccans will be valued at the price of one donkey, and not one will keep possession of a single dirham or dinar, nor of a forest or garden, nor a plot of land to sow his seed, nor a shop nor a house"⁵⁶. There followed a series of quotations from the Quran stating the necessity of Jihad .

It was a coherent argument, its reasoning religious, directed to men who might have been convinced by it. The ulama of Fez were not won over, however, and they did not declare for bin ^CAbd al-Karim and the Rifis. The Rifi advance on Fez had been stopped by the beginning of June. To have declared for bin ^CAbd al-Karim would have been very dangerous indeed, for the French remained firmly in control. However, the fighting was by no means over, for the Rifis turned their attention to the Wazzan front, where Wazzan itself came under intense pressure until it was relieved at the end of June⁵⁷. By then the French had stopped the Rifi advance along most of the front, although there were still isolated Rifi groups operating behind French lines.

It was a great victory for the Rifis nevertheless. Of a total of 66 French posts on the southern side of the Rif, 43 had been lost or evacuated. The French army had lost 1,000 men killed, 3,700 wounded, 1,000 missing, and 500 who killed themselves rather than surrender⁵⁸. It produced the usual euphoria amongst the suq-s of the Moroccan cities. It was a euphoria which Rifi agents did their best to encourage, using hyperbole which was indistinguishable from the outright lie. In the markets of Tangier they emphasised the technical superiority which, they said, the Rifis had achieved over the French, with German help. Germany was sending soldiers, supplies by submarine, and "extraordinary machines to make French aeroplanes fall from the sky". Even without this help, they said, bin ^CAbd al-Karim had already taken Fez, utterly defeated the French army and amassed enough supplies to carry on fighting for another two years⁵⁹.

The Rifis had not taken Fez, nor had they defeated the French. But they had achieved yet another victory. In four years, they had defeated two Spanish armies and badly mauled a French one. They controlled a huge area, from the walls of Tetuan in the north-west to the edge of the plain of Garat

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in the east, from the Mediterranean in the north to the Wargha valley in the south. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was at the height of his power, and the Rifi movement at its greatest extent. The euphoria was quite natural.

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12. DEFEAT

The mauling which the Rifis gave the French may have made them euphoric, but it sealed their doom. In mid-May, as the Rifi attack on the French zone built up, talks began in Madrid between Primo de Rivera and a representative of Painlevé, the French Prime Minister. Although the Spanish denied that this had anything to do with Morocco, that was a smokescreen. On 17 June a full conference began in Madrid to deal with the question of Morocco¹.

The conference led to the very outcome which bin ^CAbd al-Karim had feared and which had made him so cautious about attacking the French. The two European powers combined to "solve" the Rifi problem. One by one they signed a series of agreements. The first two dealt with how to prevent arms from being smuggled into the Rif. The third laid down joint terms for a possible peace agreement with bin ^CAbd al-Karim. He would be granted autonomy "compatible with international treaties" and an amnesty would be granted to Rifis who had "rebelled". In return the Rifis would withdraw from the French zone, and allow the Spanish to occupy Alhucemas Bay and the plain beyond; all prisoners would be exchanged, and a native police force would be set up to control arms and munitions².

Once that was decided, the conference was adjourned so that the terms could be put to the Rifis. On 21 July, Horacio Echevarrieta, the Basque millionaire who had helped to negotiate the release of the Spanish prisoners in 1923, was sent to Ajdir to pass the terms to bin ^CAbd al-Karim. As he himself expected, he got nowhere³.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had his own ideas about peace. On 28 June, as the Madrid conference was getting under way, he sent for Leon Gabrielli, the French political officer at Tawrirt, just to the south of the Rif, and told him that he wanted nothing but peace with France. Provided that France recognised the independence of the Rif, he said, the French could keep authority over their own zone⁴. This directly contradicted his own propaganda, and had the French accepted, his authority over his own supporters might have been undercut. In any event,

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it was not even remotely acceptable to the French, and Gabrielli went home.

With bin ^CAbd al-Karim's refusal of its terms, the Madrid conference was resumed. France and Spain made two more agreements on the status of Tangier and the delimitation of boundaries between the two zones. Then they moved on to their final agreement, on military cooperation. Both armies would remain autonomous, but the troops of either side could enter the territory of the other in order to defeat the Rifis⁵.

This final agreement was signed on 25 July, but it did not prevent either side from trying to negotiate on its own account with the Rifis. Their efforts were supposedly secret, but on 4 August news of them reached the ears of Walter Harris, the Times correspondent in Tangier. He telegraphed his editor privately: "Situation delightful stop both France and Spain trying to make separate peace -- Harris"⁶. In mid-August, Echevarrieta again visited Ajdir, and French negotiators arrived at about the same time⁷. Details of the talks are unclear, but they certainly achieved nothing.

Indeed, the talks were counterproductive for the allies, for they gave new heart to the Rifis. As a French political officer later complained, they only convinced bin ^CAbd al-Karim that he was still the "master of the situation and in these circumstances it was for him to impose his conditions and not for his adversaries"⁸. The confidence was certainly misplaced but the Rifis were still in a very strong position, with their forces entrenched in prepared positions along the southern front and the coast. On 1 June there were at least 3,000 men on the southern front, mainly drawn from the central Rif and the Jibala⁹.

Despite this, there were great dangers. The attack on the French zone had involved most of the Rifi forces. That left the eastern and Jibalan fronts dangerously unmanned, and bin ^CAbd al-Karim did his best to mobilise more men for those areas. It is difficult to calculate exact numbers, because Spanish intelligence relied on isolated reports, but at the very minimum the Rifis managed to put an extra 3,000 men in the field between 9 June and 12 July¹⁰. That was nowhere near the full number, but it is some indication of the scale of the mobilisation.

It was not achieved easily. Troops were so short that even prisoners were released, given guns and told to fight. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim threatened that all deserters would be shot, and one was indeed executed on the French front. If a shot was heard people were told, everyone had to rush to the spot. If they did not, they would be fined¹¹.

The war and the mobilisation were beginning to dislocate the economy of the Rif. By the end of July, French Intelligence reported, the Banu Zarwal had lost 1,000 men in action. Those who survived were forced into the haraka-s, on pain of being

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fined, or having their goods confiscated. This was the time of year when, in normal times, the harvest was gathered. In 1925, there were simply no men to do it, and wheat was harvested as it was needed, on a day-to-day basis¹². In the Rif prices rose. Barley went up from six pesetas a mudd in June 1925 to ten in September. Other essentials were worse, with wild fluctuations - tea, the staple of so much of Moroccan life, went up from twelve pesetas a kilo in June to 50 pesetas in August before falling¹³. Soap went up 140 per cent between October 1924 and August 1925, candles by 100 per cent and so on¹⁴.

The hardship, not unnaturally, produced stirrings of revolt, even in the Banu Waryaghal. There was trouble in the Banu Bu^c Ayyash clan at the end of June, and bin^c Abd al-Karim sacked three Bu^c Ayyashi qaid-s, including ^cAbd al-Salam bin al-Hajj Muhand, the former Minister of War, and Muh Azarqan, who he had first appointed in 1922 because he was so powerful in his clan. Azarqan would cause more trouble in the closing stages of the war. In the Timsaman, that old bet-hedger and side-changer, Qaid Muhammad Bu Qaddur, offered to change allegiance when the Spanish re-took Anwal, and notables in the Banu Walishak agreed to rebel if the Spanish promised to confirm them in their posts when they re-occupied the tribe¹⁵.

This was the normal stuff of Rifi politics, and the murmurings were silenced in the usual way, by further attacks on the tribal structure and tighter controls. There were arrests in the Timsaman, and bin^c Abd al-Karim centred yet more power in his own hands: he took all responsibility for "justice" away from the qaid-s, and made it his own responsibility. To make things even more secure, he brought in troops from the Jibala, under Akhriru, to man positions in the eastern front. They were outsiders, and less likely to make common cause with local dissidents. In August the Banu Tuzin was disarmed and strict steps were taken to stop the circulation of demoralising rumours. When one spread that Akhriru was dead - which he was most certainly not - it was announced in the markets that anyone who repeated it would have his tongue cut out¹⁶.

Meanwhile the mobilisation continued, since the southern frontier had still to be protected, while building up along the coast. By the beginning of September, there were big concentrations in the Ajdir region (3,000 men) and at Wadi Law in the west (1,100 troops)¹⁷. It was a response to a heightened sense of danger, for bin^c Abd al-Karim was well aware that the expected Franco-Spanish attack was about to begin.

Primo's own plans for a Spanish invasion of the central Rif, by way of Alhucemas Bay had originally been made in early May. The agreement with the French in Madrid had put the operation back from late June to late August or early September so that both countries could take part. So it was on 1 September that the operational commanders were given their final instructions for the landing. On 8 September, after simulated attacks at Wadi Law in the west and Sidi Idris in the Timsaman

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to the east, Spanish troops landed near Alhucemas Bay. On 10 September, French forces attacked Rifi positions in the south¹⁸. The invasion of the Rif had begun.

It was huge operation for the Spanish. 16,300 men, including support troops, were taken to the Rifi coast in 63 civilian ships, thirty-three from the Spanish navy and eight from the French navy. Air-cover came from 88 land-based aeroplanes and 12 sea-planes¹⁹.


Facing them, on the Rifi side were around 5,000 men. With a long coastline to defend, they were thinly spread, and the Spanish were able to disembark easily enough at a little beach in the Buqquya called Tahjarut by the Rifis and Cebadilla by the Spanish, just round the headland of Ras al-^CAbid from Alhucemas Bay. By nightfall, led by Colonel Francisco Franco, they had occupied a beachhead which stretched from Tahjarut to Ras al-^CAbid. By the evening of 10 September 9,000 men had been disembarked²⁰.

Once they had landed, things became much more difficult. The terrain around Ras al-^CAbid is very rugged, with many valleys and caves in the sides of the hills, in which Rifi troops could be concealed. They fought back very fiercely indeed, and it was not until 22 September that General Goded, the Commander-in-Chief, succeeded in battling his way onto the beach at Cala Quemada, inside the Bay itself, and it was only on 2 October that Spanish troops reached Ajdir itself, and burned it. Then, having taken only a narrow strip of land down the western side of the Bay, the Spanish advance stopped. Primo was worried that his troops would over-extend themselves before they had a secure base, and decided to consolidate his position²¹.

The French were only slightly less cautious. Certainly they reoccupied the Banu Zarwal easily enough. It took them less than two days, and then they moved northwestwards, up from Kiffan towards the Wadi Kart. On 6 October, at Syah, in the al-Matalsa, they met Spanish troops moving southwards into Suq al-Thalatha in the Timsaman. That sealed the Rif to the south and east, and on 13 October, the French suspended their operations so they could prepare before bad weather and snow set in²².


The Rif was now completely surrounded by French and Spanish forces. The lines were unbroken from Afraw, on the coast to the east, south-west through the al-Matalsa and Gaznayya, west through the Wargha valley, and then north-west into the Jibala to Tetuan. In addition the Spanish held a small beachhead on Alhucemas Bay. Nevertheless it was a long front, and the area it enclosed made up the majority of the Spanish zone. The Rifis were still undefeated, their troops and organisation largely intact, with bin ^CAbd al-Karim and his government still in control, while the Spanish and French forces were immobilised, dug in for the winter.

Within the Rif, the administration continued to work.



..... Front end of October 1925

10. The landing at Alhucemas, September 1925



11. The frontline on October 25, 1925

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There were certainly difficulties, the danger of disaffection amongst them. This bin ^CAbd al-Karim did his best to limit by clamping down on security even further. Immediately after the landings he prohibited the use of the telephone system, and banned any talk of the fighting in public²³. That may have prevented morale from sinking too low, at least for the moment, but far more effective in the long run would be proof of the Rifis' ability to carry on fighting. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim, after the landings, began a yet more complete mobilisation. Women and children were sent inland, every man over 15 years was ordered to join the *haraka*, and all camels and donkeys were requisitioned. The remaining prisoners were released, and told to fight, including such eminent troublemakers as al-Hajj Bil-Qish of the Gaznayya, who was sent home on the understanding that he would organise a *haraka*²⁴.

The other basis of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's success had always been the ability to keep order and to maintain administrative control. That continued as well. There was a brief outbreak of bloodfeuding in the Banu Tuzin and Banu Waryaghal in October and November in which 14 people were killed. It was the first serious feuding since bin ^CAbd al-Karim had taken control in 1921, but it died down again or, more likely, was heavily repressed²⁵. Apart from this, order was maintained. In March 1926 a man who admitted to the murder of another man in order to marry his wife was sentenced to death, after a thorough investigation of his crime²⁶. As late as April 1926, less than a month before the final collapse of the Rifi resistance, the Swedish newspaper reporter, Alexander Langlet, was enthusing about his ability to sleep unmolested on the roads in the Rif²⁷. The bureaucracy continued to function as well. Front-line commanders, for instance, continued to send in regular reports to Ajdir. A typical one came from Tawarda, on the eastern front, at the beginning of January; it described Spanish troop movements in the al-Matalsa, the effects of Spanish bombing raids, an argument over possession of a rifle, Rifi shelling of Spanish positions and so on. Strict records were still being kept of the distribution of weapons; there is one from the Sinhaja dated at the beginning of February²⁸. Work continued on the road system - a new one was started at the beginning of February between Anwal and Suq al-Sabat of Banu Walishak²⁹.

To be sure, there were problems. The Spanish invasion encouraged those who were opposed to bin ^CAbd al-Karim to try to rebel. By and large, they were not very successful. There was trouble in the Tafarsit in early October and, predictably, in the Gaznayya where al-Hajj Bil-Qish's promises to restore order came to nothing. Indeed Bil-Qish himself helped to encourage Gaznayyis to defect to the French and to start a small rebellion in the tribe in the first week of October³⁰. The rebellion did not last because Bil-Qish himself was killed, possibly by poisoning on the orders of bin ^CAbd al-Karim, as

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David Hart suggests³¹, or possibly by a bomb, as a Spanish informant said³². In any event, his death in mid-October removed a permanent source of dissent from the scene.

There was more trouble at the beginning of December, this time along the southern frontier in the Marnisa. It marked the return to the area of Amar bin Hamidu, under French supervision. Some Marnjis attempted to defect to his group, and to stop them bin Abd al-Karim ordered the execution of 100 hostages he had taken from the tribe. More were shot at the beginning of January. While these drastic responses may have prevented the whole tribe from going over, they did not stop the slow trickle of individuals joining the French, particularly from the Sinhaja, and the Matiwa al-Jabal and Jaya tribes in December and January. There was a serious problem in the northern Jibala towards the end of January where people from the Banu Massawar were attacking the vital night-time supply columns from Tangier. It did not last long, however - Akhriru put it down very firmly. In the western part of the Jibala, Bu Lahya dealt with a brief rebellion in the Banu Zikkar and Banu Gurfit and disarmed them afterwards³³.

But these were peripheral problems. By and large bin Abd al-Karim coped well with the disheartening effects of the Spanish and French advances on the morale of his followers. Propaganda was not easy, but he managed a very clever campaign indeed, which was broadly based and aimed at a variety of targets at the same time. It relied in part on promises of European help, highlighting alleged French and Spanish weaknesses at the same time, in part on the call to ihad, in part on fear of Spanish reprisals if they did succeed in conquering the Rif.

Bin Abd al-Karim's immediate response to the landings was to tell people not to worry, to reassure them. He said that he had promises of help from a European nation - which he did not name - that would come to the aid of the Rifis³⁴. This was a recurrent theme throughout the Rif War, and very soon bin Abd al-Karim was making full use of it. In October he named the European power: Germany, which, he said, had reformed its wartime alliance with Turkey. He then paraded four men, whom he said were Germans who had come as an advance party. Very soon rumours spread that German troops would soon disembark at Sidi Idris to help the Rifis. They were quickly followed by other stories that Germany and Turkey had both declared war on the French. Whether or not bin Abd al-Karim was himself responsible for these latter rumours, they certainly created a more hopeful atmosphere in the Rif. Bin Abd al-Karim then moved on to more subtle claims. In November, it was announced in the markets that the French advance had stopped because France owed so much money to the British that they had been refused any further credit. As if this was not enough, the announcement went on to claim that the British had threatened that, unless they were paid, they would take the Algerian city of Oran in compen-

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sation³⁵. In December another letter was read out in the markets of the Jibala, which referred to, "... the financial difficulties in which France finds herself because of the need to repay America, the hostility of the (French) people to the campaigns in Morocco and against the Druzes (in Syria), and the probable refusal of credits to continue the war"³⁶.

The opposition in the French Parliament was real enough. In October the Prime Minister, Painlevé, came under attack from the Left over the heavy loss of life and high cost of the Moroccan War - up till 15 October 2,178 French soldiers had been killed and 8,297 wounded; costs were around 1,350,000,000 francs. Outside Parliament, Communist militants organised a fierce campaign against the war³⁷. All this was grist to bin ^CAbd al-Karim's mill. Walter Harris reported in the Times that stories appearing in the French Press in Morocco that the British government supported the idea of an independent Rifi state were most unhelpful to the French government: "they merely encourage futile hope among the Rifis, and Abd-el-Krim himself uses the French newspaper articles as propaganda among his tribesmen"³⁸.

Another way to rallying call was jihad. This was of particular use in calling for solidarity from Moroccans outside the Rif itself, either those fighting in the Spanish Army, or those further away who might rise up and make trouble for the European allies.

In February 1926, bin ^CAbd al-Karim sent a letter to a certain Qaid al-Mallali, probably one of the important al-Mallali family of Alcazarquivir whose members were prominent supporters of the Spanish. He berated him for his betrayal of Islam which, bin ^CAbd al-Karim said, was even worse when the Spanish were so weak that there was no need for Muslims to submit to them. He alleged that the Spanish were using their Muslim troops as cannon-fodder, and dismissed the recent Spanish victories as being minimal: "they say that they have occupied Ajdir, whereas in fact they have occupied only a few stones on its outskirts". Spanish forces were now overstretched. The letter ended, "Do you want us to live without rights or to die in agony? God give you good judgement. And Peace"³⁹.

The same approach, the call to jihad, was used in letters sent by Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim to leaders of the resistance to the French and Spanish in the far south of Morocco, in the Anti-Atlas, and the region around the Spanish enclave of Ifni. The leader there was Marrabi Rabuh, a son of Ma' al-^CAinayn who had led a brief revolt in the region in 1911 and 1912, and had briefly been declared Sultan in Marrakesh in the confusing days after the French Protectorate was announced. He and nine other leaders received letters from the Rif which were sent in November 1925. The one to Madani bin al-Talib Ahmad al-Akhasi, one of Marrabi's most powerful supporters is typical:

Try as hard as possible to fight the unbelievers, so that

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the word of God may triumph and so as to help your friends, although we are far apart . . . The moment has come when warriors for the faith must show themselves, and throw light on their deeds . . . Know that our purpose is to throw out the unbelievers and purify the Muslim lands of their presence, so as to set up a free Islamic government in Morocco. Then it will be possible to revive the precepts of our religion in a perfect way . . .⁴⁰.


It would have been helpful if other groups had been able to take the pressure off the Rifis, since the war was now in the heart of the Rif itself, where jihad had been the rallying cry throughout the war. In the markets of the Banu 'Ammart, this formula was used to call people to the haraka; "There is no God but God. There is no God but God. There is no God but God. May God damn Satan. May God damn Satan. May God damn Satan. Oh faithful! Oh sons of perfection. (Go) to fight tomorrow, God willing, in (such-and-such a place) against the Christians"⁴¹.

Bin 'Abd al-Karim himself later described how, after the Spanish landing at Alhucemas, he had used a story - which he said was true - that the Spanish had turned a mosque in Ajdir into a stable and this "doubled the bravery of the fighters, and increased their devotion to myself and my cause"⁴². The implication was that the Spanish would destroy Islam.


They would also, bin 'Abd al-Karim alleged, destroy Muslims individually, and he began a black propaganda campaign against them. In September, just after the Spanish landings, he caused it to be announced in the markets that those who had received Spanish money and were helping them were deceived. Spain, he said, would never forgive the Rifis for the defeats of 1921, and if they ever occupied the Rif they would kill them and their families. A good Muslim, he said, should die defending his land, and not live "like a dog". For his own part, he would rather kill himself than fall into Christian hands⁴³.

Bin 'Abd al-Karim had little trouble in convincing people that what he said was true. The behaviour of the Spanish troops themselves was enough. Repeated stories of atrocities were reported by Walter Harris in private communications to his paper. He accused them of killing prisoners⁴⁴, and of decapitating them: Harris even obtained a photograph of members of the Foreign Legion holding up the severed heads of Moroccans killed in action around the post of Kudya al-Tahar on the Tetuan front, a photograph which Primo de Rivera - who was angry about the atrocities and tried to stop them - admitted was quite genuine⁴⁵. It was not, of course official Spanish policy to behave in this way, but it certainly encouraged the Rifis to resist.


The Amir's own behaviour could only instill confidence in his followers. When Vincent Sheean, the American journalist who had visited the Rif in 1924, returned in September 1925 he was impressed by bin 'Abd al-Karim's self-confidence.




12. Prices in the Rifi zone, January-March 1926



13. Prices in the Spanish zone, January-March 1926



14. Prices in Rifi and Spanish zones, April-May 1926



15. The final assault, May 1926

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Standing at the mouth of a cave, while firing a rifle at low-flying Spanish bombers, he expounded his demand for the absolute independence of the Rif, totally unconcerned by the danger. On 23 September Sheean wrote in his diary:

His courage is magnificent. His ideas have not changed, have even been reinforced by the present danger. From what I saw of him today I know that I had no idea of him before. He has a grandeur, added to by the circumstances of horror and great danger. But in spite of this he is humorous, funny: makes me laugh . . .⁴⁶.

The Rifi leader had lost none of his old charisma.

However, neither charisma, propaganda, threats nor administrative efficiency could solve the most important problem which faced the Rif in the winter and early spring of 1926. Quite simply, the Rif was running out of food. The blockade of the coast and the eastern front by the Spanish, and of the south by the French, was bad enough. It was all made worse by the bombing, since Spanish and French air-raids prevented people from tending the fields. Most families spent as much time as possible in shelters below ground and emerged only by night. By January much of the land was uncultivated and there was widespread hunger⁴⁷. The future looked even more bleak, for between January and March 1926, when the growing crops needed water, the rainfall was much lower than usual.

Of course, the Spanish-occupied areas also suffered from the low rainfall and there, as in the Rifi zone, prices rose. In fact they were very much the same in both areas in January and the first part of February 1926. However, in mid-February prices in the Rif soared as the blockade really began to bite. By April and May prices were fifty per cent higher than in the Spanish zone. There was at least some barley, though; it did not entirely disappear as salt did. Salt used to come into the Rif from the south until the French blockade stopped it. In January bin ^CAbd al-Karim tried to encourage the smuggling of salt, in order to buy it up and then distribute it. As the spring drew on, however, things got worse and worse and finally, towards the end of April, salt disappeared altogether⁴⁸.

In these difficult circumstances, despite the fact that both Spanish and French had halted their advances since the middle of November, and the high level of discipline and support which bin ^CAbd al-Karim still maintained, it was hardly surprising that he should again try to seek peace. The first attempt was not so much made as thrust upon him by the unlikely figure of Captain Robert Gordon Canning. Canning was one of the principal members of the Riff Committee in London, a strange group of Rifi supporters which included a member of the Communist Party, Arthur Field, a long-time supporter of various Arab causes, Canning, and the very bizarre Captain Gardiner who, in 1923, signed a contract with the Rifi government which would have allowed him extensive commercial concessions - including the right to set up a bank, railways, schools and even opera

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houses. Gardiner also set himself up in London as "Minister-Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Rif" and wrote letters to a number of governments inviting them to set up diplomatic posts in Ajdir. Governments such as those of Mexico and Rumania were understandably puzzled by these approaches⁴⁹. Canning, however, was more practical. He began by contacting the French Prime Minister Painlevé, his Foreign Minister Briand, and the new civilian Resident-General in Rabat, Theodore Steeg, a former Professor of Philosophy and Radical-Socialist deputy. Encouraged by their assurances that they would allow the Rif internal self-government, he set out to try to convince bin ^CAbd al-Karim of the need to negotiate⁵⁰.

When he reached Targist in January 1926, he, bin ^CAbd al-Karim, Si Mahammad and Azarqan worked out the Rifi terms: they wanted internal autonomy, under the nominal authority of the Sultan, but with real authority wielded by bin ^CAbd al-Karim who would be styled "Amir", and have his capital at Tetuan. In return, Spain would be allowed to keep Ceuta, Melilla and Larache, although some Wargha and Jibala tribes in the French zone would come in with the Rif, and the Rifis would allow an open door to European trade⁵¹.

These terms were not, of course, acceptable to the French or the Spanish and when Canning reached Tangier with them at the end of January, he was obliged to leave the international city after French and Spanish officials complained about him to the British Consul-General⁵². In any case, the Spanish and the French were preparing their final assault on the Rif. On 4 February 1926, General Pétain, the French Commander in Morocco, arrived in Madrid to plan the spring campaign. Both sides agreed that operations would begin on 15 April, and would involve 50,000 men⁵³. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was well aware of the danger and was becoming more and more convinced of the need to negotiate a peace settlement. However, not everyone shared his conviction. Among the Rifi leadership his brother, Si Mahammad, Ahmad and Muhammad Bu Dra^C and the Faqih Bu Lahya demanded that the war should be continued to the very end. These were the military commanders and the most vehement opponents of the Spanish. The political and administrative leaders, Si ^CAbd al-Salam al-Khattabi, the Finance Minister, Azarqan, the Foreign Minister, and Muhammad Bu Midar, the Paymaster, as well as bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself, were in favour of negotiating a peace⁵⁴.

That was easier to propose than to put into effect. The terms which the French and Spanish were prepared to offer had got much stiffer since the previous June. Having made contact with bin ^CAbd al-Karim through Gabrielli, the political officer at Tawrirt, in mid-March, the French told him that the new terms were submission to the Sultan, his own exile, the disarmament of all the tribes, and the return of all the prisoners⁵⁵.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim was in no position to turn down any

possibility of negotiation. The number of his troops on the fronts was falling drastically now. On the eastern front, some front-line positions - Jabal Yuddia and Suq al-Jama^ca in the Banu Walishak - had no more than 30 men holding them by mid-March, and there were less than 800 on the whole front⁵⁶. Despite desperate attempts to reorganise, by sacking several gaid-s and by recruiting yet more men, nowhere near enough could be found. The pool of manpower had been almost sucked dry, and those who remained were increasingly unwilling to fight. Indeed, the very attempt at reorganisation lowered morale even further. When bin ^cAbd al-Karim called a meeting at Akhshab Amghar in the Timsaman, for all the gaid-s on the eastern front to attend so that he could explain new tactics, it was widely interpreted as part of a plan to imprison them all⁵⁷. There was even dissent in the Banu Waryaghal itself, which was being stirred up by Muh Azarqan, the gaid of the Banu Bu ^cAyyash whom bin ^cAbd al-Karim had sacked in June the previous year, and ^cAmar bin Sadiq of the Banu Hadhifa clan, a man of equally dubious loyalty who had been given a position as gaid over his clan in 1922 simply because he was too powerful to be left out. Muh Azarqan was arrested on 20 March only to be released almost immediately on the request of the other gaid-s of the Banu Waryaghal. If bin ^cAbd al-Karim was unable even to arrest one of his principal opponents without being forced to back down by the gaid-s of his own tribe, then his power was waning fast. Indeed he seems to have been in fear of his life. He kept his whereabouts secret and avoided sleeping in the same house on successive nights⁵⁸. It was in these circumstances that bin ^cAbd al-Karim told the French that he would negotiate on their terms.

On 9 April the French announced that a peace conference would begin on 15 April in Oujda, a town on the Moroccan-Algerian frontier. In fact it started late, partly because the Rifis rejected yet more French preconditions including the release of the prisoners⁵⁹, and partly because the Spanish were not very willing to take part. It was not until 26 April that the Spanish succumbed to French pressure and backed down⁶⁰. The conference began on the following day.

The opening of the peace conference helped bin ^cAbd al-Karim politically, since he encouraged the idea that he was making a separate truce with the French. The Rifis would then only have to fight the Spanish⁶¹. With this apparently more optimistic prospect in view, he was able to reinforce the front lines on the eastern front: between 15 and 17 April over 900 men, mainly from the Banu Waryaghal arrived there. By 20 April the front was fairly well garrisoned again: 600 near Afraw, 200 at Suq al-Sabat and 200 in Jabal Yuddia in the Banu Walishak, 100 at Sidi Misa^cud in the Banu Sa'id, and another 1,200 in various other positions⁶².

As further encouragement, bin ^cAbd al-Karim sent a letter to the tribes on the eve of the conference, stating what he

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said were the terms put forward by the French and the Spanish: that the tribes should be disarmed, that five European military posts should be set up in each tribe, and that he should become a delegate of the Sultan. He also detailed his reply: disarmament he refused, the military posts he accepted provided they were manned by local people. The third point he evaded completely by telling the tribes that he would protect them with the help of Great Britain and the United States⁶³.

Such an attitude did not leave much room for manoeuvre to the Rifi negotiators, Azarqan, Si Ahmad Shiddi, a minor figure in the Makhzan, and Haddu bin Hammu, the man who had collected the arms in the aftermath of the Anwal victories⁶⁴. They do seem to have been prepared to compromise a little, even over disarmament, but the negotiations soon ran into trouble. One problem was the question of who should carry out the disarmament, another was the nature of local autonomy - after a peace treaty were the qaid-s of the tribes to be confirmed by the Sultan alone, as the Rifis wanted, or by his khalifa in Tetuan, in other words by the Spanish? But these were peripheral matters, and when the conference broke down it was over the question of the prisoners. On 1 May the allies again demanded that they should be released and refused to go on talking until they were. Azarqan and Haddu were sent back to the Rif to inform bin ^CAbd al-Karim of this demand and was given a week to bring back his reply. However, well before then it was known that bin ^CAbd al-Karim refused to hand over the prisoners⁶⁵.

The conference at Oujda had collapsed because bin ^CAbd al-Karim refused to negotiate the release of the prisoners, which for both the Spanish and French was the crucial issue. Indeed, it may have been the only reason why the Spanish were negotiating at all, since militarily the Rif was as good as defeated. Yet bin ^CAbd al-Karim had made no mention of this, the most important issue of all, in his letter to the tribes. Why then did he both refuse to negotiate their release and keep silent about the Franco-Spanish demand?

Walter Harris had the most cynical explanation, that "most of the prisoners were dead and Abdel Krim dared not disclose the fact."⁶⁶ But not all of them were dead - at least 283 French and Spanish prisoners were released at the end of the war on 26 May, some of them in an appalling condition⁶⁷. In any event, Harris is equally careful to point out that Spanish treatment of Rifi prisoners was also barbarous on occasions⁶⁸. Moreover, brutality still does not explain why bin ^CAbd al-Karim kept the demand secret in the Rif.

What was really at stake was the power which the control of the prisoners gave. This power had two faces. To have released the prisoners before the war ended would not only have deprived bin ^CAbd al-Karim of his strongest protection against an all-out Spanish attack, but it would also have weakened his power within the Rif. In the period after Anwal it was the

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fact that he, bin ^CAbd al-Karim, alone held the prisoners which gave him so much authority in the Rif. To even have hinted that he was willing to give them up now would have been a serious political mistake.

It made little difference in the end. With the collapse of the Oujda conference, the truth was finally known in the Rif. The war could not be won. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's authority was waning fast, and his efforts at preparing a final resistance were almost panicked. As the conference was ending he embarked on a last round of repression in an attempt to hold people behind him. On 26 April Muh Azarqan was rearrested, and this time he stayed in prison. Several other Waryaghli qadi-s were arrested, along with 25 Tuzanis. A qaid of 25 men from Tafarsit was shot for having relations with the Spanish⁶⁹.

Attempts to reinforce the front lines against the Spanish and French were now fairly fruitless. Quite extraordinary figures of the numbers of men at bin ^CAbd al-Karim's disposal in the final days of the war have been made: 16,500⁷⁰, 20,000⁷¹, and so on. These are clearly exaggerations. There were some large groups - 1,000 Ghumaris at Tamasind, 360 men in the Banu Walishak, 150 near Midar - but most of the positions were only very lightly manned. When the guard at Sidi Muhand Jilali in the Timsaman was strengthened, for instance, the nine reinforcements brought its complement up to 29⁷². It seems likely that Woolman's estimate of 12,000 men over the whole of the Rifi controlled zone is nearer the truth⁷³. They were not well armed either. Of the men in the Banu Walishak at least 200 were armed with old Mauser and Remington rifles, badly maintained and in bad condition⁷⁴.

In the west, Rifi control over the Jibala had been weakening for some time now. On 7 April, the Spanish were told that most Rifis had left the Tetuan area, and by mid-April they had mainly left the Sinhaja as well. As a result, bin ^CAbd al-Karim told the local people of the Sinhaja that they would have to prepare their own defence⁷⁵. The political system for which bin ^CAbd al-Karim had struggled, where the tribes were subsumed by a central authority, was breaking down. Each tribe had to look after itself.

There was not much chance of individual tribes, or the rump of the Rifi forces, successfully fighting off the French and Spanish. Against them the allies had ranged two massive armies: 28,000 men in the Ajdir sector, 12,000 in the Banu Tuzin and Matalsa and 3,000 in the Banu Sa^Cid on the eastern front, and to the south, 40,000 men in the Gaznayya, and another 40,000 in the Sinhaja and Banu Zarwal, - a total of 123,000 men helped by 150 aeroplanes⁷⁶.

The final attack was planned so that each army carried out a three-pronged advance. The Spanish would move from Ajdir up the Ghis and Nakur valleys into the mountains, from ^CAzib Midar through the Banu Tuzin towards Suq al-Thalatha, and from the Banu Tuzin into the Timsaman. The French would

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advance from Bab Sultan in the Gaznayya towards Timarzga, from al-Nazur in the Gaznayya into the Banu ^CAmart, and from the Marnisa to Targist. The intention was to destroy the Rifi centre, so that the Jibala and Sinhaja regions would then crumble ⁷⁷.

The attack began on 8 May. As expected, the eastern front collapsed easily enough, although Idris bin Mimun Khuja made a spirited stand at Suq al-Thalatha of Azilaf on 9 May. There was not much he could do against Spanish tanks, however, and he was forced back. In the south the French were able to move up fairly quickly to meet the Spanish at Azilaf. On the Ajdir front, however, things did not work out quite so smoothly. The will to resist may have been crumbling in the other tribes, but the Banu Waryaghal were still prepared to fight. Although the Spanish pushed up to Azghar on the first day, they only did it at the cost of 629 lives. The Rifis lost 80 men ⁷⁸.

The Rifis' leader, on the other hand, seemed to have realised from the first moments of the final attack that the war was all but finished. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own morale was destroyed. On 8 May he moved to his final base, at the zawiya of Si ^CAbdallah bin Yusif near Kammun in the extreme south west of the Waryaghal-land, and announced once again that it was the responsibility of each tribe to defend its own territory ⁷⁹. It was in the zawiya that Idris bin Mimun Khujja and a number of other commanders visited bin ^CAbd al-Karim. On the morning following their arrival, Idris recounted later, he saw them eating breakfast and drinking tea, and asked:

"How can you be so calm, eating and drinking, with all that is happening to us"? We replied that we were men and had to eat and drink, but that we would also die if necessary. Then he said to us 'For God's sake, I have no desire to eat. I want to know what to do'". ⁸⁰

Meanwhile the Spanish and French were moving into the central Rif. It was not always an easy advance. They were still resisted by what were now almost independent local leaders, people like Idris bin Mimun Khujja. In the Jibala, Akhriru and Ahmad Bu Dra ^C attempted a diversionary operation. On 10 May, 1,000 Jiblis and Ghumaris attacked Spanish positions near the Wadi Martil, outside Tetuan. That did cause the Spanish some problems, and it was not until 19 May that the positions were relieved. In the small part of Banu Sa ^Cid which was still unoccupied, ^CAmar Bu ^CAzza carried on the resistance, arresting those who were in contact with the Spanish ⁸¹, until he was forced to surrender on 15 May. At this point, all the Waryaghilis on the eastern front left for their own tribe to protect their homes ⁸². Skiraj says that this was on the authority of bin ^CAbd al-Karim himself ⁸³, but by this time he had little authority left. The Waryaghilis simply left.

Their homes were indeed in danger. By 15 May Spanish troops had advanced up the valleys as far as Tamasind. Anwal

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was reoccupied on 18 May and two days later the two groups met on the Ajdir front. Meanwhile, to the south, the French moved up from the Banu Zarwal through the Jaya, Matiwa al-Jabal and Banu Waryaghal on 17 May. Two days later, with little serious opposition they moved into the Banu ^CAmart, and by 23 May, they had cut the Banu Waryaghal in half⁸⁴.

For a moment, bin ^CAbd al-Karim seems to have toyed with the idea of going to the Jibala to continue the resistance⁸⁵, but when he asked for troops from the Ghazawa, Rahuna, Banu Sikkar, Banu Issaf, Sumata and Jabal Habib tribes, they refused⁸⁶. In any event by 23 May he could not get through since the French and Spanish blocked the way⁸⁷. He could only surrender.

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim surrendered to the French, almost certainly because he was frightened that the Spanish would execute him⁸⁸. On 21 May, bin ^CAbd al-Karim had written two letters, one to the Spanish High Commissioner, Sanjurjo, the other to the French Resident-General, Steeg. They were carried by Pierre Parent, a French doctor, who was visiting the prisoners. On 23 May Parent handed over his letters, which suggested a cease-fire⁸⁹. There was simply no time for a cease-fire. On the same day irregular troops under ^CAmar bin Hamidu occupied Targist⁹⁰. On 24 May the Banu Yittuft, Banu Gamil and Banu ^{Bu}Frah offered to submit to the French. That provided bin ^CAbd al-Karim with his escape route to the French. The intermediary would be Sidi Hamidu, whose zawiya was at Snada in the Banu Yittuft. On the afternoon of 24 May, bin ^CAbd al-Karim arrived in Snada. At the same time, in a last effort to revenge themselves on him, al-Raisuli's son and Sidi Hamidu's nephew arrived in Targist, and told the French colonel ^CCorap who was in command there that they could bring in bin ^CAbd al-Karim with a very few men. Corap turned down this plan on the grounds, he explained later, that it "appeared to him to serve the personal ambitions of the two people involved"⁹¹.

There was no need for subterfuge or treachery anyway. On the morning of 25 May Sidi Hamidu himself arrived in Targist to submit. When he returned home, he took with him a letter from Corap to bin ^CAbd al-Karim and was accompanied by three French officers, who after a long discussion, persuaded the Amir to surrender. At 11 at night on 25 May bin ^CAbd al-Karim finally ordered the remaining prisoners to be released and himself surrendered. On 27 May he arrived in Targist, was courteously received by Corap, and escorted out of the Rif⁹². He was later to be sent into exile on the French colony of Réunion, where he stayed until 1947. In that year, he escaped from a ship that was taking him back to France, while it was travelling through the Suez Canal. In Cairo, where he lived until he died in 1963, bin ^CAbd al-Karim became the titular leader of the North African Defence League, the umbrella organisation of North-West African nationalists⁹³. His brother, Si Mahammad,

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accompanied him and became Vice-President of the league. He returned to Morocco shortly before he died in Rabat in 1967. Other members of the wartime cabinet were allowed to stay in Morocco, and two of them, Muhammad Bu Dra and Muhammad Azarqan, formed a political party, the Hizb al-Ahrar, in the 1930s⁹⁴.

All this was far in the future, however. In the meantime, the war went on. Even before bin ^CAbd al-Karim's surrender, it was clear that some of the more enthusiastic military leaders, such as Akhriro and Idris bin Mimun Khujja, were going to carry on alone. That continued after 27 May.

On 28 May, Spanish troops occupied bin ^CAbd al-Karim's last base, the zawiya of Si ^CAbdallah bin Yussif, without difficulty. There, in a house next to the mosque, they found his personal property. Quite apart from his personal effects, they also discovered a vast number of papers and books which they took into their custody, and the Rifi flag⁹⁵. However, on the following day they lost more than 600 men at Suq al-Ahad in Tisar in the very middle of the Banu Waryaghal⁹⁶.

Suq al-Ahad may have been the "last stand" of the Banu Waryaghal, as David Hart says⁹⁷, but the fighting went on elsewhere. In the Jibala, French intelligence reported on 31 May, "As a general rule people refuse to believe that he has surrendered. His former lieutenants . . . continue to speak in his name and are still talking of the rapid arrival of reinforcements"⁹⁸.

The authority of most of these lieutenants did not last long. On 2 June al-Baqqali wuld al-Qurfa, one of the Rifis most trusted allies in the west, seized control of Shawin, but he was largely ignored⁹⁹. Revenge on the Rifis and their supporters was on the minds of many of the Jibilis. A previously insignificant qa'id named Wuld al-Far led one group. He arrested the Rifi qa'id in Tazrut and on 9 June took control of Shawin and executed Wuld al-Qurfa. Former Rifi officials in the Akhmas and the Ghumara were killed. In the Ghazawa pro-Rifi qa'ids had their houses burned¹⁰⁰.

However, some important Rifi leaders did survive to carry on fighting. Akhriro joined up with Mawlay al-Baqar, and the latter succeeded in retaking Shawin, where he set himself up as Sultan, signing himself "bin al-^CAbbas bin ^CAbdallah al-^CAlami"¹⁰¹. His real name was Mawlay Ahmad bin Muhammad bin al-^CArabi al Baqar, but his new title, emphasised his alleged connection with Jabal ^CAlam, and thereby he claimed descent from Mawlay ^CAbd al-Salam bin Mashshish, the "pole of Islam", who was buried on the mountain. He had reverted to the idea of leadership by important religious families which bin ^CAbd al-Karim had rejected.

The title did not guarantee him success, and his reign was short. His calls for a haraka were largely ignored, and his attempt to invade the Banu Zarwal at the end of June was a failure. On 10 August, Spanish forces moved up the Wadi Law to take Shawin, a very rapid operation later known as the "Capaz

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Raid" after its commander¹⁰².

Akhriru was finally killed in a skirmish in the Banu Idhir on 3 November, but parts of the Sinhaja held out through the winter of 1926-7. On 12 June 1927, al-Baqar was killed by a bomb, Jabal al-^CAlam was occupied on 14 June and on 9 July 1927, with the occupation of the last unsubmitted parts of the Akhmas, the fighting finally stopped¹⁰³. In the year after bin ^CAbd al-Karim's surrender, the opposition to the Spanish had reverted to being a purely local affair, and had ultimately collapsed. But it had continued, in some areas, without him: proof, if any were needed, that bin ^CAbd al-Karim expressed a widespread desire to resist the Spanish, and that his power was based on more than just organisation, repression or mere propaganda.

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19. Goded, 149-151; Fleming, 264.
20. Woolman, 191; al-Bu ^CAyyashi, II, 425; Martinez de Campos, 306-309.
21. Martinez de Campos, 192; al-Bu ^CAyyashi, II, 436-437; Woolman, 192; Fleming, 307.
22. *The Times*, II, 17 September, 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14 October 1925; Woolman, 193; al-Fihri, 48; SHAT Maroc E24, *Propagande Riffaine*, Lyautey to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Rabat, 24 September 1925.
23. SHM Melilla 28, *Hojas de confidentes*, Matala, Salah bin Muhammad, 11 September 1925; *Oficina de Matala*, hoja diaria, 12 September 1925.
24. SHM Melilla 28, *Hojas de concidentes*, Matala, Faqih ^CAbdallah bin Hamid, 13 September 1925, Muhammad bin ^CAmar, 14 September 1925, Salah bin Muhammad, 11 September 1925; *Informacion y confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin*, Muhammad bin al-Hajj Hammu, 27 September 1925.
25. SHM Melilla 28, *Informacion y confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin*, Muhammad bin al-Hajj Hammu, 8 November 1925; SHM Melilla 27, *Informacion de Alhucemas*, T.O. Cor. Jefe Of. de Interv. to Gral. Jefe Sector de Ajdir, Alhucemas, 12 October 1925, Urgente.

26. MAEF Maroc 519, 45, Declaration in the case of Ahmad

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- bin ^CAli bin Ahmad bin ^CUmar, and on the reverse his condemnation to death for murder, signatures illegible, 25 Sha^Cban 1344 / 10 March 1926. For a description of the case see Chapter 8.
27. See above, Chapter 8.
 28. MAEF Maroc 520, 187, "News of Tawarda", beginning of January 1926; *ibid*, 77, List of arms distributed to the Zarqat and Tisul tribes, 24 Sha^Cban 1334 / 7 February 1926.
 29. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^CAllal, 2 February 1926.
 30. SHM Melilla 28, *Informacion y confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin*, ^CAmarush, 2 October 1925.
 31. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 399. Hart puts the date as early 1926, but this is clearly incorrect.
 32. SHM Melilla 28, *Informacion y confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin*, ^CAllal bin Muhammad bin ^CAisha, 19 October 1925.
 33. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^CAllal, 2 February 1926; MAEF Maroc 520, 187, "Akhbar Tawarda" ("News of Tawarda"), beginning of January 1926; 77, List of arms distributed, 24 Sha^Cban 1344.
 34. SHM Melilla 28, *Hojas de confidentes Matalsa*, Muqaddam bin ^CAmar, 16 September 1926.
 35. SHM Melilla 28, *Informacion y confidencias Tafersit y Beni Tuzin*, ^CAllal bin Muhammad bin ^CAisha, 19 October 1925; SHM Melilla 27, *Informacion de Alhucemas*, nota, 21 October 1925, Zaghdud, 8 November 1925.
 36. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupeement de Fez du 15 novembre 1925 au . . . 13 juillet 1926*, C.M.T Fez, 31 December 1926.
 37. Isoart, "La guerre du Rif et le Parlement francais" in *Colloque*, 173-217, reference here to 203-204 and Charvin, "Le Parti Communiste francais face a la guerre du Rif", in *ibid*, 218-261.
 38. *The Times*, 29 March 1926.
 39. B.N.E. Sec. de Afr., *Miscelenea Garcia Figueras*, vol. XLIII (no page numbers, Spanish translation of a letter

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from bin ^CAbd al-Karim to Qaid Si al-Mallali, dated - on the typescript - "Aydir, 13.2.25". Clearly this should be 1926.

40. SHAT Maroc E24, *Propagande Riffain*, Blanc (Delegate of the Resident-General in Morocco) to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Rabat, 24 December 1925, enclosing translation of letter from Si Mahammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim to Qaid Madani bin al-Talib al-Akhsassi, 5 Jumada I, 1344 / 21 November 1925. Nine other letters, of the same date, all from Si Mahammad were also enclosed. They were addressed to Marrabi Rabuh, his brother Muhammad bin Ma' al-^CAinayn, Faqih Sidi al-Hajj al-Abad, the main anti-French propagandist in the south, Qaid Mubarak al-bin ^CImrani, Muhammad bin al-Bashir, of the Sabula tribe in the Atit Ba ^CAmran confederacy, Sa'id bin Ahmad al-Kardussi of the Ida U Baqil tribe, and Qaid Nujim al-Akhsassi.
41. Quoted in Sanchez-Perez, 21, who includes it as a "curiosity", having heard it from the market-crier himself.
42. Anonymous article entitled, *Jahl zu^Cama al-muslimin wa-mafasid ahl al-turuq wal-shurafa wa kawnuhum sababan li-fashl za^Cim al-rif al-maghrabi* in *al-manar*, pt.8, vol. 27, 1244-1245 a.h., 630-634. Reference here to 632.
43. SHM Melilla 28, *Hojas de confidentes*, Matalsa, Salah bin Muhammad Hammush, 17 September 1925.
44. TAHP, *The Times Correspondence*, Harris to Williams, Tangier, 30 September 1925.
45. *ibid*, Harris to Williams, Tangier, 13 October 1925; telegram, Harris to *Times*, 26 October 1925, Confidential; telegram Harris to *Times*, 17 September 1925; Harris to Williams 15 November 1925, Confidential.
46. Sheean, *Personal History*, 152.
47. SHAT Maroc Riff 3, *Interrogatoires des indigenes evades*, Sgt. Muhammad bin Brahim Tirraillieur Musa bin Ahmad, Fez, January 1926.
48. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^CAllal, 30 January 1926; SHAT Maroc Riff 3, *Interrogatoires des indigenes evades du Rif*, Captain Clerget, Taza, 29 May 1926.
49. Al-Bu ^CAyyashi, II, 442; Sheean, *Personal History*, 411-

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- 412; MAEE, Antiguo Archivo 2543, carpeta, VE 438, *Marruecos Noticias sobre Guerra*, Gardiner to Government of Mexico, London 29 August 1923; and T.C. Amalfi (Sp. Minister, Bucarest) to Ducque de Alba, Bucarest, 22 September 1923; FO 371 / W9218 / 783 / 28, Clive to MacDonald, Tangier, 27 October 1924 and W9483 / 783 / 28, Clive to MacDonald, Tangier, 27 October 1924.
50. Fleming, 311-312.
 51. Al-Bu ^cAyyashi, II, 443-444.
 52. *The Times*, 30 January, 5 February.
 53. Fleming, 331-332.
 54. Gabrielli, 178; Skiraj, 147.
 55. Gabrielli, 180-185.
 56. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, ^cAmarush, 14 March 1926.
 57. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^cAllal, 2, 7 April 1926 and Qaddur Azugaj, 3 April 1926; *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, nota, 5 April 1926.
 58. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, Si ^cAbd al-Salam Muhammad and ^cAbd al-Wahid bin ^cAmar, 11 March 1926 and ^cAmarush, 20 March 1926 and Zaghdud, 19, 22 March 1926.
 59. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 278-287.
 60. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 291-2; Fleming, 340.
 61. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, Zaghdud, 25 April 1926.
 62. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, ^cAmmarush, 17 April 1926; *Oficina de Drius*, nota, 15 April 1926 and Muhand al-Darmusi 19 April 1926 and ^cAbdallah Tuzani, 20 April 1926.
 63. *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, Zaghdud, 26 April 1926.
 64. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 387. Shiddi was minister of "property"; Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 278-279.

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65. Fleming, 342-343; Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 301-304; Skiraj, 148-149.
66. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 296. Certainly accounts of Rifi mistreatment of their prisoners abound, Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 297-299.
67. Martinez de Campos, 329.
68. Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 299; see also Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 399.
69. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Drius*, Hammu bin Sa^Cid and Hammu ^CAllal Mizzyan, 30 April 1926; *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^CAllal, 22 April 1926; *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Salam, 28 April 1926 and Hammu Darri, 4 May 1926.
70. Fleming, 345.
71. Sanchez-Perez 21-22.
72. SHM Melilla, *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^CAllal, 1, 4 May 1926; *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, Haddu bin Sha^Cib bin ^CAmar, 3 May 1926, ^CAbd al-Salam bin Qaddur, 8 May 1926; *Oficina de Informacion de Drius*, Hammu bin Sa^Cid, 30 April 1926.
73. Woolman, 204.
74. *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin Haddu bin Qaddur, 9 May 1926.
75. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Drius*, Muhammad bin Hammush, 7 April 1926.
76. Sanchez-Perez, 14-19.
77. Sanchez-Perez, 12-13.
78. Sanchez-Perez, 36-52.
79. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, Mawlay ^CAbd al-Salam bin Rahayl and Hammu Darri, 8 May 1926; Skiraj, 151.
80. Sanchez-Perez, 108.
81. SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Tafersit*, ^CAbd al-Salam bin Sha^Cib, 12 May 1926.

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82. Sanchez-Perez, 93-94; SHM Melilla 30, *Oficina de Informacion de Dar Mizian*, Hamid bin al-Bashir ^cAllal, 15 May 1926.
83. Skiraj, 141-152.
84. Sanchez-Perez, 95-96.
85. Skiraj, 152.
86. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupeement de Fes*, novembre 1925 - juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 21 May 1926.
87. Skiraj, 152; Sanchez-Perez, 115.
88. Woolman, 206; Fleming, 349, quoting letter, Sanjurjo to Primo de Rivera, 2 June 1926; Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 401.
89. Fleming, 350.
90. Sanchez-Perez, 115.
91. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, (no file) Commandement Superieur des Troupes au Maroc, rapport du general Roichut sur les circonstances de la reddition d'Abd el Krim, Rabat, 9 June 1926.
92. *ibid*, and Harris, *France, Spain and the Rif*, 317-8. The chronology of the surrender is confused by various authors. Fleming, 349, says that bin ^cAbd al-Karim fled to Snada on 16 May, Woolman, 206, says that on 23 May he was "already" in Snada. Neither writer used the SHAT archives, which provide the French military report on the surrender, which is certainly the most accurate.
93. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 401, 421.
94. Great Britain, *Morocco*, II, 191.
95. Sanchez-Perez, 121-125. The flag is now in the Army Museum (Museo del Ejercito) in Madrid. The whereabouts of the papers is uncertain, but they may be in the Archives of the Moroccan Protectorate which are at present housed in the Archives of the Presidency of the Government in Alcala de Henares, outside Madrid. These archives are still not open for research, although it would be most interesting to examine them.
96. Sanchez-Perez, 128-133.

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97. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 401.
98. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupelement de Fes*, novembre 1925 - juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 21 May 1926.
99. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupelement de Fes*, novembre 1925 - juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 2 June 1926.
100. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupelement de Fes*, novembre 1925 - juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 8, 9, 10, 13 June 1926.
101. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupelement de Fes*, novembre 1925 - juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 28 June 1926; Intervencion de Larache, *Beni Aros*, 38-39.
102. SHAT Maroc Riff 8, *Groupelement de Fes*, novembre 1925 - juillet 1926, C.M.T. Fez, 29 June, 1926; *The Times*, 1 July 1926; Martinez de Campos, 335.
103. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 403; Martinez de Campos, 342-348, 352-356; Intervencion de Larache, *Beni Aros*, 39.

13. CONCLUSION

If the resistance continued after the surrender of bin ^CAbd al-Karim does that mean that the five years when he led the Rif were no more than a stage in the long history of resistance to the Spanish? Clearly not: the resistance of Akhriu and others was the very last gasp. The Rif War, to all intents and purposes, ended with the surrender. Perhaps, however, the Rif War itself marked the end of traditional resistance and Abdullah Laroui is right to assign mention of the Rif War to a single footnote in his History of the Maghreb. He places it in the context of the declining ability of the Sultan to lead jihad, thus throwing responsibility for resistance on local forces, and says that the Rif War was no more than a final fling of traditional, primary resistance to the French and Spanish. Laroui describes as "illusory" the tendency of historians to point to the gap of a single year between the end of the Rif War and the beginning of the urban nationalist movement in Morocco and from there to propose that they were in some way connected:

For if we extend our perspective to the Maghrib as a whole, the war in the Rif recedes into the past and takes its place beside numerous rural and mountaineer revolts (the Rif had been in a state of revolt against the Spaniards since 1860), whereas the political phenomena (i.e. in urban Morocco) relate to the overall nationalist movement in the Maghreb and the Orient. In reality, initial resistance and political nationalism are separated by far more than the lapse of a year's time¹.

This is a curious point of view: to use the word "revolt" implies that the Spanish had been the authority in Morocco since the 1860s. They had not, and this was resistance, not rebellion. The nationalist Laroui sees the Rif as an example of the most traditional political developments in Moroccan society. Albeit for different reasons, it is a view he shares with the French colonialist Robert Montagne. Montagne, the sociologist-in-chief to the French Protectorate, sees the Rif War in terms of the bilad al-siba theory: a single leader, Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi was able first to take over the leadership

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of his clan, then of his tribe, then of a Rifi confederation². "Under our eyes was forming, just as in the legendary time of the Almohades, a Berber confederation at the centre of a kingdom conquered by arms"³.

For Montagne, bin ^CAbd al-Karim, was a man who was able to use the unity "created by the Spanish incursions during the summer of 1921", and the overwhelming defeats of July and August - both of them "exceptional circumstances" - to "clear, at one leap, the first two hurdles in the race for political power: the takeover of a canton (i.e. clan) as well as a tribe"⁴. Relying on his own tribe and members of his own family, Montagne says, he succeeded in extending his control over a wide area. However, that reliance proved to be his undoing, for his power collapsed in a few days in 1926 once the Banu Waryaghal itself was attacked⁵. The theory nicely fits into the colonialist requirements of the French Protectorate, confining all opposition to the Berber areas and the bilad al-Siba, and both he and Laroui ignore the very profound political and social changes which were brought about between 1921 and 1926. Moreover, Montagne brings the focus onto bin ^CAbd al-Karim, as the one figure of importance in the war.

Certainly bin ^CAbd al-Karim was important, and the political and social changes were, to a very great extent, the result of his policies. He did more than just lead a movement to Europeans; he moulded it and gave it coherence and took it along new paths. Consequently his ideas, and actions have dominated both this and all other accounts.

The concentration on bin ^CAbd al-Karim can be taken too far, and turn into hagiography, as happens with Furneaux, or even more extravagantly into demonology as is the case with the Spaniard Clemente Cerdeira, writing in the heat of the war itself:

Only in the fantastic imagination of the Aulad al-Jattabi (sic) confused by Machiavellian adventurers, is there any belief in the mad idea of forming an independent nation, when its components have neither religion nor even a rudimentary culture and sunk in misery lacks even the basic necessities for the survival of its people . . . Ben Abdelkrim, clever and daring, well acquainted with the idiosyncrasies and mentality of his people, took advantage of our withdrawal of July 1921, and great opportunist that he is, was able to appeal to the primitive feelings of his brothers⁶.

It might be better to say that only in the fantastic invective of a Spanish propagandist could the disaster of 1921 be described as anything as innocuous as a withdrawal, for this is colourful propaganda. But it had its roots in the idea of Morocco which typified most European thought at the time: a society which could be taken over and led by a single individual acting solely out of self interest.

The danger with this approach to the Rif War is that it

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precludes analysis of what both bin ^CAbd al-Karim and his supporters were trying to do apart from fighting the Spanish. The categorisation is one of traditional primary resistance in contrast with the later "political phenomena". The distinction is one that is often used in describing movements of resistance to colonialism in North Africa, and elsewhere for that matter, and is based largely on the presence or absence in the movement concerned of an ideological content which makes reference to the various Islamic reform movements or to European-style nationalism. Thus Edmund Burke can write of the rising in the countryside around Fez in 1911, headed by Mawlay Zayn: "One looks in vain, for example, for evidence of the influence of reformism, pan-Islam or Islamic modernism on the movement"⁷. However, these are just the aspects of the Rif War which have been highlighted by other writers on the Rif War. For David Hart, the American anthropologist, he is preeminently a reformer⁸, a man who imposed the shar^C, broke the power of the sharif-s and tariqa-s and set up a strong centralised government with a regular army organised along European lines. The Israeli, Pessah Shinar, takes a similar position concentrating on the way in which his religious opinions influenced his action⁹.

There is always a tendency for wishful thinking in such an approach. ^CAllal al-Fasi, one of the founders of the Istiqlal party which dominated the struggle for independence, describes how bin ^CAbd al-Karim headed a "liberation movement . . . (which) had a democratic orientation and aimed at the improvement of the lot of the people"¹⁰. Furthermore, says al-Fasi, bin ^CAbd al-Karim did not intend to supplant the Sultan of Morocco. What was set up in the Rif was no more than a "temporary regime, in which an administration could be organised and the people trained to govern themselves and when the liberation of the country had been achieved, the liberated territory would be returned to the King"¹¹. This is, of course, a highly suspect series of assertions, because, while bin ^CAbd al-Karim certainly had very considerable popular support, he was certainly not a constitutional democrat. Al-Fasi's position is, at the very least, anachronistic, as his use of the term "King" for "Sultan" indicates¹².

Al-Fasi was an advocate of constitutional monarchy in Morocco. Another modern nationalist, the left winger Abderrahman Youssef, puts a different emphasis on the Rif War, emphasising not only its "democratic" content, but also its modernism, its rejection of old forms. It was not a rebellion (siba), nor was it an attempt to set up a Makhzan of the traditional type; it aimed to install "a modern state structure which at once rejected the errors of the Makhzan and the negativeness of the siba"¹³ by which he means that it was not simply a rejection of the Makhzan, but had its own ideology.

There are, therefore, two bodies of opinion. One, while it concentrates on different aspects, generally emphasises the

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"modernist" side of the war, the ideological attitudes of its leadership. The other portrays the Rif War as primary resistance. Both approaches seem only part of the truth. For, as this book has shown, both the actions of the Rifi leadership and their followers during the war were determined by the political realities of the society and the time; the policies which were adopted by bin ^CAbd al-Karim may be seen to have been simultaneously in line with the concepts of the Islamic reform movements and the most suitable policies which could be adopted at the time. In fact it is impossible to tease out the ideological content of those actions from the political circumstances which surrounded them and which necessitated their adoption. It is therefore illusory to make the absolute distinction between "primary" resistance and modern ideological nationalism and Islamic reformism. An illustration of this is bin ^CAbd al-Karim's own apologia, which is strictly modernist and nationalist in tone.

After the war was over, bin ^CAbd al-Karim gave an interview which was reprinted in the Egyptian journal Al-Manar which at the time was edited by Rashid Rida, a follower of Muhammad ^CAbduh, and a very prominent salafi thinker. The interview is an account of what bin ^CAbd al-Karim says were his objectives during the war and what he believed to have been the reasons for the failure¹⁴.

As an explanation the interview has serious flaws. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly an important document. In it bin ^CAbd al-Karim states what he says were the ultimate ends of the movement, which he identifies with his own intentions. These were to create a republic (jumhuriya) "with a resolute government, firm sovereignty and a strong national organisation"¹⁵, which was to be a modern "state" like France or Spain, but of course an Islamic one. In order to do this, he said, the Rifi tribes would have had to set aside their traditional independence from one another " . . . to form a national unity from tribes with different inclinations and aspirations. In other words, I wanted my people to know that they had a nation as well as a religion (la-hum watanan kama la-hum dinan)"¹⁶. Such a concept was essential, he said, if they were to survive the immediate Spanish attack, but he also considered this unity to be a permanent necessity, for he declared that he had no intention of allowing the tribes to revert to complete freedom once the war was over and won since that would have been a reversion to anarchy.

In attaining these objectives, he says, he was thwarted by two things. In the first place, he faced the reluctance of the "tribes" to cooperate in the formation of a permanent unity and, in the second, he was opposed by the "fanaticism" of the shaykh-s of the tariqa-s, and the sharif-s, who did not accept the idea of fighting for a watan, and told him that they would only fight in "the cause of faith". As a result, bin ^CAbd al-Karim says, all the sharif-s opposed him, with the exception of the Akhamlishin, whose head was "an old friend of my

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father's".

It is notable that bin ^CAbd al-Karim emphasised the internal factors on the defeat, rather than the external attack of two powerful modern armies. What he is saying is that if his policies had been carried out, had the shar^C been imposed correctly, then irrespective of the power of the Rif's enemies, the Rif would still have triumphed. It was an illusion which like his arguments were in line with the general thinking of the Salafiya. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's attack on the tariqa-s, that their shaykh-s "tinkered with the Book of God", echoes that of Rida, who dismissed them as making of their religion a "joke and a play-thing"¹⁷. His call for unity in a single watan reflected a long line of thinking in nineteenth and twentieth century Islam which stretched back to the Egyptian Rifa^C at al-Tahtawi's (1801-1873) idea of the duty of the citizens of a watan to self-sacrifice, submission to the law and unity¹⁸. However, it also reflected Rida's rejection of secular solidarity (asabiya) on the grounds that it perverted the shar^C¹⁹. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim rejects secular solidarity too, by under-mining tribal structures to form "a national unity from tribes with different inclinations and aspirations", and basing unity on Islam, which "ordains brotherhood and unity in the face of the enemy and encourages self-sacrifice (lit. "death") in the cause of freedom and independence"²⁰.

In fact, however, the Al-Manar interview contains a very significant contradiction. On the one hand, bin ^CAbd al-Karim says that what was needed was to "work with sincerity and loyalty to form a national unity from tribes with different inclinations and aspirations" and that the people needed time to "form themselves into a (state) with resolute government, firm sovereignty, and a strong national organisation" all of which implies that the identity of the tribes would be absorbed into that of the new watan. On the other hand, he says that the country was given the name of " 'Republic of the Rif' as a sign that we were a state composed of independent tribes in an alliance, and not a representative state with an elected parliament"²¹. That says the opposite: that the identity of tribes as separate units was maintained and that each was an acquiescent partner in the alliance.

The contradiction is a symptom of the reason why any entirely ideological explanation of the war is, in the end, unsatisfactory. The Al-Manar article steers clear of the practical political and military problems of the war. It makes no mention of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's most important supporters, gives no explanations of how he emerged as leader or why, does not explain the economic problems of the war, nor the crises with individual leaders. It does, however, raise the crucial ideological issue of the position of Islam within the new order. The difference between what is omitted from the Al-Manar article and what is included is the essence of the tension between the practicalities of power and the call of Islamic ideology which so characterised the war.

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This book has largely been concerned with the practicalities of the resistance to the Spanish and the French. However, any attempt to tease out those issues from the ideological consideration is fraught with enormous difficulties. Where did ideological conviction end, and political advantage begin?

Bin ^CAbd al-Karim says that he was opposed by the shaykh-s of the orders out of "fanaticism"²², that is for ideological reasons. It is clear that this is not the whole truth. Take, for example, prominent members of the Nasiriya tariqa. Sidi Muhammad al-Sadiq al-Akhamlish, an old friend of his father's, was an enthusiastic supporter of bin ^CAbd al-Karim. Yet, during the Ghumara revolt in May 1924, two of his nephews joined the Rifis and they were supported by the Bujdayni sharif-s, who headed the Nasiriya zawiya in the Banu Tuzin. Another Nasiri sharif, Sidi al-Tayyib al-Hadawi, raised the tribes in the area around Tangier in September 1924, having been encouraged to do so by the head of the tariqa. Another member of the Akhamlishin family, Sidi Hamidu of Snada, who was a member not of the Nasiriya but of the Wazzaniya, maintained what was effectively a neutral attitude during the war. Having supported bin ^CAbd al-Karim initially, he remained rather on the side-lines, certainly not opposed to bin ^CAbd al-Karim, but less enthusiastic than he might have been. Certainly the head of the Darqawiya tariqa, Sidi ^CAbd al-Rahman, was opposed to bin ^CAbd al-Karim, as was the sharif Mawlay Ahmad al-Raisuli, but in both cases what was at stake was not religious orthodoxy, but a social and political conservatism which depended on a highly conservative interpretation of Islam to preserve the economic and political interests of such as ^CAbd al-Rahman al-Darqawi and al-Raisuli. The control of the habus and the allegiance of their followers were threatened by the new political systems which evolved, or were created, in the Rif. Here too it will be seen how difficult it is to disentangle the ideological concerns of the sharif-s from the practical and economic questions which were at stake. The same, clearly, is true of bin ^CAbd al-Karim in his dealings with them; he may have had ideological disagreements with the tariqa-s, but he was quite prepared to coopt them if they were willing to be coopted entirely under his control.

Further evidence that the opposition was to a great extent founded on a conflict over power and resources is provided by the fact that not all bin ^CAbd al-Karim's opponents were sharif-s. ^CAmar bin Hamidu was not, nor was al-Hajj Bil-Qish. Nor, indeed, were many of their followers - although large numbers were certainly ordinary members of one tariqa or another. These followers were important, for without them there could have been no opposition, just as there could have been no support for bin ^CAbd al-Karim's new order. For the ordinary people in the tribes the question which lay at the heart of rebellion was a stark economic one. The old political systems which existed before the Rif War had been based on a balance

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of mutual antagonism; although peace was unstable, people were at least relatively untroubled by heavy taxation or the general vexations of government. In the new order, taxes were higher and paid more regularly, men were liable to recruitment into the haraka, the requisitioning of their labour and the confiscation of their animals. The war itself brought higher prices, scarcity, and generally disrupted the economy. Moreover, they were disarmed by bin ^CAbd al-Karim's administrators, which meant that they could no longer resist. The old political system, and the assumptions that underpinned it were as much under pressure as the economic interests of the ordinary people. It was small wonder that some of them did not lose the opportunity to revolt.

Yet the majority of Rifis remained loyal to bin ^CAbd al-Karim. The reasons are simple enough. Just as local leaders opposed him in order to preserve their local power and influence, so others, supported him for much the same reasons. Provided they did not rebel, and retained the support of the people of their clan and tribes, then bin ^CAbd al-Karim would confirm them in their positions. Bu Qaddur was a prominent, and highly successful example of this trend, his apparent obedience ensured that he survived the war with much of his local power intact. Moreover, men like Bu Qaddur not only had to secure themselves with bin ^CAbd al-Karim, but also with their own followers. There was, as we have seen, great support for the idea of resistance to the Spanish. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim did not create the resistance; that was something which predated him by years, if not centuries. What he did was to channel it and reorganise it, and as a result achieved a whole series of victories. Success, to a considerable extent, was its own reward. Yet bin ^CAbd al-Karim had another pillar on which to rest his authority: Islam.

From the beginning of the war, bin ^CAbd al-Karim made it clear that his aim was not simply to resist the Spanish, but also to impose the shar^C in full. That was the central point made by his bay'a in 1923. The imposition of the shar^C served a number of purposes at the same time. Not only did it fall in with the ideological perceptions of bin ^CAbd al-Karim, but it had specific political purposes.

In the first place, the imposition of the shar^C enabled a more stable unity to replace the shaky alliance backed by haqq fines. That that was essential was absolutely apparent from the chaos of the time before the Rif War. Secondly, it allowed the administration to centralise a great deal of power in its hands. Finally, it legitimised the new order. In a world which, in Islam, is divided into the Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and the Dar al-Harb (the Abode of War - that is, the countries not ruled by Islam) the Rif represented the former. Between 1921 and 1926 it did so on its own in North Africa. It alone was being governed Islamically; it alone was opposing the Christian imperialists. So the ideological need for the shar^C was mirrored by its political necessity.

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As a result, the rallying cry of the Rifis was Jihad . It could be no other, however much bin ^CAbd al-Karim may have tried to persuade the French officer, Gabrielli, that he had discarded Jihad as a medieval anachronism. Indeed, as he himself admitted in the Al-Manar article, "I do not deny that sometimes I was obliged to make use of religious sensibility in (an attempt) to win support".

Moreover, Islam, and the imposition of the shar^C had another role. Islam was not only a rallying cry for unity against an outside threat, but it was a pillar of internal unity as well. Islam had always played this role in the tribal areas of North Africa, transcending the local forms of community²³. The cohesion which it brought, and which changed the political structure of the Rif was summed up in the Al-Manar article as bin ^CAbd al-Karim explained "I wanted my people to know that they had a nation (watan) as well as a religion".

What, then, is meant by watan ? Was it a fatherland, a patrie , a state in the European sense? Up until now, the term "state" (except in quotations from other writers) has been carefully avoided in this book. However the problem of what was the political unit which emerged in the Rif cannot be avoided.

From the time before the Rif War, there would seem to have been some talk of an independent Rif, although in a rather vague form. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim, however, was quite sure about what he wanted when, on the eve of the war, he said that he was looking for a "country with a government and a flag". He later talked of a "Republic of the Rif". Government, "republic", flag, all these are the small change of the modern European state, like France or Spain which bin ^CAbd al-Karim explained in the Al-Manar article was what he wanted to see in the Rif. That that was his desire does not, of course, make the Rif such a state and the ordinary Rifis certainly did not recognise the concept: they referred to the government as the "Makhzan".

The concept of "Makhzan" is crucial. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim's administration did indeed preserve the outward form of the pre-colonial Moroccan Makhzan. It concerned itself with the old concerns of government: foreign affairs, finance, habus , war and so on (but not of education, and agriculture). Its policies were those of the old Makhzan: the imposition of the shar^C , the collection of taxes the reduction of the tribes to the level of administrative units. Its methods were those of the Makhzan too: those who disobeyed were punished in the traditional fashion. What was the difference between Bushta al-Baghdadi's expedition against the Buqquya in 1898 and bin ^CAbd al-Karim's punishment of the Akhmas in the winter of 1924 and 1925? Because it acted as a Makhzan it was recognised as such, and thereby the Makhzan in the Rif was legitimised by general acclamation. However, if the Rifis recognised a Makhzan, did that make ^CAbd al-Karim a sultan, and did his claim to be carrying out the functions of the caliphate include a direct

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challenge to the Sultan of Morocco? Was this separatism or localised jihad?

These are difficult questions to answer, once again because the ideological aims were always overshadowed by the conditions of war. The boundaries of the Rif were defined by fighting, by the area under bin ^CAbd al-Karim's control; they were de facto, certainly not de jure. Yet there was a sense in which a specifically Rifi identity did exist. There was a heartland, which formed its core: the mountains. Effectively those mountains marked the boundaries: the foothills in the east, and the south and the western edge of the Jibala in the west: the Rifis never held the plains. But there was more than just a physical boundary: there were limits determined by culture and indeed by colonialism itself. The Qal'ayis were excluded, at least partly because of a long standing distrust, a reputation for fickleness which, in Rifi eyes distinguished them from themselves. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim told people in the Gaznaya to release their European captive, John Arnall, and when they refused to obey informed them that "they were Rifi by language and must not go against these decisions". He told the Banu Mastara in 1923 that they belonged to the French zone, not with the Rif.

Yet the dominant theme in the ideology of the war was not one of a community of culture or area in the Rif but of jihad, of fighting the Christians, since that was why the state existed in the first place. How then could the Dar al-Islam be confined simply to the Rif? It ought to have been a movement which could expand and retake the whole of Morocco and begin the liberation of the whole Islamic world. That, after all was what Sheean's Matalsi qaid-s would have wanted.

"What if . . . ?" is not a very helpful approach. The Rifis did attack the French, but they did not raise the whole of Morocco behind them, and they did not take Fez. So the question of what might have happened if they had is largely irrelevant. However, for a brief time it seemed as though they might, and in those moments bin ^CAbd al-Karim sent his letter to the ulama in Fez asking for their adhesion to his cause. That was the extent of his attempt to replace the ^CAlawi makhzan and liberate all Morocco. In reality, the borders of the Rif were defined by practicalities, not ideology. The Rifis found that there were limits to their expansion.

Within those limits it is clear that basic state structures did exist. The government brought every element of society under its control, Islam and the centrally controlled shar^C bound the tribes together and allowed the government to impose its will. The resemblance to the pre-colonial Moroccan state and pre-colonial Muslim states elsewhere was therefore very close. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim adopted similar policies: a nizam army, a centralised administrative system - these were common objectives in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like any ruler bin ^CAbd al-Karim aimed at permanence; once the structures had been built he did not want them to collapse. It was this

concept of permanence which separated him from many of those whom he rules. His aim was not simply to defeat the Spanish but to guarantee Rifi independence, and to preserve the Islamic concepts of his rule. It was an objective which many of his fellow Rifis did not share. As he explained in the Al-Manar article:

Unfortunately I was understood by only a few individuals who could be counted on the fingers of both hands. On the contrary, even my most faithful supporters, and those of the greatest knowledge and intelligence believed that after the victory had been won I would allow each tribe to return to complete freedom despite their realisation that this would return the country to the worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism ²⁴.

The truth of that assertion is absolutely patent. From the period following the victories at Anwal he was faced with demands first from the Buquya, then from other tribes, for the right to protect their own frontiers without control from outside. It was even a formula that he used himself, in order to exclude certain tribes: the Qal'aya in 1921 and, by implication, the Banu Mastara in 1923. However, within the Rif itself, he could allow no such tendencies towards political fission. It was this refusal to allow breaks in the unity which distinguished the Rifi resistance to the Spanish from other localised attempts to resist European encroachment in the pre-colonial Maghrib.

Resistance in the Maghrib took two forms. It could either be centralised, led by a single leader, like that led by bin 'Abd al-Karim in the Rif, or at an earlier period by the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, or it could consist of the sort of localised resistance by tribes which existed in the Rif before 1921 or around Figuig in south eastern Morocco at the beginning of the century.

In the Figuig region there was a series of attempts to oppose the French by tribes which never reached any permanent unity. The first in 1881, led by 'Abu Amama, a sharif and head of a zawiya which he himself founded, collapsed in the face of the French response and the movement disintegrated. The three elements - nomads, pastoralists and the spiritual disciples of Abu 'Amama - which made it up had no common objective. Subsequent resistance was confined to raiding parties which attacked French positions and farms in Algeria, acting independently without any overall command. However, in 1900, after the French occupation of the oasis at Tuat, attempts were made to organise a local jihād. Makhzan pressure (for fear of French retaliation) and local discord prevented the haraka from being formed. Further French advances were not seriously resisted either; again, rivalry within and between tribes prevented any united action ²⁵.

The experience of the Figuig area points up the contrasts with the Rif. Its very disunity prevented it from being effective. As Ross Dunn says in his account of these events:

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Under conditions of extreme economic uncertainty, in which no lineage, class or faction could accumulate sufficient power to control the distribution of resources, competition for them stimulated a profusion of more or less temporary groupings of leaders and followers which coalesced to pursue specific short-run objectives²⁶.

The extent of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's success in uniting the Rifis in resistance may be seen from the fact that when the Spanish and French finally triumphed it was not because the new political system had disintegrated. It was military pressure far greater than the Rif could meet, coupled with economic ruin, which destroyed the Rifi state.

That, admittedly, was not how bin ^CAbd al-Karim saw it. In his disillusion bin ^CAbd al-Karim declared in the Al-Manar article, "... I came before my time to carry out this work, but I am convinced that my desires will all be realised sooner or later through the force of events and the reversals of time"²⁷. The "work" and "desires" were the reforms which he tried to put into effect, the failure of which, according to him, sabotaged the resistance. In fact, they were extremely successful in preserving his leadership and the unity of the Rif.

So what is to be made of his assertion that he "came before his time"? Was what he was doing in the Rif entirely new, or was he simply acting, as Montagne suggests, like any traditional Berber leader who wanted to seize a wider power? The question is naive. Bin ^CAbd al-Karim had no choice but to act within the political confines of the Rif. Therefore, in order to take power he had to use the political groupings and systems which were available to him: the support of members of his own family, though Montagne is incorrect to say that all the members of bin ^CAbd al-Karim's Makhzan were relatives of his²⁸. Furthermore, bin ^CAbd al-Karim did rely on the support of his own tribe: not only was it his first base, but it was also the most numerous and powerful tribe in the Rif. All these were practical necessities. What is quite certain, however, was that from the very beginning bin ^CAbd al-Karim had the intention of creating a very different system, one based not on the old traditions of Berber autonomism but on resistance to the Europeans. To this he added a mixture of salafi-inspired reform and technological progress. Perhaps the Rif was not yet ready for either - but that was never given the chance to be proved or disapproved, given the short life of the Rifi state. It was, however, the only way of effectively prosecuting the war.

Yet the attempt that was made in the Rif between 1921 and 1926 was a new phase in Moroccan history only in the sense that it was a successful attempt to carry out policies which had been tried before, but which had failed. Successive sultans had tried to reform the shar^C, create a regular and trained army, and to increase the authority of the centre in order to resist European pressure, but also for religious reasons - attempts to

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enforce the shar^C after all, long predate European intervention. In the Rif, these objectives were achieved. Bin^C Abd al-Karim had an aim larger than that of many, perhaps most, of his followers who simply wanted independence. Nevertheless, both he and they came nearer to achieving their desires than the inhabitants of any part of Morocco, or any Moroccan leader, had done since the European threat to the country began in the middle of the previous century. They failed in the end, for the forces of two modern European states were ranged against them. But the five years in which the Rif survived showed how much further they had advanced down the path of organisation and unity than all the previous efforts that had been made. Certainly, that organisation and unity was opposed by many, as was the control that went with it. Yet, at the heart of the resistance was an alliance between the traditional forms of jihad and the doctrines of the salafiya. No movement of rural resistance this; the Rif War was no less than an attempt to put into effect the ideas of Islamic unity, to give practical shape to the plans for reform of four generations of Moroccan sultans and Maghribi leaders. In fact, the Rif War raises important questions about the practicalities of Islamic resistance to colonialism, which threw considerable light on the theories of the reform movement as a whole. If the policies represent both the policies of Islamic reform, and the most practical system of resistance to European imperialism, and yet they still failed, it seems that bin^C Abd al-Karim was right to say that he "came before his time".

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6. Cerdeira, 72-73. The remarks here are Cerdeira's own.
7. Burke, "Rural Resistance and Popular Protest", 205.
8. Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, 369-403 Chapter 15, is titled "The Reformer and the War on Two Fronts".
9. Shinar, *passim*.
10. Al-Fasi, 121.
11. *ibid*, 121.
12. The title "King of Morocco" was adopted by Muhammad V on independence.
13. Youssoufi, *Colloque*, 81.
14. *Al-Manar* interview. The whole document is reproduced in Appendix 7.
15. *ibid*.
16. *ibid*.
17. Hourani, 225.
18. Hourani, 78.
19. Hourani, 299.
20. *Al-Manar* article.
21. *ibid*.
22. *ibid*.
23. See von Sivers "Alms and Arms", for an account of how

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the zawiyas contributed to this.

24. *Al-Manar* article.

25. This passage is derived from Dunn, *Resistance*, 141 ff.

26. *ibid.*, 265.

27. *Al-Manar* article.

28. Montagne, *Berbers*, 80.

APPENDIX 1

Population and density of three Jibalan tribes and five central Rifi tribes

Jibala

Tribe	<u>Donoso-Cortes</u> estimate 1913	<u>Intervencion</u> figure 1928	<u>Instructores</u> figure c. 1936
B. Aros	10,000 (19.12/km ²)	9,468 (18.3/km ²)	12,134 (23.2/km ²)
B. Issef	5,000 (20.04/km ²)	5,077 (20.34/km ²)	5,494 (22.02/km ²)
B. Sikar	--	2,305 (32.69/km ²)	2,296 (32.56/km ²)

Central Rif

Tribe	<u>Donoso-Cortes</u> estimate 1913	<u>1929 census</u> (Hart)	<u>Instructores</u> figure c. 1936
B. Waryaghal	45,000 (42.8/km ²)	37,537 (35.7/km ²)	45,163 (43.0/km ²)
B. Tuzin	30,000 (49.1/km ²)	21,204 (34.76/km ²)	21,204 (34.76/km ²)
Timsaman	24,000 (63.8/km ²)	24,729 (65.76/km ²)	24,729 (65.76/km ²)
Buqquya	25,000 --	7,079 (31.01/km ²)	12,763 (55.9/km ²)
B. 'Amart	10,000 (25.00/km ²)	7,885 (19.7/km ²)	7,908 (19.8/km ²)

Sources: Donoso-Cortes, *passim*; Hart, *Aith Waryaghar*, España, Ministerio de la Guerra, *passim*.

APPENDIX 2

WALL POSTERS IN TETUAN, JULY AND AUGUST 1921

(1) On the wall of the Great Mosque

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful: God has purchased of the believers their persons and their goods. For theirs, in return, is the Garden of Paradise. They fight in his cause, slay and are slain, as a promise binding on Him in truth, made in the Turah, the Gospel and the Qura'an. 'And who is more faithful in his promise than God'.¹

Oh Muslims, the Spanish have drowned us in every calamity. They have soiled our honour, killed our children, possessed themselves of our goods, ruined our religion. They have committed every evil which would have frightened you if you could see them. You would have lost your joy in the best things, you would no longer wear silken garments, you would no longer be able to live well. Could you have been happy in the face of this shame, oh our brothers? No, by God, death is preferable.

If you could see your brothers on the fields of battle, some dead, some wounded, you would cry tears of blood, you would not hesitate to come to their aid. We see the Spanish help one another, and they are infidels and unjust people, but we see no one come to our aid, who have the true faith. Do we not make war in the cause of God? Is not our conduct in conformity with the precepts of Islam? Are not our dignity and your dignity one, as our shame and your shame are one? Where are your Culema? Oh, Culema are you not the descendents of the prophets? What are you thinking of? Is there any doubt about God?²

How will you excuse yourself tomorrow in front of God, if you are among those who through fear neglect war in the cause of God? The ignorant have no responsibility. Return oh Culema to the ranks of the Muslims, do what you wish to do. Leave to one side what is forbidden, and victory is ours.

Are there any who wish to win Paradise by their personal cooperation? Are there any who wish to gain it by the gift of their goods? Are there any men of knowledge who would gain it by their exhortations? This world is perishable. It will not last for anyone, but what a difference there is between those who die bathed in blood, and those who die in their bed. Reply:

Put yourself in the shelter of death if you are true. Do not believe that those who have died fighting in God's cause are dead: they live close to God and are fed by him. Full of joy

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for the benefits that God has heaped upon them, they rejoice that those who follow in their tracks, who have not yet reached them, will be sheltered against terrors and agonies.

If it is difficult for you to come to our aid, oh Muslims, address yourselves to the leader of the faithful, our lord Yussif, that he should give you the provisions necessary to accomplish our task. Let him apply the laws that he wills, through the intermediary of any country that he wills, except Spain, and let him pray to God for his subjects. Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessing.

15 Qa'da al-Haram, 1339 (i.e. 21 July 1921).

The Muslim Muhammad assembly of the Rif.

(in the margin) Whoever suppresses this letter or prevents its circulation, let God curse him and may he not die a Muslim.

(2) A letter affixed to the outer wall of the Darqawiya zawiya in the Dar al-Burud quarter of Tetuan

Praise be to God.

I look to God for a shelter against Satan the stoned, in the name of God the compassionate the merciful. Truth has come, falsehood had disappeared. Indeed falsehood is bound to disappear. Praise be to God, Lord of the universe. Glory is in God, victory is near, tell the believers.

Oh believers, be patient, have recourse to patience and unite with each other against the enemy. Fear God, perhaps you will be successful. Unite yourselves through the link of faith and do not separate. The Prophet has said 'Divine aid is with those who are united'. He also says 'He who fights in God's cause is the same as he who fasts and prays continually, until the day when he returns home'.

Oh Muslims what is wrong with you? You do nothing except eat and drink and your brother Muslims fight in the cause of the king of kings. The pleasures of this life are nothing compared with those of the next world. Is not your religion the same for everyone? Is not our country of Morocco a single country? Where is your care for your religion and your country? Do they not suffer as much as we, while we have hopes that they have not? Where are your wise men? Friday preachers, incite your brothers with your brilliant quotations from the hadiths. Rich men, aid your brother mujahids with your wealth. This is the moment to give, oh you who make no difference between charity and egoism. Oh you who are the torches of the Darqawa, where are your words of action, that you propagate

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to be shining and powerful?

You, who are full of illusions, do you believe that the two nations, France and Spain have come to Morocco to restore it? On the contrary, they have come only to ruin it and to scatter its leaders. So have you not learned from history, what Spain did in Andalusia? Did they not massacre the children who were at their mothers' breasts. Did they not disembowel the women? You forget that Andalusia was a country of criminals. What has become of the mosques of Cordoba and the knowledge that was taught there? What has become of the schools of Seville and their teachers. What has become of the books of the Muslims? The mihrabs have become places dedicated to the worship of idols, and the schools centres for the education of infidels.

Look at Algeria and Tunisia. Where are the ^Culema and the shaykhs? Where are the rich men of these countries and their fortunes? The call of the faithful to prayer is no longer heard from the minarets, women and girls are no longer respected.

Awake from your indolence, oh Muslims. The hour is coming the moon is divided in two. The half moon of Islam has risen and shines. Stop the rush of the two nations who move against us in our country, and who wish to scatter our people and to destroy our religion. They have forgotten what happened to the Portuguese nation, which conquered Morocco and believed that there was no more opposition. Do they not have enough territory in their own lands? They do not follow the example of the great powers, England, Germany and America who have had important commercial relations with us for years which have been very profitable. They have never shown any desire to interfere with our religion. After taking the precaution of asking for advice and listening to it carefully, they remained at home and kept only commercial links. Peace is good and treachery is evil. Oh believers, obey the words of God who helps those who rely on Him.

Oh believers fight against those infidels who make you perish. They will find in you a harsh resistance. Know that God is with the pious.³

We have made enquiries, which a large amount of information has confirmed, and we have found that since the war there has remained only one notable for twenty Muslims because of the misfortunes that befell them since your country was invaded. The witness of the eyes is preferable to verbal declarations. Call on God for help. He will help you and make firm your path. Demand, each of you, justice and patience. Do not be frightened of cannons, for these things will fall into your hands. Look what we have done in a single morning. We have taken

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cannons, shells, cartridges and large amounts of money. The booty is still mounting up, and men embrace the religion in crowds. The armed men are without number, they come from every side so that we do not know where they came from. Join the struggle, oh Muslims. The wise men of the great powers are happy about this great victory. Pray to God to help us, for the prayer of Muslims is answered. Praise be to God, the Lord of the universe.

Done on 28 Qa'da in the year of the stupendous war and the victorious miracle.

This notice is one of several which will be distributed in the east and the west. May God destroy the parents and the - - - (sic) of he who destroys this call, may He make his death painful, and dedicated to disgrace. I have charged people that you know not to watch that no one touches this letter. God, may he be praised, gives us aid as he helped the prophet Soloman. May blessings be upon him and on our Prophet.

Source: FO 371/7067/W8710/184/28, White to Curzon, Tangier, 6 Aug. 1921, Confidential. 28 Qa'da is 3 Aug. 1921.

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1. Qur'an sura IX, v. III.
2. Ibid., sura XIV, v. 10.
3. Qur'an sura IX, v. 123.

APPENDIX 3

The Bay^Ca of Muhammad bin ^CAbd al-Karim (I)

Praise be to God alone. May God's blessing be upon our Lord Muhammad, his family and companions. Praise be to God who has set up the Caliphate to unite the religion and the world, who has raised its power above all other, so that it is of the highest rank, who has raised its sun above all things, illuminating all things with its light. He has made a friendship between the hearts of his servants, between those who are close to each other and those separated by a great distance. He has made the Caliphate a rampart against (the spilling of) blood, (protecting men's) fortunes and (safeguarding) against the accidents of fate. With the Caliphate He has bound the hands of tyrants, so that they may not achieve that evil which they intend. Through the Caliphate He has brought about morality and righteousness. Laws and limits and principles have been established. He has raised the minaret of the Caliphate as a banner by which (men) may be guided, calling them to the truth. In its long shadow both the powerful and the weak, the lowly and the high-born, seek refuge.

Praise be to Him who decides, and guides mankind. Man does not ask (for sustenance) in vain. But He has ordered (man) to do some things and has forbidden him others. He has warned mankind against following his desires and He has set upon him the performance of religious duties and good works. He is the most wise of the wise.

If it were not for some men who fought others, so that the world was degraded . . . (text unclear) But God is possessed of mercy towards the inhabitants of the world, and through his mercy, kings (al-muluk) have been set up, and He has shown roads along which men may travel and a conduct which they must follow. Otherwise man would sink into anarchy, some would devour others and the people of order would fall into factionalism and anarchy. If it were not for the Caliphate the roads would not be safe for us, the strong would prey upon the weak. . . . (illegible)

Praise be to God for him who was sent as a sign of God's complete mercy, the origin and foundation of all things, the height and greatest extent of perfection, the most holy of the saints, the leader of the pure, and for the family of him who has universal glory and the greatest power (i.e. the Prophet) and his Righteous Companions and the rightly-guided leaders, who set up the principles of the faith and arranged its foundations for those who would build upon it. They told what he (i.e. Muhammad) had done basing (the hadiths) on his authority, God's mercy and peace be upon him. He said: 'God has confer-

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red this distinction upon a Qurashi, and God has settled on him, and God has bestowed his power on the man he wishes from amongst us'.

(The Prophet) said: 'A man who dies and has not made a bay'a, has died in ignorance'.

According to the Sahih of Muslim, he said, God's mercy and peace be upon him:

'He who wishes to break up the nature of this community, when it is one, cut off his head with a sword, whoever he may be'.

According to the Sahih of Muslim, he said, God's mercy and peace be upon him:

'If a man comes to you, when you are all agreed on one man (as amir) and he tries to break up your community, kill him'.

In the Sahih of al-Bukhari it is said, on the authority of bin 'Abbas - may God be pleased with him - that the Prophet of God, God's mercy and peace be upon him, said:

'If a man dislikes anything that his amir does, let him bear it in patience, for he who removes himself from the authority (of the Sultan) by even an inch will die the death of an ignorant man'.

Also in (the Sahih of al-Bukhari) it is reported on the authority of Abu Hurayra, may God be pleased with him, that the Prophet of God, God's mercy and peace be upon him, said: 'He who obeys me, obeys God, and he who disobeys me, disobeys God, and he who obeys my amir, obeys me, and he who disobeys my amir, disobeys me'.

The Commander of the Faithful, 'Umar bin al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, said to bin 'Ugba: 'Perhaps after today you will see (lit., Meet) me no more. You must be strong in faith in God, may He be exalted, and listen to and obey the amir, be he a slave or Abyssinian'.

The (first) community (of Islam) swore together that a single imam should be appointed over the Muslims, for it is one of the precepts of suitability in the eyes of God . . . (illegible) just as the organisation of the Caliphate is an obligation pointed out by the texts of the hadiths and the verses (of the Qur'an).

The poet said: 'It is not good that the people should live in anarchy with no authority over them, and there is no authority if the ignorant among them have control'.

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Thus the tribes of the Rif and the tribes of the Jibala, before the (events of the past) two years, lived in (a state of) extreme ferocity and disgrace, in great ignorance and tyranny and obduracy, and lived far apart from the rules of law (shari'a), and crime grew among the believers to such an extent that resistance to him who held authority in the country became general, and they continued (to live) in factionalism, to kill and to rob people's goods. At the same time they had (to face) what the enemy (i.e. the Spanish) brought in the way of sedition and terror so that they had no place of refuge or even of habitation, except what they could bring about through great cooperation. And, when all this exhausted them and they knew no remedy, they sought someone who would take over their leadership, (a man) commissioned by them, and they came together to consider, and they entrusted their business, in its importance, both in heaven and on earth, to Him who is most praiseworthy in His deeds in all the length and breadth of the earth. A man responded to their wishes and took over their affairs and he ordered them first of all to follow the law (shari'a) of the Prophet through which every expectation is achieved, after he had made them swear on the Holy Book (al-mashaf) to keep their covenants and promises. He set up over them
. . . (illegible) and then he organised them and he taught them the methods of war and defence of the fatherland (watan) and the way to attack the servants of the cross and (worshippers) of idols (i.e. the Christian Spanish). They seized the opportunity of attacking their enemy at once. At once they came on him, victorious, caring nothing for the strange (methods? . . . illegible) which the Spaniards brought against them, neither were they stopped by their unfamiliar fortifications. And they went at once and became united . . . Praise be to Him who has destroyed them (i.e. The Spanish) for in His power he has every matter always (text very unclear here). By following this their amir, may God help him, they found happiness and by following his excellent orders they started (on the road) towards complete victory, and they achieved their ultimate (ends) in organising their country. And this is known both far and near, and no human being would deny it. The man who scorns (this achievement) is scorning the light of day: for how could anything (be said to) be right in men's minds if the light of day is in need of proof?

Then, when they had gained security, both for themselves and their possessions, they multiplied and progressed, (they rejoiced) in great peace and success and well-being in accordance with their dearest wishes, and so the disruption caused by murder and robbery and the other kinds of misfortune to which they had been accustomed in the past dwindled and faded. All the fires of revolt were put out and God dispelled their worries and spread out his mercy and removed their griefs, and their hearts became resolute where they had been miserable, and their

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faces smiling where they had been melancholy. And the evil and violence that came between them vanished and the standards of peace and well-being (came close). God directed the armies of the Muslims to pleasing actions and inspired them to what is for the good of the world, and the faith and the soul, and the citizens.

Opinions concurred and the community joined together to proclaim him who has risen on the horizon of happiness whose full moon has appeared and risen in the heaven of knowledge. The man (in whose hands) the reins of the Imamate are joined, and the . . . to him have come the benefits of the Imamate (text unclear). He is a man to whom the Caliphate came dragging its robe behind it, and he took it without wasting time. (The Caliphate) was appropriate only for him, and he was appropriate only for it. (He is a man) whom the hearts of all creatures were created to love, who has found a welcome throughout Islam because of his glory and great importance, the commander of the fighters for the faith. He is the man who puts his trust in God, the one singled out (for this task). Our Lord Muhammad, son of our learned and distinguished Lord 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi al-Waryaghli al-Rifi. They have proclaimed him, may God fortify him and make him victorious, in accordance with the Qur'an of God and the sunna of His Prophet (to) install justice which is the aim of all desires. A Proclamation (bay'a), a duty in which (all men's) hearts and tongues are bound, towards which all men's feet and heads strive, obediently and humbly, (promising) never to set aside their obedience towards him and never to deviate from the road of the community, by which we pledge allegiance to our Lord the Prophet of God, God's mercy and peace be upon him, and the rightly-guided caliphs after him and the rightly-guided imams. They will keep their promise to hear and obey his commands. Their eyes have seen it, and they have borne witness to it through the purity both of their secret desires and their public actions, and they have given their hands (as a seal to the promise) upon it, and they have signed their names to it, owing it (i.e. the Caliphate) their allegiance both in private and in public, in what is encouraging and what is hateful, in what is easy and what is difficult. They have borne witness to themselves aware of their secret thoughts and cognisant of all that is hidden, saying:

We have given you our bay'a, and we have invested you with authority so that you may direct us with justice and kindness and in sincerity and that you should judge between us in truth just as God, may He be exalted, said to his Prophet: (illegible)

'Indeed we have created a Caliphate on earth, so judge between men with justice'.

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He also said, may He be exalted, and His words are true: 'He who carries out what God has promised, him we shall reward greatly'.

He also said, may He be exalted: 'Be not used as an advocate by those who betray their trust'.

On this are agreed those who (bind) and loose, those who can speak on matters great and small, those who are characterised by knowledge and judgement, those who are allowed to reject and contract (lit. sign). There was no argument between them (when they met) before any mosque, not from scribe nor legal expert (lit. possessors of the fatwa) who are asked and who reply, neither from those who persevere in their views - be they right or wrong - nor among those who are known for (their) religion and probity, no horsemen of war nor fighter, nor from men of responsibility in (affairs) or government, nor the a'yan, the noble sharifs, nor the important faqihs, nor from those of lesser power and position.

Those who were present witnessed this themselves in obedience. God be exalted, they did their duty by the law. God has made (the Caliphate) a mercy for creation, and through it He has set up on the earth justice and truth. He helps the man who meets (the Caliphate) with a welcome, with His aid and assistance, and with the success (He grants) and His guidance. Man is given life through the sunna, our Lord and Master, the Prophet, God's mercy, peace, glory and kindness be upon him.

Let our country be happy since its fetters have been cut away, let it (be given to) the man who undertakes its protection, who spares its blood, who suppresses its enemies, who defends it from destruction, makes the law triumphant, and who undertakes to build it.

May God make him triumphant, make him victorious. May he destroy heresies and errors through (this man), and the party of oppression and unbelief and depravity. May he make the Caliphate stay in this man's family until the day of resurrection.

Indeed, Oh our master, you are able to do this. You are indeed the Lord, the one who gives victory.

There is no power, no strength, except through God the high, the great. May the blessing and complete peace of God be on our Lord Muhammad, his family and companions.

Finally we call out to praise God, Lord of the worlds.

On the day of the full moon 14 Jumada II 1341.

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(1) MAEF, Maroc 517, p. 180. Proclamation of Muhammad Bin 'Abd al-Karim, dated 14 Jumada II 1341/2 Feb. 1923.

APPENDIX 4

Pay of officers and men in the Rifi regular army
according to various sources, in pesetas per month

	Hart	al-Bu ^c Ayyashi	Skiraj
Soldier	60	60	75
Qa'id 12	65	--	90
Qa'id 25	70	75	100
Qa'id 50	80	80	125
Qa'id 100	100	100	200
Qa'id 250	--	--	--
Qa'id <u>tabur</u>	125	150	300
Qa'id 1,000	--	--	500

APPENDIX 5

(I) Rifi Army Regulations

Praise be to God alone.

God bless our Lord Mohammed and his family.

Note of the military regulations 6 Safar 1344 (26 August 1925).

- I. All officers must obey each other according to rank.
- II. All orders must be obeyed without question.
- III. There can be no change or alteration in the position of a caid once he has been appointed, and no one may have rank reduced without the authorisation of the Emir.
- IV. Each caid must know by heart the names of all his soldiers, and keep on him at all times a list of their names on which he will write the day on which each one leaves his command either through death, absence or for any other reason.
- V. Each officer must know the number of guns and cartridges held by his soldiers.
- VI. The caids in the front line must make an inspection with the officer of the post, and must make the latter responsible for everything concerned with arms and cartridges.
- VII. Immediately they arrive at a position, the caids must have trenches dug, build air-raid shelters (see photograph IX : 3) and remove all rubbish.
- VIII. No one in any position may flee from the enemy if he attacks. Anyone who does so will be punished.
- IX. No one may leave his post at the end of his tour of duty, before his relief arrives. If he does, he will be punished.
- X. The fine for being late on arrival at a post will be half a rial a day, payable when the latecomer does arrive. The money so collected will be equally divided among those who were on time.
- XI. Anyone who interrupts his time in the haraka is equally liable to a fine of half a rial a day. The product of these fines will be divided among the caids who remain on duty. The Pasha or his Khalifa, will receive one third and the other two thirds will be given to the caid 100 and his subordinates.

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XII. No caid shall give leave to any of his men in exchange for money. If he does he will be liable to a prison sentence, according to his rank. This penalty will be applied to a caid 25, or a caid 50, or a caid 100.

XIII. Anyone who wishes to impose a fine be it great or small, must first consult the Minister of War - who will refer it to our Lord--God give him victory.

XIV. All those who carry an arm must take care that it is not damaged. He who through negligence breaks it or exchanges it etc, must repay the value. The same applies to a man who sells his arm, and he will be put in prison until he has repaid the value.

XV. The caid 100, as all the other caids must fight along with his own men and not mix them with those of another officer.

Peace.

Approved by the Minister of War the Caid Ahmed ben Draa(sic)
God protect him.

(1) SHAT, Maroc E24, Propagande Riffaine enclosed in letter
Ministre Plenipotentiaire Résident Général du Maroc to Ministre
de Guerre, Rabat, 10 Apr. 1926.

APPENDIX 6

Numbers of individuals imprisoned (I)

<u>Crime</u>	<u>26 Dec.</u> <u>1923</u>	<u>17 Feb.</u> <u>1924</u>	<u>2 May</u> <u>1924</u>	<u>5 May</u> <u>1924</u>
<u>Military offences</u>				
1. Refused service under <u>qa'id</u> /absent from <u>harka</u>	3	3	4	2
2. Captured in battle	1	5	6	4
3. Arrested by army	1	1	1	1
<u>Civil and religious offences</u>				
4. Arrested by <u>qa'ids</u> etc.	3	3	-	-
5. <u>hannash</u> (i.e., general bad conduct)	3	-	10	6
<u>Criminal offences</u>				
6. Murder/suspicion of	5	10	16	17
7. Fighting/assault	8	5	-	-
<u>Wartime offences</u>				
8. Suspicion of spying	11	14	23	20
9. Visiting Spanish zone	4	5	6	-
10. Living in Spanish zone/ former Spanish employee	5	9	10	10
11. Suspected sabotage	-	2	2	2
12. Hostage	-	2	2	2
13. Captured members of 'Amar bin Hamidu's party	-	18	46	46
14. Unclear	30	11	4	3
15. Other	22	14	16	16
TOTAL	96	102	146	129

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- (1) MAEF, Maroc 519, pp. 138-139, 143-144, 146-147. The term hannash is derived from the term for a snake charmer and was used in the ganuns of the period before the Rif War to mean "evil doers", Hart, Emilio Blanco II, p. 289.

APPENDIX 7

The Al-Manar interview (I)

"An interview with Muhammad 'Abd al-Karim (sic).

I wanted to make the Rif an independent country like France and Spain, and to set up there a free state with full sovereignty and not an Amirate, subject to the regulations and ordinances of the Protectorate. From the first I tried to make my people understand that they could not survive unless they were as closely joined together as are the bricks of a building, and unless they worked with sincerity and loyalty to form a national unity from tribes with different inclinations and aspirations. In other words I wanted my people to know that they had a nation (watan) as well as a religion (din).

I have been greatly criticised by some people because, in the Oujda negotiations I asked with some insistence for a definition of the meaning of independence; this definition was very necessary, because our aim was real independence, unmarked by any blemish. By independence we meant that which would guarantee our complete freedom to determine our development and the independent direction of our affairs, the right to make treaties and to form alliances that we considered to be suitable. I and my brother gave our country the name of the 'Republic of the Rif' (al-Jumhuriya al-Riffiya) as a sign that we were a state composed of independent tribes in an alliance, and not a representative state with an elected parliament. In fact, in our opinion, the title of 'Republic' (jumhuriya) could not take on its true meaning for some time, because all peoples need a period in which they can form themselves into (a state) with a resolute government, firm sovereignty, and a strong national organisation.

But unfortunately I was understood by only a few individuals who could be counted on the fingers of both hands. On the contrary, even my most faithful supporters, and those of the greatest knowledge and intelligence believed that after the victory had been won I would allow each tribe to return to complete freedom despite their realisation that this would return the country to the worst conditions of anarchy and barbarism.

Religious fanaticism was the greatest cause of my failure even if I do not say that it was the only cause. This is because the shaykhs of the orders have greater influence in the Rif than in Morocco as a whole or in the rest of the countries of the Islamic world. I was incapable of acting without them and was obliged to ask their aid at every turn. At first I tried to win over the masses to my point of view by argument and demonstration, but I met with great opposition from the great families

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with powerful influence - with the exception of the family of 'Khamlasha' (sic) whose head was an old friend of my father's. The rest were all my enemies, especially after I spent money from the awqaf to buy supplies for the war. They did not understand that this money could not be spent on a more worthy object than that of the independence of the country.

I do not deny that sometimes I was obliged to make use of religious sensibility in (an attempt) to win political support. Thus, I said that after the Spanish had occupied Ajdir they compelled the evacuation of a part of the village in which there was a mosque, which they did not respect and they made into a stable. When I heard this I ordered three of the qa'ids who were famous for their piety and their bravery to verify the matter for themselves. This tactic of mine doubled the bravery of the fighters, and increased their devotion to myself and my cause.

The truth is that Islam is the enemy of fanaticism and superstitions (khurafat). What I know of its fundamentals is enough to make me declare publicly that Islam as I know it in Morocco and Algeria is very far removed from the Islam brought by the great Prophet.

Those who truly or falsely claimed that they were descendants of that pure stock (i.e. that of the Prophet) turned their whole attention to gaining the sympathy of the people for their transitory selves, and set themselves up as idols to be served by the ignorant, and established religious brotherhoods which were transformed into a powerful army to serve their personal ends. But Islam is as far removed as may be from sanctifying individuals because it ordains brotherhood and unity in the face of the enemy and encourages self-sacrifice (lit. 'death') in the case of freedom and independence. However, the shaykhs of the orders and the leaders of religion tinkered with the Book of God and the sunna of His Prophet in order to satisfy their own longings and to gratify their greed. They took no part in the revolution under the pretext that fighting for the fatherland (watan) had no meaning for them and that they would only fight in the cause of the Faith.

I exerted myself to the utmost to free my land from the influence of the shaykhs of the orders who are an obstacle in the way of any sort of freedom and independence. The policy of Turkey pleased me greatly because I knew that the Islamic countries could not be independent unless they freed themselves from religious fanaticism and emulated the people of Europe. But the Rifis did not understand me - which was my misfortune as well as theirs. Thus the shaykhs shook with anger at me when I appeared one day in the uniform of an officer, although I did not do such a thing again.

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The shaykhs of the orders were the bitterest enemies both of myself and my country as it advanced. They omitted nothing in their efforts to frustrate my policy, even spreading through the length and breadth of the land that I wanted to follow the example of Turkey, and that that would inevitably lead to giving freedom to women so that they could go around in (European) hats (al-burnita), dressed like French women and aping their customs and so on.

The machinations of these ignorant fanatics convinced me that progress is impossible in any country where they have a strong influence unless it is brought about slowly and through the use of force and violence.

I must declare here and now that I did not find in the Rif the least support for my efforts at reform and that (only) a small group of people in Fez and Algiers understood me, helped me and agreed with my policy because they are in touch with foreigners and know where lies the true good of my country.

In short I came before my time to carry out this work, but I am convinced that my desires will all be realised sooner or later through the force of events and the reversals of time".

(1) Anonymous article "Jahl zu'ama' al-Muslimin wa-mafasid ahl al-turuq wal-shurafa' wa kawnuhum sababan li-fashl za'im al-Rif al-Maghribi" in Al-Manar, pt. 8, Vol. 27, 1344-5/1926-27, pp. 630-634. The text of the article appeared in the Egyptian weekly al-Shura, according to Al-Manar, Shinar, 173, says that it was also reprinted in Al-Minhaj, Muharram/Safar, pp. 96 ff. Shinar's article reproduces about two thirds of the article in translation, but omits the important opening paragraphs which were not completely relevant to his examination of the religious thought of bin 'Abd al-Karim.

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